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  I 
Abstract 
This thesis is an investigation into cultural variations in experiences of depression. 
With the aid of empirical data, and with a phenomenological outlook, the arguments 
presented in this work aim to give a comparative account of the significance of culture 
in shaping cross-cultural variations, as seen in Iran and the UK. Despite the existence 
of a large body of literature on cross-cultural variations in depression, a close 
examination of the ways in which culture shapes these variations has been mostly 
lacking. In this work, viewing experiences of depression as necessarily situated and 
embedded within a phenomenologically significant sociocultural context, I offer a way 
of understanding these dynamics and mechanisms. I situate different aspects of the 
experiences and narratives of depression, as seen in Iran, within the broader 
sociocultural context and the dominant discourse around depression. As such, I show 
the way in which these different elements form a network of meaning-making, 
understanding, and interpretation, that can be seen to underlie some of the variations 
in expressions and experiences of depression, as seen in Iran and the UK. I examine 
different elements in experience of depression and symptom reports, including 
somatic symptoms, metaphors in narratives, emotional difficulties, and disturbances 
to one’s normal way of being in the world, against the backdrop of culture within 
which these experiences and expressions find meaning. I therefore offer a way of 
understanding experiences as inherently bound with culture and cultural narratives. 
This positioning of culture at the centre of the investigation of experiences of 
depression, I argue, has important consequences for psychiatric thought and practice, 
as well as for phenomenological investigations, both of which have tended to offer 
presumptively universal criteria and accounts, without paying sufficient attention to 
cultural differences.     
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1. Introduction 
The present study is an investigation into cross-cultural variations in experiences of 
depression and the mechanisms by which culture shapes the experiences of illness. 
Based on empirical data, the phenomenological analysis presented throughout this 
work views individuals and their experiences of depression as embedded within a 
sociocultural context, which gives a framework for understanding, interpreting, and 
articulating their experiences.  
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), developed by the 
American Psychiatric Association, has been in use globally by psychiatrists and mental 
health practitioners, as a tool for diagnosing mental disorders, including depression. 
The importance of the DSM lies in part in its universalist approach to defining and 
identifying mental disorders, which enables its wide use in different cultures across 
the world. Within this approach mental disorders and their symptoms are largely 
conceptualised independently of culture, such that they are manifested in more or less 
the same way regardless of the cultural context in which they are seen. This thinking 
guides the assumption that the same set of diagnostic criteria can be employed to 
diagnose a mental illness around the world. However, various studies have shown that 
there are indeed variations in the way mental disorders are conceptualised and 
manifested in different cultures, with important consequences for the diagnostic and 
treatment approaches. The revisions to the DSM throughout its history have aimed to 
accommodate for the findings of such studies, by acknowledging the role of culture in 
shaping elements of mental disorders, as well as through development of some tools 
for discerning such cultural influences. Such revisions, however, fall short of providing 
a satisfactory account of how cultural considerations ought to be integrated within 
conceptualisations of mental disorder and psychiatric diagnosis of them. Crucially, it 
remains unclear how such revisions ought to inform diagnosis, and remain peripheral 
to the core of the DSM, namely the diagnostic criteria, which is assumed to be 
universal.  
Such viewing of culture, as having only a marginal influence on manifestation and 
presentation of disorders is not limited to DSM revisions. Studies concerned with 
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cross-cultural variations in depression, from the fields of medical anthropology and 
cultural psychiatry, have been mainly focused on different manifestations and 
articulations of depression. Whilst the role of culture has been noted in shaping these 
differences, the concrete question of how culture, as a system of interpretation and 
meaning making, shapes experiences of depression has remained largely unanswered. 
Through a comparative approach, taking into account experiences of depression in 
Iran and the UK, and noting cultural differences between the two countries, the 
present study aims to give an account of the ways in which culture shapes conceptions, 
experiences, and articulations of experiences.1  
Phenomenological studies of mental disorders have recently received attention in the 
literature, aiming to move beyond some of the established understandings of these 
disorders, and focusing on first-person perspectives of what it means and what it feels 
like to suffer from a mental illness. Although a large part of this body of literature has 
been concerned with schizophrenia, recently the phenomenology of depression has 
received more attention, thanks in particular to the works of Matthew Ratcliffe. In his 
work Experiences of Depression: A study in phenomenology (2015), Ratcliffe offers a 
systematic study of phenomenology of depression. His account is developed based on 
first-person accounts of depression obtained through a qualitative questionnaire as 
part of a research project conducted at Durham University, as well as various memoirs 
and works of literature. The empirical work by Ratcliffe and colleagues at Durham 
forms the basis of the present work: the qualitative data collected in the UK underlies 
the comparative element of the work, the methodology for the acquisition of data was 
repurposed to be used in Iran, and both works are concerned with first-person 
experiences of depression and the phenomenological significance of them.  
 
1 I acknowledge that part of what cultural variation involves is different ways of articulating 
the same or very similar experiences and therefore make the distinction between variation in 
experience and articulations of experiences. In Chapter 8 I offer a way of viewing experiences 
and articulations as both finding meaning within a cultural context. 
  6 
The present study, insofar as it is concerned with culture, diverges from the 
investigation conducted at Durham. Phenomenologists are largely concerned with 
universal structures of our consciousness, which is assumed to be common to all 
individuals, regardless of their cultural and social backgrounds. Thus, there has been 
little room for phenomenological investigations in light of culture and cultural 
variation. The comparative and cross-cultural nature of this study, means that 
individuals and their experiences are viewed as situated within a phenomenologically 
significant context, shaped by cultural conceptions, norms, and customs, rather than 
in isolation. Within this understanding, I have aimed to give an account of variations 
in experiences of depression, as seen in Iran and the UK, through an exposition of the 
cultural context and background, which give meaning and significance to the 
experiences, as the subject of the phenomenological enquiry.  
The findings of the present research have clear implications for psychiatry as science 
and practice. In the first instance, noting that there are indeed cultural variations in 
experiences and manifestations of depression, the implicit claim to universality in 
much of psychiatry, particularly in the DSM, is brought into question. It is shown that 
the rigid definitions and criteria for understanding and identifying depression fall short 
of accounting for such variations. Such a challenge has clear implications for the 
practice of psychiatry, since it demonstrates that at least some level of understanding 
of, and sensitivity to culture is needed for a comprehensive understanding of patients’ 
experiences and needs. Such an understanding undoubtedly plays an important role 
in diagnosis and effective treatment of depression. Additionally, not only does my 
research reinforce the findings of other cross-cultural studies of depression, which 
have been noted and led to certain revisions in the DSM, it aims to go further by 
offering a systemic account, not only of the fact that there are indeed such variations, 
but also of how these are brought about and maintained through culture. 
In the course of this thesis, through the methodological approach which is empirical 
and comparative in nature, I aim to give an account of how cultural variation in 
experiences of depression as seen in Iran and the UK can be accounted for. And 
additionally, through a phenomenological outlook which views individuals and their 
experiences as situated within a broader sociocultural context, I demonstrate the ways 
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in which culture influences individual experiences and narratives of depression. The 
account I offer here, is made up of specific arguments concerned with particular 
symptoms of depression, and the cultural context that gives them meaning. Overall, 
however, the work aims to answer the following broad questions:  
- How, if at all, do the experiences of depression in Iran differ from those in the 
UK? 
- What is the phenomenological significance of these similarities/differences? 
- What are the social factors contributing to these similarities/differences? 
- What implications arise from these similarities/differences regarding the 
practice of psychiatry and the claim of universality of psychiatry as a science? 
 In what follows, I will give an overview of the previous research on cross-cultural 
studies of depression, particularly those conducted in Iran. In doing so I contextualise 
the work in the broader literature on the subject, while demonstrating the unique 
methods and aims of the present research which distinguish it from other works done 
on Iran. I will then give an exposition of the methodology employed in the study, both 
in the acquisition of the empirical data, and the qualitative method for analysis of the 
findings, before giving a brief overview of the arguments as presented in the later 
chapters.  
1.1. Background to the Research 
Cross-cultural variations in depression have been subject of various studies, 
traditionally within medical anthropology and cross-cultural psychiatry. These works 
have been predominantly concerned with variations in manifestations of depression 
in different cultures. For instance, Kleinman has famously shown that while depression 
in the US might be predominantly characterised by psychological symptoms 
(hopelessness, guilt, low self-esteem, etc.), in China it may manifest with somatic 
symptoms (Kleinman, 1982; 1986). Presentation with somatic symptoms has received 
particular interest since Kleinman’s study and is well-documented (Ryder, et al., 2008; 
Vega & Rumbaut, 1991; Simon, et al., 1999). Feelings of guilt in depression are another 
symptom of depression that have been investigated in the cross-cultural studies (e.g. 
  8 
Stompe, et al., 2001; Fakhr El-Islam, 1969). A recent systematic review of cultural 
variation in symptoms of depression indicates the prevalence of different symptoms 
and complaints in different regions of the world (E.E.Haroz, et al., 2016). In addition to 
particular symptoms, variations in conceptualisations and understandings of 
depression, which influence help-seeking behaviours, have been examined (e.g. 
Naeem, et al., 2012; Ying, 1990; Ying, et al., 2000). There have also been several 
seminal collections of studies, which examine a wide range of variations across 
different cultures. In particular Culture and Depression (Kleinman & Good, 1985) and 
Cultural Conceptions of Mental health and Therapy (Marsella & White, 1982) form the 
background to the present research.  
Most of the works cited here note the importance of culture in shaping manifestations 
and articulations of depression. However, in-depth studies discerning the different 
ways in which culture plays a role in shaping experiences of depression, have been 
lacking. In particular, the dynamics by which the cultural modes of thought and 
interpretation influence the individual experiences of depression, as situated within a 
given sociocultural context, remain largely overlooked. Undoubtedly, an investigation 
into these dynamics requires an interdisciplinary approach, one that not only takes 
into account the cultural, historical, and sociological factors that shape the context of 
illness experience, but also takes note of individual narratives and experiences, which 
draw their meaning and significance from this context. The present study, noting this 
gap in the literature, aims to examine and provide an account of this complex network 
of factors that whilst influencing one another, shape the totality of the experiences of 
depression. 
Within the literature on cultural variation and depression, the literature specifically on 
depression in Iran is scarce, and the studies focused on the subject have been done 
within the field of Anthropology. The most recent and noteworthy work is by Orkideh 
Behrouzan (2016), titled Prozak Diaries: Psychiatry and Generational Memories in Iran. 
The work focuses on the conceptualisation and narratives of depression, as seen 
among the 1980s generation in Iran, and the influence of the memories of Iran-Iraq 
war. Behrouzan offers a comprehensive account of the trajectory of the place of 
psychiatry in Iran, and the way psychiatric discourse frames the public’s understanding 
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of their own experiences. She shows how such discourse is employed by the 1980s 
generation to make sense of their shared generational memories not only of war, but 
also of the changes in modes of conduct and the shift in values as implemented 
following the Islamic revolution of 1979 (see §2.1). 
Behrouzan’s account is important, since it offers a view into the ways social change 
and collective experiences, shape the conceptualisations and use of depreshen, which 
not only aides the formation of a generational identity, but also defines a framework 
for understanding and talking about shared experiences. Behrouzan’s work offers 
invaluable insight into the way a large group of Iranians think and talk about 
depression and experiences of it. And despite the special focus on a single generation 
of Iranians, the work provides an important reference point for studies into depression 
in Iran, including the present one at hand. 
Other noteworthy studies on depression in Iran, which provide the background to this 
work, are those by Byron Good and Mary-Jo DelVecchio Good, which are based upon 
their extensive fieldwork in Iran between 1972-76, in the small town of Maragheh. 
Their research focuses on symptom reports and the cultural background giving 
meaning and significance to them. For instance, they emphasise the role of dysphoric 
affect in the Iranian experiences of depression and anxiety (Good, et al., 1985). Arguing 
that dysphoric affect is a valued feeling in Iranian culture, they offer a meaning-
centred approach to understanding expressions of distress in the Iranian setting. 
Similarly, Byron Good’s work on the semantics of illness in Iran analyses the syndrome 
of ‘heart distress’ in Iran in terms of the semantic network which enables Iranians to 
express social distress in medical terms (Good, 1976). 
The works by Good and Good offer important insights into depression in Iran, and 
some of their findings will be discussed throughout this work (particularly in Chapters 
2 and 7). It should, however, be noted that the sociocultural make up of Iran has 
changed considerably since the studies conducted by them. These changes are due to 
the shift in the dominant value system of Iran following the Islamic revolution, the 
long-lasting effects of the Iran-Iraq war, the rapid modernisation of the country, as 
well as a population boom which has seen the population of Iran more than double in 
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the time since their study. These changes have undoubtedly influenced the cultural 
conceptualisations of depression as well as ways of articulating experiences and 
encountering depression. Thus, in certain instances I would argue that some of the 
conclusions drawn by Good and Good ought to be revisited and updated.  
Apart from these studies, which aim to understand depression as situated within the 
Iranian culture and society, other studies on depression in Iran have been limited to 
biomedical enquiries, such as epidemiology and comorbidity of depression and other 
illnesses. What is important to note, is the fact that the aims and methods of these 
previous works on depression in Iran differ considerably from the present study. 
Behrouzan’s work focuses on a particular section of the Iranian population, with its 
own sense of shared identity, through common experiences and understanding, and 
aims to give an exposition of how this group understands and encounters depression 
in light of this shared identity. Good and Good offer an understanding of depression 
in Iran through anthropological fieldwork, and analysis of cultural narratives of 
dysphoric affect in a rural, Azeri-speaking area of Iran. The present study differs from 
these other works done on Iran, with regards to its aims, and its methodology. Firstly, 
rather than being concerned with a particular subculture, or with a particular group of 
people in Iran, the present study is concerned with the meaning-making structure of 
Iranian culture as a whole, and its influence on experiences of depression. Whilst I 
acknowledge the existence of different subcultures and the diversity of belief systems 
in Iran, by focusing on elements of Iranian culture which have remained central in 
different communities, I offer an account that is applicable to a large part of Iranian 
society.  Secondly, as mentioned earlier, through adopting a phenomenological and 
comparative outlook, this study aims to give an understanding of different ways in 
which culture influences experiences, therefore offering an insight into understanding 
cross-cultural variations in depression more generally.  
1.2. Methodology of the Research 
The acquisition of the empirical data for the present study was done in two parts. In 
the first instance, to get an initial understanding of the Iranian experience of 
depression, some first-person accounts of depression written by Iranians on Facebook 
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were examined. These accounts were posted following a public invitation for 
individuals with depression to talk openly about their experiences, during the 
international mental illness awareness week in April 2015. The aim of the invitation 
was to encourage open conversation about depression to combat misconceptions, 
and stigma around depression in Iranian society. The result was that a considerable 
number of Iranians took to Facebook to talk about what they understood to be the 
most important elements of their experience of depression, and later on, the creation 
of a Facebook support group for Iranians suffering from depression. Around 20 of 
these accounts were posted publicly, and shared widely for public reading, and as 
such, the easy access to them enabled an investigation of the common themes 
Iranians talk about in expressing their experiences of the illness.  
A few of these public accounts aimed at giving a more accurate picture of depression 
than what is commonly conceptualised in Iranian society, based on personal 
experiences. As such, rather than presenting first-person cases of experiences of 
depression, they aimed to be informative about the nature of depression as an illness. 
Apart from these accounts, the majority of the posts, focused on the first-person 
descriptions of depression experiences, gave an insight into some of the common 
themes that Iranians see as important components of their overall illness experiences. 
As a result, these accounts have informed part of the focus of the present work, and 
indeed, some have been used as quotes demonstrative of certain themes explored in 
the work (marked with ‘FB’ in the text). These accounts further informed the second 
part of the acquisition of data, namely the qualitative questionnaire.   
The qualitative questionnaire used for the acquisition of the main body of the data 
used for the study, follows the format used in the work done by Matthew Ratcliffe and 
others at Durham University. The questionnaire used in both studies, comprised of 
open-ended questions with no limits on the length of responses, and thus prompted 
respondents to give detailed accounts of different aspects of their experiences of 
depression. In both cases, there was an introductory section where respondents were 
asked to provide background information, including gender, age, place of residence, 
details of diagnoses, and treatment methods received.  In the Durham project, the 
questionnaire was posted online on the website of the mental health charity SANE, for 
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a period of three months, during which time 145 individuals participated in the study. 
Results from the study were made available in various publications that followed the 
study. Most notable of these is the already mentioned Experiences of Depression 
(2015), and the collection of articles Depression, Emotion and the Self (Ratcliffe & 
Stephan eds., 2014). These publications have been the primary source for the 
comparative element of the study, since due to the confidentiality agreements access 
to the raw data was not permitted. I also spoke to a researcher on the Durham project, 
Dr Benedict Smith, on a number of occasions. Dr Smith offered advice on adapting the 
questionnaire for the Iranian sample, and later in conducting the cross-cultural 
comparative analysis of the findings with the UK sample. Since the study conducted at 
Durham forms the basis for the comparative element of the present work, I attempted 
to ensure that the methodology for the acquisition of data did not differ significantly 
between the two. However, based on the preliminary findings from the Facebook 
sample, and due to differences in available platforms for conducting the research, 
certain elements of the two methodologies differ.  
The questionnaire used in the present study (see appendix) has three additional 
questions compared to the one used in the UK. These additions were informed by the 
Facebook accounts, and were in part aimed at examining and clarifying certain 
conclusions drawn by previous studies. The accounts published on Facebook indicated 
that interpersonal relationships have a considerable role to play in shaping individuals’ 
experiences of depression in Iran. This finding is in line with the sociocultural make-up 
of Iran which emphasises the role of others and relationships with them (see §2.1). To 
prompt details of how this aspect influences experiences of depression, the following 
questions were added to the questionnaire:  
- How would you describe your relationships with others when you are 
depressed?  
- Has the reaction of others influenced your experience of depression? If so, 
how? 
Through the examination of the personal reports on Facebook, it was established that 
relations with others, and the way in which others reacted to individuals’ depression 
  13 
had an influence on their illness experiences. What remained unclear, and therefore 
what the above questions aim to discern, was how this influence was perceived to take 
place, and therefore provide a basis for giving a phenomenological account of the 
importance and significance of the interpersonal in experiences of depression.  
As mentioned in §1.2, some of the previous studies done on depression in Iran 
emphasise the role of sadness and dysphoria in the culture. Given that such feelings 
are seen as one of the defining elements of depression, it has been important to 
discern how depression and depressive feelings are distinguished from feelings of 
sadness in Iran. In other words, if, as it has been suggested (Good, et al., 1985), sadness 
and dysphoria are valued and normalised in the Iranian culture, rather than viewed as 
pathological, it is important to understand what gives depression its perceived 
pathological nature in the Iranian context. To this end, respondents were asked to 
detail how their depressive experiences are different from normal sadness: 
- What distinguishes what you’re feeling as depression, from other, more 
general forms of sadness?2  
The final version of the questionnaire with these additions, together with the consent 
form and participant information sheet, was approved by members of Lancaster 
University Ethics Committee, and translated into Farsi, with the help of an academic 
translator. This version was then made available online and advertised on two Iranian 
support group forums for individuals with depression; one on Facebook, and one on 
an online forum in Iran, Depressed Anonymous. A total of 13 responses were recorded 
online in a two-month period. To increase the sample size, and in collaboration with 
practitioners in Iran, the questionnaire was also distributed to outpatients in a 
University clinic in Shiraz, resulting in an extra 30 responses which were returned for 
analysis. The background information on all the respondents (where provided) can be 
seen in Figure 1. Cases where the numbers represented in the chart do not add up to 
the total number of respondents, such as in the case of place of residence, indicates 
 
2 I thank Dr Benedict Smith for his suggestion of the question clarifying the distinction between 
depression and other forms of sadness in Iran.  
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instances where an answer to background question was not provided. As can be seen, 
a few of the respondents had received additional diagnoses of psychiatric disorders. 
Two of these individuals suffered from bipolar disorders, two from obsessive 
disorders, and one individual had diagnosis of both bipolar and obsessive disorders. 
One individual suffered from conversion disorder, and one from insomnia.  
 
































Background information of respondents
Total: 43
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It should be noted that for the most part the analysis offered in this work is not 
differentiated by gender or social class. Although there are doubtless important 
gender differences in the experiences of depression, the great majority of my 
respondents were women, and the small number of responses from depressed men 
meant that a detailed analysis of the importance of gender has not been possible. As 
such, although I will discuss possible gender differences on occasion, and respondents’ 
quotes indicate their gender (M/F indicators after quote numbers), gender has not 
been the prime focus of the analysis.  
Rather, for this study, the responses were analysed as a whole, against the backdrop 
of Iranian culture. To analyse the data, a qualitative content analysis was carried out, 
through which common themes of complaints and symptoms, which were either 
different from the findings in the UK, or more frequently talked about and emphasised 
were identified. The symptom categories presented in Figure 2 represent the 
respondents’ most frequent complaints about their experiences of depression. I have 
differentiated the categories in part to reflect the particular words that are used in the 
complaints, and in instances to reflect the theme being complained about. The 
category of negative thinking for example, is differentiated from feelings of 
hopelessness and guilt, as it represents all the instances were respondents specifically 
use the phrase ‘negative thinking’ or variations of it, such as ‘negative thoughts’ (afkār-
e manfi). Similarly, the category of absurdity encompasses all the instances where 
respondents have used the words ‘absurd’ (pooch) or ‘absurdity’ (poochi) in describing 
their feelings. In the case of isolation, however, the category includes various 
responses that talk of a tendency to ‘withdraw’ or ‘escape’ from social gatherings, 
complains of being ‘hermitic’, and expressions such as ‘going into my shell’. The 
following are a few examples of the kind of responses categorised under isolation.  
#18(M) – I stop doing my daily activities and go back into my shell and stop 
interacting with others. 
#15(F) – I was hermitic/withdrawn (goosheh-gir), avoided gatherings, was 
not in the mood to be around anyone.  
#3(F) – I escape from/avoid the interaction with my usual people.   
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Figure 2. Common Symptoms and Complaints 
The identified themes and their significance were subsequently analysed and 
accounted for through various theories within the phenomenological literature, as 
well as works in anthropology, sociology, and psychology, where these provide a 
framework for discerning the phenomenological and cultural significance of the 
variations. In all instances, in order to situate the experiences and complaints in a 
culturally significant context, I outline the relevant sociocultural and historical 
elements unique to the Iranian ethos, which can be shown to have phenomenological 
significance, through their influence in shaping the experiences of depression as 
expressed in the responses. Each of these themes of variation, are the subject of 
different chapters in the work, together with the corresponding phenomenological 
analyses of their significance against a particular sociocultural element.   
A worry should also be noted here regarding the epistemic reliability of the responses 
to the questionnaire. It is conceivable that the profound existential change involved in 
depression would be reflected in self-reports of experiences, bringing into question 
the accuracy and reliability of the report. For instance, depressed individuals might be 
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instances of feeling rejected, stigmatised, etc. I acknowledge that as a possibility, this 
problem can be seen as a methodological limitation of the study. Resolving this 
problem would require real time experience sampling to reduce issues such as 
memory bias, which is not practical within the methodological framework of this 
project. Additionally, the use of the present methodology, which is largely the same 
as the one employed at Durham, is what allows for cross-cultural comparison of 
experiences which lies at the heart of the project. Furthermore, insofar as 
interpretations and experiences are viewed as intertwined, the ways in which 
depressed people report their experiences is still of interest for the project. Part of the 
investigation here is precisely the ways in which one’s understanding and 
interpretation of one’s daily experiences (e.g. relations with, and perceptions of 
others) are changed in the course of depression, and how these changes are 
articulated by individuals in depression.  
As detailed in Ch.2, noting the diversity and complexity of the Iranian culture and 
society, where possible, I focus my analysis on three elements which I see as 
fundamental to the Iranian culture as seen today, namely, Shi’ism, Iranian literature 
(classic and modern alike), and historical events (most notably the Islamic revolution 
of 1979, and the Iran-Iraq war). Through these elements, not only do I depict the 
phenomenological context in which the experiences are had and made sense of, but I 
also demonstrate the cultural dynamics in light of which variations in experiences of 
depression can be accounted for. Given that these cultural workings and dynamics 
remain largely unconscious, by detailing them I bring to the foreground of the analysis 
the invisible forces that influence the way individuals experience and relate to the 
world, as well as how these experiences find meaning and are interpreted against the 
backdrop of culture. 
1.3. Chapter Outline 
The outline of the thesis, for the most part, follows the differentiation in the themes 
identified in the questionnaire. Before the main analysis, in chapter 2, I portray the 
broad sociocultural context of Iran, as the background against which different 
symptoms and manifestations of depression find meaning. The elements discussed in 
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this chapter will be used in later parts, in giving accounts of the role culture plays in 
shaping experiences of depression. I draw a broad picture of the sociocultural make-
up of Iran, noting certain demographic points, as well as important historical events 
which have significantly influenced the dominant discourse and culture as seen in Iran 
today. I will also give a brief exposition of the history of psychiatry in Iran, showing 
how the trajectory of pedagogical and practical psychiatry has progressed in light of 
historical and cultural changes in the country.  This history is important in 
understanding conceptions of psychiatry among the public, and the expectations that 
result from such conceptions. This exposition is followed by a sketch of the various 
cultural elements that shape the Iranian conception of depression in particular. I argue 
that the dominant understanding of depression among Iranians is heavily influenced 
by a) traditional Iranian and Islamic medicine, which have shaped folk beliefs around 
health, illness and medicine, b) character types that Iranians aspire to, how individuals 
view themselves and others in light of these ideals, and c) the cultural modes of causal 
attributions. Using examples from responses to the questionnaire, I show how these 
elements all play a role in the dominant ways of conceptualising depression. In the last 
section, drawing on previous research on Iran, I offer a way of understanding the place 
of sadness and dysphoria in the Iranian culture. Crucially, I argue, contrary to previous 
studies, that such emotions rather than being valued and emphasised in their own 
right, draw their place in the culture following the long-standing cultural conceptions 
of life, as a fight between forces of Good and Evil. As I will show in later chapters, this 
way of viewing life has important consequences for the understanding and 
interpretation of experiences of depression in Iran.  
In Chapter 3 I will look at metaphors used in descriptions of depression experiences, 
as a form of narrative that can offer important insights into the way depression is 
conceptualised, experienced and articulated. Using the cognitive-linguistic framework 
for understanding metaphors, I examine the implications of the variation in the use of 
metaphors in different cultures, for understanding experiences themselves. In 
particular, I will look at two sets of metaphors used by Iranians in describing their 
experiences, showing that while some might be reducible to universal metaphors used 
in other cultures, others arise from culturally specific conceptions and experiences. I 
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argue, therefore, that metaphors carry within them important insights into cultural 
ways of understanding and encountering depression – in the case of Iran, such 
metaphors express the dominant ways of viewing the world in depression, as well as 
the cultural conceptions of depression itself.  
In Chapter 4, I give an explanation for the presence of a sense of absurdity among 
Iranian depressed patients, as well as for the variation in the emphasis placed on the 
feeling of hopelessness, and attitudes towards suicide. I argue that what links these 
variations together is the presence of a culture of death-consciousness in Iran, 
reflected in religious texts and works of literature, and amplified following the Iran-
Iraq war and the dominant discourse around it. After giving an argument for the 
presence of this culture in Iran, manifested through these elements, and drawing on 
points noted in Chapter 2, I argue that the presence of absurdity and the stronger 
emphasis on hopelessness can be explained through cultural frameworks for thought 
and understanding found in Iran today.  
Chapters 5 and 6 are concerned with the alterations in one’s way of being with others 
seen in depression, and the variations in this domain between Iran and the UK. The 
discussion is divided into social relationships, particularly those between an individual 
and the society (chapter 5), and interpersonal relationships between individuals 
(chapter 6). Drawing on phenomenological literature, particularly those of Sartre and 
Heidegger, I highlight the interpersonal conflict central to two phenomenologists’ 
accounts of relationships with others, to argue that in depression this conflict comes 
to the foreground of consciousness, and determines one’s experiences in these 
domains. Here, variations in emotional experiences in depression, arising from 
misunderstandings of depression prevalent in Iranian society, are accounted for 
through phenomenological and cultural considerations. I particularly look at issues of 
social stigmatisation of depression, empathy, absence of guilt and presence of 
aggression among Iranian patients, and the tendency towards isolation.  
Chapter 7 deals with the issue of somatisation in depression and aims to give an 
account of the significance of somatic symptoms and their variation cross-culturally. I 
draw on phenomenological literature on embodiment to argue that somatic 
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symptoms ought to be understood as a constitutive part of the overall experience of 
depression universally, rather than a culturally specific element of experiences, as is 
often portrayed in the cross-cultural literature. Despite this universality, I argue that 
the manifestation and emphasis placed on different somatic symptoms varies across 
cultures. Taking the case of pain as one of the most complained about physical 
symptoms among Iranian patients, and noting the cultural significance of pain, I offer 
an account for understanding the special emphasis placed on this symptom among 
Iranian patients.  
In chapter 8, I examine the methodological advantages and shortcomings, and offer a 
discussion on the relationship between culture, experiences, narratives and the 
problem of interpretation of reports. Drawing on theoretical works in philosophy and 
anthropology, I argue for an understanding of experiences as inherently cultural, 
inseparable from the context in which they are had, and the narratives expressing and 
describing them. Exploring the methodological shortcomings and issues in the 
interpretation of the data, I argue against the use of ‘idioms of distress’ as a way of 
understanding difficult reports of experiences, suggesting that the notion lacks 
explanatory power. I instead offer concrete suggestions for improvements to address 
these problems, noting the need for further research.  
In chapter 9, I discuss the implications of the study for the science and practice of 
psychiatry, and for phenomenology as a discipline and method. I argue that the 
arguments presented in the thesis make clear the need for better recognition of 
culture as a central element in understanding experiences and ways of encountering 
phenomena, in particular mental disorders such as depression.  
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2. The Iranian Context 
The aim of this chapter is to provide some background information on Iranian culture 
and society, which will be used in later chapters to contextualise the Iranian 
experiences of depression. The themes explored here form the foundations upon 
which the cultural analysis of the work will be based, and I will return to these themes 
repeatedly. Given this centrality, therefore, it is important to explore these themes 
here, in their own right, before using them in the analyses and interpretation of Iranian 
experiences of depression.  
2.1. Sociocultural Make-up – an overview 
Iran is located on a 1.5 thousand square kilometre plateau, reaching in the North to 
the Caspian Sea, and in the South to the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, bordering 
Afghanistan and Pakistan in the East, and Iraq and Turkey in the West. According to 
the latest census conducted in 2015, by the Statistical Centre of Iran, the country had 
a population of just under 80 million. 59.1 million live in urban areas, compared to only 
20.3 million living in villages and small towns. The urban population of Iran has been 
continuously growing in recent years, whilst smaller villages and towns have seen a 
reduction in population. The most populous province of Iran is Tehran (which includes 
the capital city of Tehran), with a population of over 13.3 million. The province of Fars, 
located in the south of the country, where the present study was conducted, is largely 
rural and has the highest share of nomadic population (ashāyer) in the country, 
including big nomadic communities and various nomadic clans. Despite being almost 
10 times the land size of Tehran, Fars has a population of just under 5 million 
(Statistical Center of Iran, 2015). The psychiatric clinic where outpatients were 
recruited for the questionnaire is located in the capital and largest city in the province, 
Shiraz, where patients from different parts of the province receive care.  
Iran has a young population, with over 75% being aged forty or under, and over 21% 
aged between 25-34. Over half of the adult population have a high school diploma 
and/or have a higher education certificate. These statistics vary in different parts of 
Iran, due to the centralisation of wealth, jobs and education opportunities in larger 
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cities especially Tehran. Yet the general picture of demographics and education levels 
highlights the changing nature of attitudes and beliefs in the culture to be covered in 
the later chapters.  
Iranian society is a collectivist one, with a heavy emphasis placed on the importance 
of interpersonal relationships, for the well-being of both the individual and the 
collective society (Hofstede, 2001; House, et al., 2004). This is in contrast to the 
individualist nature of Western countries such as the UK, where the aims and goals of 
the individual tend to take precedence over that of the collective. In Iran, however, 
this priority is reversed, and the goals of the group, are considered more important, 
whether understood on a personal level (e.g. groups an individual is a member of such 
as family and friends), or on a national level (often highlighted by the discourse 
sanctioned by the state).  
According to the official statistics, 99.6% of Iranians identify as Muslims, with 
Christianity, Zoroastrianism, Judaism, and other ‘undeclared’ religions respectively 
forming the biggest religious minorities in the country.  It is worth noting that the 
official statistics do not take into account different belief systems within a religion. 
Thus, although there is a Sunni minority in Iran, no official statistics exist on the 
proportions of Sunni and Shi’ite belief systems. Shi’ism is the official religion of the 
country and the state, and as the most widely held faith in the country, has had a large 
influence in the present sociocultural make-up of the country. It should be noted that 
Shi’ism as practiced in Iran differs in notable ways from other countries and cultures 
that practice this branch of Islam, such as Iraq and Syria. This difference is in part due 
to the official status of Shi’ism and its association with the ruling regime, which 
highlights and encourages certain teachings and customs of the belief system, and in 
part due to the influence of pre-Islamic culture of Iran (Persia), which has shaped the 
practice in the country to have its unique Iranian form. 
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Similarly, no official data is collected on ethnic and language minorities in the country. 
Although Persian ethnicity and Farsi language3 form the majority of the country (over 
60%), there are various other languages and ethnic backgrounds which have had a 
considerable influence on the culture. The largest minority groups, both ethnic and 
linguistic, include Azeri (16%), Kurd (10%), Lur (6%), Baluch (2%) and Arab (2%) 
(Minority Rights Group International, 2017).   
These statistics serve to show that despite the large cultural diversity and 
heterogeneity of the country, the dominant force in shaping the cultural forms and 
narratives, takes power from the official status both of the Farsi language, as well as 
Shi’ism. It is given this dominance that in much of the analysis presented in this work, 
Shi’ism and Persian works of literature are viewed as principal pillars of Iranian culture.  
Persian literature has been, for centuries, a mirror of the Iranian culture and concerns 
of the society. One reason for this continued influence is the fact that the Persian 
language, as primarily a spoken language, flourished in the form of poetry, different 
instances of which continue to be used as everyday expressions. As Behrouzan notes, 
“For Iranians, poetry precedes literacy; it is carried ‘in the chest’, an expression 
indicating that Iranians’ poetic heritage lives on from one generation to the next, in 
hearts and in memory, shaping part of the cultural aesthetics of the literate and 
illiterate alike” (Behrouzan, 2016, p. 13). Despite the changes to the language itself 
over the years, pieces from literary works, and especially poetry remain a strong 
medium through which Iranians express their emotions and everyday concerns and 
preoccupations.  
Furthermore, the power of Persian poetry and literature also lies in the fact that, as 
the most dominant forms of art in Iranian culture, they offer an insight into the social 
 
3 ‘Persian’ and ‘Farsi’ have both been used to signify the official language of Iran (formerly 
Persia). Since Persian can refer to the ethnicity, and anything belonging to the land of Persia, 
I will be using ‘Farsi’ when talking about the language. In instances I will use terms such as 
‘Persian literature’ to denote the historical range of works of literature spanning from Persia 
to present day Iran.   
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and political changes in Iranian society, especially in the modern era. In the absence 
of sustained scholarly research and institutions, and given the history of 
expressiveness and influential power of poetry, this medium became, and remains, 
the one reflecting the goings on at the heart of the culture and society. Given this 
sustained influence, in addition to reflecting the dominant culture, Persian poetry and 
literature also offers an insight into how the thoughts and concerns of the Iranian 
people have changed and evolved throughout the years. The creation and popularity 
of different works of literature during political upheavals, and the censorship of 
different works under different ideological governments throughout history, show the 
historically important role of literature in reflecting the sociocultural changes of Iran. 
This domain, therefore, provides an important insight into cultural conceptions in Iran. 
Two particular historical events ought to be noted in shaping Iranian culture and 
society, as it is presently. First is the Islamic Revolution of 1979, which transformed 
the largely secular monarchical government into an Islamic Republic. It is worth noting 
that prior to the revolution, monarchy had been the system of governance in Iran for 
over two thousand years, although different dynasties had different styles of 
governance, and different emphases on religiosity. Although this change in system of 
governance is noteworthy, the 1979 revolution is also important, for the enormous 
shift in value system and modes of conduct that has been enforced in the years 
following the revolution. The new regime, in an attempt to distance itself from the 
Pahlavi dynasty that it had overthrown, reversed many of their policies and 
approaches to governance. The most important of these reversals that has changed 
the face of Iran ever since, was the enforcement of Islamic law in all domains of public 
(even sometimes private) life. For instance, the first of the two kings of Pahlavi dynasty 
had banned women from adhering to the Islamic dress code and wearing the Hijab. 
After the Islamic revolution wearing the Hijab became mandatory for women, and to 
this day Iran remains the only country in the world with a compulsory Hijab rule. This 
‘Islamisation’ of governance and public life in Iran has defined a powerful public 
discourse, which after almost 40 years, has had an undeniable influence on cultural 
modes of thought and understanding.  
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The second important historical event is the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, and the 
population boom that accompanied it. The eight-year war had devastating effects in 
the country, which remain visible today, 30 years after the events. These effects 
include large areas close to the border which have never recovered from war, 
minefields that continue to take lives, as well as the continuing sense of loss for those 
who never found out the fate of their loved ones. During the war, Iran saw a 
population boom as well, following policy changes after the revolution. In a reversal 
of the previous regime’s policy, the newly established government started promoting 
larger family sizes. With the start of the war, these promotions carried stronger 
emphasis, since a larger population was seen as an advantage in the war 
(Karamouzian, et al., 2014, p. 231). The population boom resulting from such policies 
was such that a large part of the present population of Iran was either born, or had a 
large portion of their childhood spent during the war. As will become clear in later 
chapters, the continuing effects of war, and the generational memories of war, shared 
among a large part of the Iranian society, have a considerable impact on the way 
depression is conceptualised and experienced in Iran.  
2.2. History of Psychiatry in Iran 
Concerns with mental disorders have had a long history in the medical traditions in 
Iran. Well-known names in Iranian and Islamic medicine, such as Avicenna (Ibn-Sina) 
and Rhazes (al-Razi), wrote about illnesses of the soul, such as melancholia, and how 
they can be remedied (Dols, 1992). Although these discussions of mental illness have 
had their place in Iranian medical traditions, modern psychiatry in Iran began with the 
founding of University of Tehran in 1934, where the department of psychiatry began 
the formal education of students in the field a few years later.  
Before the formalisation of psychiatric care, various asylums for the mentally ill could 
be found in Tehran and elsewhere around the country, known as dārolmajānin, or 
madhouses. These asylums, often managed by local authorities, and funded by charity 
endowments, often suffered from poor conditions (Javanbakht & Sanati, 2006), and 
accommodated a range of criminal, poor, mentally impaired, and handicapped 
individuals (Behrouzan, 2016). The asylums became the subject of various socially 
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critical books and novels, that aimed to tell the stories of individuals in the asylums as 
well as the conditions under which they were kept and cared for (e.g. Ali Akbar 
Jamalzadeh’s Darolmajanin, 1942).  
Such asylums were repurposed into psychiatric wards and clinics when modern 
psychiatry came to Iran in the 1930s and 1940s. This arrival was due to waves of 
students who were sent abroad for education and training beginning from the 1930s. 
The first group of students who would later lay the foundations of psychiatric 
pedagogy in Iran, were trained in France (individuals include Ebrāhim Chehrāzi, 
Abdolhossein Mirsepāssi, and Hossein Rezaei). These French-educated founders were 
trained in neurology and neuropsychiatry and therefore had a largely biological 
orientation (Behrouzan, 2016, p. 42). As Behrouzan notes, the distinction between 
mental and nervous diseases, which followed psychological and/or psychoanalytic 
traditions, and neurological sciences respectively, characterised the psychiatric 
education in Iran. This distinction was evidenced by the first teaching curricula, built 
by “a generation of scientific, Francophile, can-do modernizers” (Ibid. p.49).  It was 
during this time, in 1946, that Ruzbeh hospital, the first modern psychiatric teaching 
hospital, was built in Tehran, and it continues to be at the forefront of psychiatric care 
and education in the country. 
The influence of psychoanalysis on psychiatric education and practice, was not seen in 
Iran until the 1970s. The Iranian public were introduced to some psychoanalytical 
concepts, through radio programmes (Behrouzan, 2016, p. 50), and a few translations 
by non-specialists of some of Freud’s works, in the 1950s (Barzin, 2010). Despite this 
familiarity, the influence of Freud and his works remained largely outside the medical 
domain. This changed when another generation of foreign-educated students 
returned from the US, bringing with them a legacy of psychoanalysis, as a dominant 
force in American psychiatry at the time. Psychoanalytic traditions had an influence 
both in the education of psychiatry, for instance at Ruzbeh, as well as in practice, with 
many of those oriented towards psychoanalytic traditions setting up private practices 
in Tehran and other larger cities such as Isfahan and Shiraz. Various research 
programmes in psychoanalytic research and training were formed, and along with 
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biomedically focused programmes, they offered a mixed pedagogy of psychiatry at 
universities and hospitals.  
The marriage of the two traditions ended with the Islamic revolution of 1979, when 
the ideological forces, and the public opinion which equated psychoanalysis “with 
unconsciousness, repression, resistance, libido and the irrational sexualization of 
everything” (Shoja Shafti, 2005, p. 388), created unsavoury circumstances for 
practitioners and experts in psychoanalysis, causing many of the leading members to 
leave Iran or limit their influence to private practices. At this time, psychoanalytic 
teachings were abandoned and the focus was again shifted to biomedical orientations. 
Furthermore, during the Cultural Revolution of 1980-83, which aimed at the 
‘cleansing’ of academia, the focus of psychiatric practice, education, and discourse, 
shifted further to accommodate for the newly formed value system. Although there 
would be a renewed interest in psychoanalytic traditions in the late 1980s and 1990s, 
this was heavily influenced, and determined by a newly defined value system that 
education and practice would have to adhere to.  
During the cultural revolution universities were closed for three years, during which 
time a large number of faculty staff, including some of those psychiatrists who 
pioneered psychoanalysis, either left or were dismissed (Behrouzan, 2016, p. 52). 
Behrouzan notes that following the Cultural Revolution, although the broader medical 
curriculum remained largely unchanged, psychiatry “was implicitly neglected early on, 
if not disdained, as either a bourgeois discipline or as inconsequential compared to 
other medical specialities” (Ibid., p.53). Eventually, however, with the war ending in 
the late 1980s and especially with the return of war veterans in need of psychiatric 
help, the importance of, and need for psychiatric care was recognised. This recognition 
resulted in a sense of pragmatism with respect to psychiatry, which allowed it to be 
practiced more or less freely, while psychiatric pedagogy became increasingly 
biomedical and psycho-pharmacologically oriented. 
Given the large influence, both of the Revolution, and the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, 
the psychiatric attitude that emerged in public discourse in the 1990s differed 
considerably from that of the late 1970s. This attitude was influenced by two 
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elements. First was the concern with the implementation of religious codes of conduct 
and Shi’ite moral order in the society, as the new dominant moral and value system. 
Second was the concern with the wellbeing and care of those influenced by war, 
including veterans and prisoners of war, and their families, as well as the families of 
martyrs. It was within this context, and against the backdrop of increasingly biomedical 
psychiatric pedagogy, that the new emphasis on psychoanalytic traditions was 
formulated.  
The new attention to psychoanalysis in Iran was largely pressed for by Mohammad 
San’ati, who was trained in the UK and returned to Iran in 1985. As one of the first 
psychiatrists to appear on radio and TV shows, San’ati advocated for attention to 
psychoanalysis not as an alternative to the biomedical traditions now firmly in place 
and widely supported, but as complementary to these traditions. Whilst navigating the 
public discourse with emphasis on clinical and medical models of psychiatry, San’ati 
brought psychoanalytic traditions into the public domain through his analyses of well-
known Iranian literary works, while at the same time training students in 
psychoanalysis at his home (Behrouzan, 2016, p. 57). Through his efforts, in 1996 a 
new curriculum was designed for teaching dynamic therapies to psychiatry residents, 
which led to the 2008 implementation of a residency curriculum that included 9-
month training in dynamic psychotherapies. In 2014, a fellowship in analytical 
psychotherapy was launched at the Dynamic Psychotherapy and Human Studies Unit 
(itself established in 2006) at the University of Tehran.  
Today, psychiatric education is more or less uniform across universities in Iran, due to 
the national standardisation of curricula. Although the core topics and subjects taught 
at medical universities are determined at the national level by the Ministry of Health 
and Medical Education, some elements may vary across universities, depending on the 
specialisations of staff. The curriculum in use currently is firmly situated within the 
biomedical tradition for understanding and treating mental disorders. Some of the 
broader topics in the curricula include: neuroscience and neurology, basics of human 
psychology, psychiatric classifications (ICD and DSM), clinical psychiatric assessments, 
and biomedical and pharmacological treatment options for psychiatric illnesses 
(Secretariat of Council for Medical and Specialised Education - Ministry of Health and 
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Medical Education, 2007). Although there is a short unit introducing psychotherapy as 
a treatment method, this is not central to the national curriculum of psychiatric 
training. Any larger emphases on psychotherapy is dependent on the individual 
institutions; for instance at Ruzbeh hospital, the opportunity to study such topics in 
more detail is greater, as compared to other programmes in other parts of the country.  
Currently, psychiatric diagnoses in Iran are based on the DSM-IV-TR4 and the vast 
majority of treatment methods around the country are biomedical ones. Although 
centres for counselling can be found in different parts of Iran, psychotherapy and 
psychoanalysis remain scarce and mainly exclusive to Tehran. Due to the time-
consuming nature of such treatments as well as their high cost compared to other 
treatment methods, the demand for these is limited to the more well-off parts of the 
population, which remain largely concentrated in Tehran. As Behrouzan notes, even 
for those clinicians and students who are interested, training in psychotherapy and 
psychodynamic traditions is often sacrificed for the financial security offered by 
biomedical and pharmacological practices, due to their high demand among the larger 
public. At the Hafez University Hospital in Shiraz, where the empirical part of the 
present research was conducted, the following services are offered for psychiatric 
patients: “medical therapy, shock therapy, occupational therapy, psychological 
counselling for individuals and families, and personality tests” (Hafez Training and 
Medical Center, 2018).  
Public discourse around psychiatry, as well as attitudes and expectations of the 
practice, are formed and maintained against the presumed dichotomy between 
psychodynamic and biomedical approaches. Although at the margins, psychoanalysis 
and the approaches arising from it remain influential, both among the public, as well 
as among the practitioners, the actual practice of such approaches remain scarce due 
to limitations on time and money. In Behrouzan’s words, psychiatrists in Iran practise 
 
4 Although the 5th revision of the DSM was published in 2013, and the translation into Farsi 
was completed in 2015, the criteria in use by practitioners in Iran continues to be DSM-IV-TR, 
at the time of completion of this study.  
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in an ‘in-between’ space within psychiatry: “On the one hand, the medical 
establishment’s attitude toward psychoanalysis oscillates perplexingly between 
acknowledgement and rejection. On the other hand, psychodynamic psychiatry, 
neither absent nor holding a deserved status, continues to inform Iranian psychiatry 
in creative ways” (Behrouzan, 2016, p. 207). It is within such pedagogical and 
professional understanding, and the way they inform broader pre-defined cultural 
norms and conceptualisations, that individuals in Iran understand mental disorders, 
and make sense of their own experiences of these illnesses.  
2.3. Conceptualisation of Depression in Iran 
It is undeniable that the way a phenomenon is conceptualised and understood 
influences one’s experiences of the phenomenon. This claim is seen in discussions 
regarding the distinction between illness and disease. As Kleinman notes, “Disease can 
be thought of as malfunctioning or maladaptation of biological or psychological 
processes. Illness is the personal, interpersonal, and cultural reaction to disease” 
(Kleinman, 1977, p. 9). Defined as such, it can be seen that the presence or absence of 
a disease, and its characterisations, are determined and interpreted by “the 
empirically derived knowledge about human biological functioning” (Fabrega, 1972, p. 
185). In the case of psychiatric problems, however, both the diagnosis and the 
characteristics are known through means which, rather than being universal and 
empirically determinable, are often influenced by personal, sociological, and cultural 
factors. In diagnosing depression, for instance, the primary indicators come from 
personal reports of experiences that are thought to be abnormal and debilitating. 
Here, the personal articulations come about and find meaning within a broader 
sociocultural framework for thought and interpretation, as do the judgments of what 
constitutes an abnormal experience or behaviour. Understanding psychiatric disorders 
as diseases, ones that remain universal and empirically observable, despite cultural 
variations that only superficially muddy the picture, thus making the observation of 
the universal characteristics more difficult, does not give an accurate picture of mental 
disorders. More importantly, such a characterisation of mental disorders would be 
unhelpful for the purposes of cross-cultural study of depression, as Kleinman notes. 
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Rather, the role of culture, as a system of understanding and interpreting mental 
disorders must be acknowledged, even if there is a biological underlying cause of 
experiences of mental illnesses. It is through this recognition that the important role 
of culture in various elements of experience of depression can be established and 
investigated. The arguments and analyses presented throughout this project, signify 
the various and complex ways in which culture shapes the experience and 
manifestation of depression, and as such portrays an image of depression as an illness. 
One that is moulded within a sociocultural context and is given meaning and 
significance within a uniquely cultural framework for understanding. This portrayal of 
depression is in contrast to the universalist and unchanging one presented in the DSM. 
Recognising that sociocultural modes of understanding and interpretation influence 
the way depression is experienced on an individual level, demands a preliminary 
account of cultural conceptualisations of depression, through which individuals make 
sense of their experiences of depression. Behrouzan (2016) has offered an extensive 
account of how shared historical experiences and generational memories, form the 
basis of understanding depreshen for a section of Iranian society. Given that this 
generation forms a large section of the current population in Iran, as noted in §2.1, 
Behrouzan’s account of depreshen is of utmost importance in examining the cultural 
understandings of depression in Iran. I would argue that there are other broader 
cultural modes of thought and understanding that also carry significance in 
understanding, and encountering depression in Iran today, namely, traditional Iranian 
and Islamic medicine, and Iranian ideal character types.  
2.3.1. Traditional Iranian and Islamic medicine 
Although mental illnesses have been a subject of discussion in traditional medicine, 
the broader influence of this field has been on the cultural conceptualisation of health 
and illness, as well as ways of preventing and treating ill health. Iranian traditional 
medicine, especially as developed in the Islamic era (from the 7th century onwards), 
has remained influential throughout the years among Iranians. There has also been a 
renewed interest in the subject in the recent years in Iran, with the creation of a 
Traditional Medicine department within Tehran University of Medical Sciences, 
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dedicated to teaching and research. The continued influence of traditional medicine 
shows that it forms part of the cultural way of understanding health and illness, and 
individuals’ methods for encountering different illnesses.  
In the understanding of traditional medicine, the physiological functions of the human 
body are based on factors such as elements, temperaments, humors, and forces 
(Rezaeizadeh, et al., 2009). Traditional Iranian medicine gives more attention, and 
attaches more importance to the prevention of disease, rather than curing it, thus the 
primary role of a physician is to keep people healthy, and secondarily to cure them if 
sickness arises. Good health is understood as a state of balance between various 
elements in the human body, such as the humors, and those in the individuals’ 
environment, such as ‘good air’, lack of stressors and cleanliness of the environment. 
So long as this balance is maintained, individuals enjoy a state of health, whilst the 
disruption of this balance gives rise to ill health and disease. Within this understanding, 
therefore, diseases are understood as natural events, and as such can be alleviated 
using natural means which could restore the balance in the body. Such natural 
treatments often include a change in habits, such as one’s diet, and the use of 
medicinal plants and herbal remedies.  
Interestingly, although in this understanding disease is essentially a physical 
phenomenon, a healthy mind is also seen as essential in maintaining a general state 
of health. This is since in traditional Iranian medicine there is no strict separation 
between mind and body, and rather, the two are seen as interdependent, and 
influencing one another. As such, stress factors such as worry, anxiety and 
unhappiness are seen as states of ill-health of the mind, which can threaten the 
healthy state of the body. Stress is further seen as an important factor, through which 
many physical symptoms and sicknesses, such as headache, back pain, fatigue, and 
blood pressure, can be accounted for and treated. With such importance, various 
stressors in life are identified as the ultimate ‘causes’ of disease. These stressors can 
be due to pressures from the environment such as work, relationships or studies, as 
well as from more abstract sources such as jealousy or The Evil Eye (Loeffler, 2007). It 
is acknowledged that stress cannot be avoided altogether in life, and therefore one 
should aim to deal with stress in such a way as to maintain one’s state of health. It is 
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believed, therefore, that the drugs prescribed for diseases caused by stressors merely 
treat the symptoms and leave the root cause of the illness intact. Thus, “dealing with 
stress, learning to cope with it or avoiding it altogether, is considered to be a more 
satisfactory and desirable treatment than pharmaceutical remedies allopathic doctors 
recommend” (Loeffler 2007, p.56). 
Within this conceptualisation, although the environment is a key element in the 
understanding of health and disease, these latter are ultimately understood in physical 
terms. The emphasis on the body and maintaining a humoral balance is such that 
psychological states, such as emotions, can also be understood in physiological terms. 
For instance, “anger is the boiling of the blood in the heart and the movement of the 
natural heat, which is sent outward to the rest of the body; it can be seen by redness 
in the eyes and a flushed face” (Dols, 1992, p. 64). Such a characterisation is important, 
because by giving a physiological account of how emotions come about, traditional 
medicine defines a close relation between physical and psychological states. Such a 
relation, in turn, can be used in treating diseases, of psychological and emotional 
nature, as well as those primarily affecting the body. As Dols shows, in this 
understanding, “emotional states were, thus, able to influence directly the qualities in 
the body. Like food or drink, emotional states, such as happiness or anger, could be 
induced in a patient to counteract a humoral imbalance or physical condition” (Dols, 
1992, p. 159). The conviction that psychological and emotional states can also be 
understood in physical terms, implies that purely mental diseases, if in existence, are 
incurable, since treatment is only a viable option for diseases of the physical body, 
which can be observed and examined. For instance, Ibn-Sina claimed that “people who 
imagine they can cure effeminate homosexuals are singularly stupid. For this is a 
mental –not a physical– disease” (Dols, 1992, p. 97).  
The continuous prevalence of this understanding of health and illness has an 
undeniable effect in shaping experiences of depression in Iran. This influence is not 
limited to how Iranians understand depression and their experiences of it, but is also 
seen in the social understanding and judgments towards depression and those 
suffering from it (chapter 5), as well as in the experience of somatic symptoms and the 
embodied experience of depression (chapter 7).   
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2.3.2. Iranian ideal character types 
The second important element in shaping Iranian conceptions of depression and 
modes of encountering it, is what is considered to be an ideal kind of person in Iranian 
culture. Although there are gendered differences in such an ideal, informed by the 
sociocultural norms and expectations of men and women, some ideal characteristics 
apply to both genders. The concern here is in the large part with values that are 
thought to be essential for a good person, regardless of their gender. As it will become 
clear in the analysis in later chapters, this aspect plays a role in shaping interpersonal 
relationships, social judgements of depression, and the resulting behaviours and 
attitudes in individuals (chapters 5 and 6).  
There are two extremes in the stereotypical character traits among Iranians, as 
observed by Bateson and others. One, a constellation of negative traits, is often 
mentioned when Iranians are criticising their society. These negative traits, portraying 
an image of an individual as calculating, opportunistic, and insincere, are often 
attached to people with power, who have historically been mostly men but 
increasingly include more women, due to their financial situation, or socio-political 
status. Such a characterisation attaches to the individual as a central characteristic, “a 
hidden purpose, a discontinuity between behaviour and intention” (Bateson, et al., 
1977, p. 262). 
In contrast with these traits, there are certain qualities that Iranians value in 
themselves and in their intimate circle of friends and family. In this category, traits 
such as honesty, kindness, modesty, sensitivity and being emotionally responsive are 
among the most mentioned. Given the influence of religious teachings, and especially 
Shi’ism, in Iranian culture, these positive traits are often attributed to religious figures 
and in particular to Hazrat-i Ali, the first Imam of Shi’ite Muslims: “Hazrat-i Ali is the 
perfect man, and all virtues are ascribed to him” (Bateson, et al., 1977, p. 263). 
Although there are various role models in Shi’ism, both male and female, who are 
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adhered to5, Hazrat-i Ali stands out as one of the most powerful of these, due to his 
positioning in Shi’ite Islam – as the first Imam hand-picked by the Prophet. In addition, 
a relatively large body of his written work has been preserved. These written letters 
and sermons, together with oral stories about him, detail not only his thoughts and 
ways of governing, but also his morale and conduct which make him a role model for 
a large part of Shi’ite Iranians.  
At the heart of the specific traits attributed to Imam Ali, is a sense of purity of the heart 
and integrity, termed safā-yi bātin. It is this characteristic that can be found at the 
centre of the positive valuations of an individual’s character, and what individuals 
would aspire to. 
Safā-yi bātin, literally translated as ‘inner peace’ or ‘inner tranquillity’, has embedded 
within it an important distinction made by Iranians in judging one’s personality and 
character, namely between the interior and exterior of one’s behaviour, what one 
appears to be and how one actually is inside. This dichotomy is seen in different terms 
and in different judgments of individuals, rooted in the religious teachings that preach 
good intentions (niyyat-i khayr), a good character (sīrat) as well as a good face (sūrat). 
In this characterisation, negative judgments and criticism towards individuals often 
take the form of an attack on their character, for failing to have purity of heart, thereby 
causing and manifesting a discontinuity between intention and behaviour. As such, 
safā-yi bātin functions both as an aspect of many Iranians’ self-image, or a trait they 
aspire to, as well as being the characteristic expected to guide personal relationships.  
Purity of heart, or safā-yi bātin, therefore, can be thought of as the most important 
marker of what Iranians consider to be a good person, and the ideal character type to 
aspire to. It should be noted that the person identified with safā-yi bātin carries certain 
other desirable qualities as well. For example, such a person has a certain depth of 
character, is self-reflective, and is aware of the goings-on around her. This 
 
5 Examples of such female role models include Fatemeh, the Prophet’s daughter and Imam 
Ali’s wife, whose purity of character, innocence, power to stand up to injustice, and support 
and care for her family are among her most celebrated personal characteristics.  
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characteristic is associated with religious figures such as Imam Ali, and therefore there 
is often the expectation that a person with this attribute would also be a devout Shi’ite. 
However, increasingly this association and the resultant religious expectations are 
replaced with general non-religious moral standards. What does remain, is the 
association of such a person with other morally superior characteristics, seen both in 
Islamic teachings and in broader Iranian conceptualisations. Notably, such a person, 
with her depth of character, honesty and appreciation of the ongoing fight between 
Good and Evil that constitutes life (see §2.4), and with her inner peace and purity, 
seeks to be ‘good’ in the spiritual and immaterial way that is celebrated in religious 
figures. 
Understanding this cultural way of evaluating one’s character and personality is 
important for the discussion at hand for two main reasons. First is the association of 
the valued characteristics with religious figures, which signals the cultural tendency of 
measuring oneself up against these figures. As will be seen later on, the adherence to 
these individuals makes the case for their teachings forming part of the cultural 
consciousness. As such, their teachings have a role to play in understanding part of the 
cultural sources of variation in experiences of depression and their articulations. 
Secondly, these cultural modes of evaluation play an important role in social and 
interpersonal relationships and the way these are disrupted in depression. As I will 
show, the dynamics of the breakdown of interpersonal bonds can in part be analysed 
with reference to such modes of evaluation and judgements of character.  
2.3.3. Causal attributions in the cultural context 
It is noted in the psychological literature that members of collectivist societies are 
more likely to attribute the cause of events in their lives, especially the negative ones, 
to an outside source (e.g. Choi, et al., 1999; Carpenter, 2000; Triandis, 2002). This 
externalising approach is in part due the conception of self in these societies as 
dependent on the collective group, which has consequences for ascribing 
responsibility for a certain action or event. Iran, as a collectivist culture and society, is 
not an exception to this idea. This characteristic in Iran, however, goes beyond the 
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individual persons’ ideas of causes of events in their lives, and has been discussed in 
theories about the broader Iranian identity and culture.  
Among Iranian modern intellectuals who attempt to analyse and understand historical 
events and their consequences, almost always the causes of misfortune and lack of 
success have been attributed to external forces of influence; whether through waging 
war, or more insidious forces of Imperialism. The few intellectuals who have not 
followed this trend, stand out as especial cases, such as the writer and thinker Sadegh 
Hedayat (e.g. Hedayat, 2002).  
Despite their influence, it would be a mistake to see these conceptions as unique to 
intellectuals. They have rather formed part of the dominant discourse among public 
figures, including politicians and policy makers, and, more importantly, the general 
public. For instance, in popular culture, the supposed decline of the Iranian nation as 
a whole is often attributed to the Arab invasion of the 7th century, and later to the 
influence of ‘the English’ (as seen in the immortalised novel of Iraj Pezekshzad, My 
Uncle Napoleon). This cultural way of encountering ‘the Other’ and the almost 
instinctive and automatic attempt to guard oneself against it, arguably has its roots in 
ancient, pre-Zoroastrian worldview, where the distinction between Self and Other is 
between Iran and aniran (non-Iranian). This differentiation has carried over through 
history and been maintained in the dominant belief system of the country:  
In Zoroastrian texts, and with a remarkable resonance later in Shi'i Islam, 
such differentiation carried important political implications. In the cosmic 
struggle between forces of the good supporting Ahuramazda (the God of 
Wisdom) and forces of evil supporting Ahriman, the Iranians are naturally 
perceived as being on the side of the good. That meant that they had to be 
constantly on guard against impurities and evil pollutants that originate from 
the aniran. If left unchallenged, these alien forces were to prevail either by 
violent means or through deception, that would corrupt the believers’ 
communal and individual bodies. (Amanat, 2012, p. 11) 
This brief exposition serves to show that the causal attribution of an event, especially 
a negative one, to a source outside of oneself, whether an individual self or as part of 
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a bigger national self-identity, is not merely the result of the collectivist nature of the 
society but is a more general cultural tendency. Furthermore, certain parallels can be 
drawn between this conceptualisation and the ideal character types seen in the 
previous section, where the suspicion of a powerful Other not only guides one’s 
encounters with others, but also forms the basis for distinguishing one’s inner peace 
and purity of the heart from the Other’s dishonest hidden intentions.  
2.3.4. Conceptualisations of depression in questionnaire responses 
The three elements explored here as influencing the Iranian conceptions of 
depression, are indeed reflected in the responses to the questionnaire, particularly in 
how respondents define depression, and what they see as having caused their 
depression. In instances respondents view depression as an ‘illness of the soul’, or a 
state of ‘unbalance’ in the soul, since depression is rarely associated with physical 
symptoms, and is seen as distinct from physical illnesses.6  
#1(F) – When the state of one’s soul (hāl-e roohi-e ādam) becomes 
unbalanced and goes towards a continuous (mostamar) sadness (ghamgin 
shodan), it is depression. 
#19(F) – Depression is illness of soul and spirit. 
#22(F) – Depression is an illness of the soul and problems in life caused me 
to become depressed. 
Alternatively, there are those who, in line with the conceptualisation of health and 
illness in traditional medicine, view depression as rooted in physical disturbances that 
influence one’s mind.  
#2(M) – [Depression is] a physical process that happens in the body and ends 
in depression or as some might say, problems of the soul. 
 
6 This is despite the prevalence of complaints of somatic symptoms among the Iranian sample. 
I will look at these symptoms more closely in chapter 7.  
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#21(F) – [Depression is caused by] diet and [genetic] inheritance – my 
mother has depression. 
A significant number of respondents identify external causes for their depression, 
among them environmental stressors that are hinted at in traditional medicine 
conceptualisations. There are also cases where other people, their bad behaviour 
and/or intentions are seen as bringing about depression, highlighting the idea of one’s 
inner purity being tainted by external forces.  
#16(F) – In the process of getting divorced and when I was engaged I endured 
difficult circumstances and that caused my depression. 
#17(F) – I became depressed after failing the Konkour [national university 
entrance exam] and the death of my fiancé. 
#20(F) – Death of the dear ones has caused my depression, the pitying and 
humiliation because of this sadness has caused it. That I used to go to the 
cemetery and cry, and that others humiliated me for this caused my 
depression. 
#33(M) – Depression [is], unsuccessfulness, being suppressed financially and 
physically, emotional incidents, and lacking support network. Not having a 
job or an investment, not having social insurance, losing the dear ones [has 
caused my depression]. 
#37(F) – [Depression is] Not believing in oneself, having stress, of course in 
occasions which are not really under anyone’s control. 
#42(M) – Depression is a mental pressure, which is injected into one as a 
result of problems in life. 
2.4. Sadness, Dysphoria, and Conception of Life in Iran 
As noted in §1.1, one of the central conclusions Good and Good draw from their 
observations in Iran, is that sadness and dysphoria are valued emotions in Iranian 
culture, and even encouraged: “Dysphoria – sadness, grief, despair – is central to the 
Iranian ethos, an emotion charged with symbolic meaning” (Good, et al., 1985, p. 384). 
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This claim defines a cultural framework for understanding depression in Iran, since it 
presents a case where the boundaries between what is considered normal and 
pathological are blurred. The centrality of sadness and dysphoria in Iran is based on 
observations of cultural and religious rituals, as well as works of literature. Good and 
Good argue that the importance of dysphoric affects and experiences pertaining to 
them, as seen in Iranian culture, find meaning within two frameworks; “one associated 
with an understanding of the person or self, the other with a deep Iranian vision of the 
tragic”, as expressed in various cultural mediums and interpretations (Good, et al., 
1985, p. 385).  
Whilst I agree that various cultural rituals and mediums are concerned with some form 
of dysphoric affect, I disagree that the presence of sadness in these occasions is a sign 
of the positive cultural valuation of this affect. The importance of sadness and 
dysphoric affect, I argue, should rather be seen as a consequence of the cultural 
conceptualisation of life. Granted that the status of such emotions has notable 
implications for the conceptualisations and experiences of depression in Iran, it is 
important to understand the significance and place of these emotions within the 
cultural context. In what follows, I will show that in various domains, including religion, 
literature, and interpretation of history, although sadness and dysphoria have a special 
place, it should not be concluded that these emotions are valued for their own sake.  
2.4.1. Shi’ism 
As noted in §2.1, Shi’ism represents the most widely held belief and value system in 
Iran. Good et al. observe that “the core of Iranian Shi’ism embodies a vision of the 
tragic and of grief as a religiously motivated emotion” (Good, et al., 1985, p. 387).  This 
claim is rooted in observations of the religious ceremonies and rituals, which take 
place on a regular basis in Iran.7 Although some of these events are joyful and 
celebratory (e.g. Mid-Sha’ban, Mab’as, Eid al-Fitr), the majority (and the most 
important) of the ceremonies and rituals are aimed at commemorating the lives lost, 
 
7 It should be acknowledged that most of these events are supported by the state, ensuring 
the regularity of the events, as well as the wide reach of them around the country. 
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of the prophet as well as the Imams, and are thus centred around feelings of loss, grief 
and sadness. The latter group of religious occasions make up the main part of public 
religious ceremonies seen in Iran, with a considerable public participation. Based on 
the observation of these events, Kleinman and Good claim, “For Shi’ite Muslims in Iran, 
grief is a religious experience, associated with recognition of the tragic consequences 
of living justly in an unjust world; the ability to experience dysphoria fully is thus a 
marker of depth of person and understanding” (Kleinman & Good, 1985, p. 3). It is 
important to emphasise that the grieving and sadness associated with these events is 
not limited to that of the loss of a person, religious or otherwise. Rather, the lives and 
individuals commemorated symbolise the broader cultural ideal, namely the sacrifices 
made by the forces of Good, in the fight between Good and Evil.  
The most important of the rituals for Shi’ite Iranians is one commemorating the death 
of Imam Hussein, the third Imam of Shi’ite Muslims, whose tale of life and death 
symbolises bravery and fighting for justice in a world of injustice (Fischer, 1980). On 
the day of Ashura, the third Imam and his army of 72 fought against an army of 
thousands in the Battle of Karbala and the war ended with the death of Hussein and 
all of his men. In the rituals commemorating these events, the tale of the battle of 
Karbala is told and retold through different mediums such as public performances 
(ta’zieh) or mourning ceremonies (hey’at-e azādāri). Hundreds of people attend these 
ceremonies, to hear the tale of the battle and the sacrifices made by Imam Hussein 
and his followers, while weeping, beating their chests and grieving. Despite the 
differences in form and shape, the common factor linking all of these ceremonies 
together is the public display of sorrow with large groups of people participating in 
them. It is this factor, whose observation leads researchers to conclude that such 
religious ceremonies are a public manifestation of a personally felt sadness, one that 
is static in nature and thus ready to be publicly expressed routinely.  
I suggest that, despite appearances, what is more fundamental than the public display 
of sadness and sorrow in this and other similar events, is the emphasis placed on the 
fight between the forces of Good and Evil. What is relived in the ceremony of Ashura, 
is the remembrance of the bravery and the values held by the Imam and his willingness 
to die for these values. The battle of Karbala is the ultimate representation of what 
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Iranians take to be the very essence of life itself, i.e. a fight between the forces of Good 
and Evil. And Hossein, as one of the most adhered to role models for Shi’ite Iranians, 
represents the good person fighting this fight, suffering inevitable pain in his efforts to 
be on the side of good, battling evils of injustice, unfairness, and cruelty. Viewed in 
this way, the annual ceremonies commemorating this battle act as reminders of the 
injustices and evil that exist in this world, and of the fact that being good is inevitably 
accompanied by pain and suffering and sadness. Understood as such, it is not the case 
that the religious ceremonies and rituals provide a platform for the display of sadness. 
Rather, sadness is construed as the necessary consequence of being on the side of 
Good, in the eternal fight between Good and Evil.  
The notion of Good and Evil is emphasised in various religious texts and teachings, and 
thus is part of the religious culture of Iran. However, this understanding is not limited 
to the religious domain, and rather is part of the broader cultural conceptualisation of 
life, which can be found in Iranian culture long before it endorsed Islam.  
2.4.2. Persian poetry and literature 
As explained in §2.1, works of literature can be thought of as another pillar of Iranian 
culture, along with religion. Good et al. view the exploration of dysphoric affects in 
works of literature as another indicator of the centrality of sadness as a valued 
emotion in the Iranian culture. They specifically examine the modern secular literary 
works, as “they explicitly explore the boundary between pathology and a valued sense 
of tragic, exploring the meaning of despair, pathological grief, and suicide” (Good, et 
al., 1985, p. 389). Although these themes are indeed present in the most influential 
works of Iranian literature in the 20th century (which will be explored in more detail in 
chapter 4) it is again important to understand the cultural context within which such 
themes find meaning. Similar themes of the tragic, grief, and loss have been present 
in Iranian works of literature throughout history, within the broader conception of life 
as a fight between Good and Evil. These themes can be found in the ancient religion 
of Zoroastrianism, especially in the Gathas – the hymns at the heart of the religion –, 
as well as in ancient Persian mythologies. It is from such starting points that the 
themes are seen in works of literature over the centuries. 
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An instance of where this cultural conceptualisation is seen in works of literature, is in 
The Book of Kings (Shāhnāmeh), dubbed “the national epic of Persia” (Encyclopaedia 
Iranica, 1999). Written by Ferdowsi around the 10th century, the work revisits ancient 
Persian mythologies, but with real mortal people in place of the forces and the ancient 
gods. The epic tells stories that are often concerned with tragedies of loss, grief, 
injustice and war, which find meaning in the eternal fight between forces of Good and 
Evil. The most well-known and influential story in the book is what is arguably the most 
sorrowful of all, telling the tale of a father and son, symbols of bravery and chivalry, 
who have to endure immense suffering. Sohrāb unknowingly enters a battle with his 
father, Rostam, and gets fatally wounded. After realising that he has wounded his own 
son, Rostam tries to find an antidote to heal Sohrāb, but the medicine arrives only 
after Sohrāb’s death. Now Rostam, who is portrayed as incredibly strong and 
unbeatable, is filled with sorrow, guilt and grievance. The depiction of these feelings 
is a detailed and powerful account, comprising, similar to the religious tales, the 
themes of grievance and loss. And similar to the religious tales, these themes find 
meaning in a broader context of the fight between Good and Evil, where a person who 
is a symbol of bravery and strength, falls victim to a conspiracy of a few thirsty for 
power. It is within this broader theme that the truth is kept from Rostam, and he is 
made to endure the guilt of killing his own son, and the grief of his loss.  
The theme of the war between the forces of justice and injustice and the resulting 
sacrifices is also seen in the Book of Kings in the story of the death of Siāvash. He is 
one of the most innocent characters in the epic, who falls victim to the jealousy of 
others. Despite proving his innocence over and over again, Siāvash becomes the victim 
of an elaborate plot that results in his painful unjust death. He, who believed in his 
innocence and was filled with love, refused to fight, and the other side, deceived by 
the jealousy of its people, took him away and brutally took his life. The account 
following his death is not only concerned with the state of the world that has taken 
the life of an innocent man, but also the shame and guilt and grievance felt by the 
deceived side upon knowing the truth. The emphasis put on righteousness and 
innocence, together with the appraisal of truth and condemn of jealousy, makes clear 
certain parallels with the religious ceremonies. The aim of retelling the stories, 
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whether of the fictional battles in the Book of Kings, or those of the religious figures is 
one and the same: the commemoration of forces of good. The sadness and the sorrow 
at the centre of these tails, come from seeing and appreciating the suppression of 
these forces of good.  
Themes of sadness and dysphoria found in the more recent works of literature, also 
find their meaning within this broader conception, albeit they approach the matter 
from a different perspective. Good et al. look at the example of a 20th century novel, 
The Blind Owl by Sadegh Hedāyat, which explores themes of sadness and melancholy 
from a social perspective. Here, the concern is with the fight of an individual for 
authenticity, in the face of a society that limits him, causing him suffering and despair. 
The concern here is the same as the early works of literature, and the religious 
ceremonies. Life itself is construed as a fight between Good and Evil, manifested in 
different forms – unjust war, struggle of individual vs the society, etc. –, with those on 
the side of Good facing inevitable sadness and suffering.  
2.4.3. Iran in the 1980s 
As Good et al. argue, another domain where the emphasis on sadness and dysphoria 
can be seen in the Iranian culture, is in the interpretations of historical events. In 
particular, they view the death of Imam Hossein and the rituals for commemorating 
him, as an instance where the emphasis on sadness can be seen with regards to 
interpretations of a historical event. Taking the more recent example of the war 
between Iran and Iraq, I would argue that interpretation of historical events is done 
against the backdrop of cultural conceptualisations. As such, it should not be surprising 
that similar themes, as those in the works of literature and religious ceremonies, are 
seen in such interpretations.  
As seen in §2.1, Iran suffered huge numbers of casualties during the war and many of 
the army veterans returned with lifelong injuries. During the war, the length of battles 
was justified by appealing to the fight between the forces of Good and Evil, with the 
Iranian side unquestioningly on the side of the Good (see §2.3.3). The official discourse 
after the war, continues to make this association, aiming at keeping the memories of 
war alive, whilst sanctifying the horrors of war. For instance, the tales of those killed 
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in the war were made into compulsory school curricula – most famously the story of 
Hossein Fahmideh, a 13-year-old who was killed at the beginning of the war. Giant 
murals of those killed in the war were put up on streets and highways (and remain 
until the present day), and roads and alleys everywhere are named after those killed. 
Within the dominant discourse, the confrontation with Iraq has never been a ‘war’, 
but ‘The Holy Defence’, and those killed are not ‘casualties’ but ‘martyrs’.  
Various national ceremonies commemorating the sacrifices of war and the lives lost, 
emphasise the same themes as those visited in the religious ceremonies, namely the 
eternal fight between Good and Evil. It is true that Iran suffered heavy losses and 
destruction, but these are justifiable since Iran was the one fighting on the side of 
Good, and as such, the loss and suffering was not only inevitable, but remains 
something to be proud of. By keeping the memories of war alive, therefore, the public 
is reminded, not only that there is an eternal fight between forces of Good and Evil, 
but also that being on the side of Good brings with it inevitable pain, suffering and 
sadness. Thus, by encouraging people to be on the side of Good, the inevitability, and 
the desirability of suffering as a sign of moral superiority, is emphasised.  
The significance of this analysis is twofold. First, as has been made clear, is the 
refutation of the claim that sadness and dysphoric affect are valued in the Iranian 
culture. As I have shown, it is a mistake to take public displays of sadness, and the 
emphasis on these emotions in other domains of Iranian life, as a positive valuation 
and encouragement towards such feelings for their own sake. Rather, this emphasis 
finds meaning against broader cultural modes of understanding and interpretation. 
The inevitable sadness that one endures by attempting to be good, is seen as 
meaningful and significant. It is valued because it signals the individual’s good 
intentions and pure heart (which are culturally valued as discussed in §2.3.2.). And it 
is the fact that this kind of sadness is meaningful that distinguishes it from what is to 
be considered as abnormal, meaningless, and pathological.  
#41(F) – Depression is very different [to sadness and sorrow]. Other forms 
of sadness have a clear reason, but in depression one gets confused and 
loses the reason.  
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#39(F) – Depression is very different [to sadness and sorrow], it brings 
seclusion/isolation and you are sorrowful all by yourself. But one can 
tolerate sadness and sorrow, and can leave it to God.  
Secondly, the analysis highlights the cultural conception of life as an ongoing, and 
never-ending fight between the forces of Good and Evil. As it will become clear 
through the course of the thesis, this cultural conception is noteworthy as a powerful 
cultural framework, against which various experiences find meaning, and are made 
sense of. Furthermore, the observation that as a broad cultural conceptualisation 
instances of this understanding can be seen in different forms and in different domains 
of life, highlights the importance of acknowledging this conceptualisation in a study 
concerned with Iranian cultural frames of thought and understanding. Indeed, in 
exploring the influence of culture on experiences of depression, the understanding of 
life as a fight between Good and Evil, can be shown to be a recurring and important 
cultural influence.  
2.5. Conclusions 
What I have aimed to do in this chapter, is to give a context for the discussions and 
analyses presented in the later chapters. As I will show, each of the themes touched 
upon here, present important elements against which the experiences and debates 
around depression as seen in Iran find meaning. The demographic make-up of Iran has 
important consequences for the attitudes and frames of reference that different social 
and age groups have in understanding depression. Cultural elements such as 
traditional medicine, ideal character types, and cultural modes of causal attributions 
have shaped the Iranian conceptions of depression, while the changing emphasis on 
the approach to psychiatry and public discourse, has influenced Iranians’ 
understanding of psychiatry and their expectations of practitioners and different 
treatments. Whilst the different cultural, religious, and historical elements have led to 
various ways of defining and understanding depression, the interrelation of these 
elements is played out in the way depression is experienced and made sense of in the 
culture. The conceptualisation of life as an ongoing and eternal fight between the 
forces of Good and Evil, and the perception and aspiration of oneself being on the side 
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of Good, has tangible influences on the way in which Iranians understand and interpret 
various aspects of their experience of depression. And furthermore, this 
conceptualisation underlies the distinctions Iranians make between the normal 
sadness and suffering that is seen as an inevitable part of being Good, and the 
pathological feelings experienced in depression. With this framework for meaning-
making and understanding in mind, and making use of the different elements detailed 
here, in the following chapters I will attempt to make sense of the Iranian experiences 
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3. Metaphors of Depression 
3.1. Introduction  
One of the notable features of the questionnaire responses is the use of metaphors in 
describing personal experiences of depression. The place of metaphors in our 
language and everyday lives is an integral one, and this is not solely the result of the 
common appearance of these in our poetry and works of literature. Metaphors are 
“pervasive in everyday life”, not just because they provide us with a tool to talk about 
abstract ideas, or to convey feelings and emotions that are difficult to convey in 
ordinary language, but also because “our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of 
which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980, p. 3). 
This centrality of metaphor in our way of thinking about ourselves, our experiences, 
and the world we live in, can also be seen in experiences of illness (e.g. Sontag, 1990), 
and is of special interest in the case of mental illness. This is due to the fact that 
experiences of mental illness can, in instances, be so alien and unfamiliar that, ordinary 
language would fall short of providing an accurate description of the experiences. 
Understanding the use and significance of metaphors in narratives of depression is 
therefore of utmost importance, both for diagnostic purposes, and for interpersonal 
communications of experiences of depression. As an illness situated at the intersection 
of physical, emotional, and cognitive realities, and carrying symptoms within each of 
these domains, depression gives rise to complex experiences. The complexity of these 
experiences often has consequences for the narratives of depression; the way we 
understand and know it, and the way those suffering from depression attempt to 
describe and explain their experiences. As Kimberly Emmons notes, the definition of 
depression does not follow a universal and straightforward equation-like format, one 
that is easily understood, and has universal implications for any individual 
experiencing it. In the absence of such straightforward definitions, and “[w]hen 
equations fail, metaphoric and figurative language often provide an alternative mode 
of explanation” (Emmons, 2010, p. 94).  
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The use of metaphorical language in talking about depression is seen in various 
domains concerned with depression; such as in pharmaceutical company marketing 
and in texts directed at medical practitioners. But of concern here are the metaphors 
used specifically by patients in expressing and describing their experiences of 
depression. A look into the formation and the use of such metaphors can be 
informative of different elements in experiences of depression. Understanding the use 
of metaphors can illuminate, for example, the perceived nature of depression (e.g. a 
scary intruder as seen in characterisations of depression such as ‘The Beast’ by Tracy 
Thomson (1996)), and the change in one’s perception of the world, brought about by 
depression (e.g. as falling in ‘darkness’ or the world ‘losing its colour’).  
Metaphors can be informative about the cognitive structures of our minds and modes 
of thinking (as noted by Lakoff and Johnson), as well as the culture-specific domains of 
knowledge and belief against which the metaphors sometimes find meaning. A shared 
history can lie at the heart of the formation and use of a metaphor across cultures, 
while different cultural, physical, and environmental experiences can give rise to 
metaphors unique to the context in which they are used. There are further questions 
arising from the analysis of metaphors used in describing experiences of depression 
across cultures: what does the variation in metaphors tell us about depression itself, 
as experienced across cultures? Does the variation in metaphors used in description 
amount to differences in how depression is experienced across cultures?  
I will be looking at metaphors used by patients with depression in Iran in describing 
their experiences of the illness, comparing these to the metaphors used in the US and 
UK. Needless to say, the differences and similarities I will be looking at will be more 
conceptual ones, rather than purely linguistic ones. Where appropriate, I will be 
tracing the metaphors back to a possible cultural, social, or experiential source and 
examining whether the message conveyed through these metaphors points to a 
variation in experiences. In the first instance, however, I will look at some metaphors 
used in describing experiences of depression which are thought to be universal, thus 
shared among depressive patients across different cultures.  
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3.2. Universal Metaphors of Depression 
McMullen and Conway (2002) studied metaphors as used among patients suffering 
from depression in the US. They closely examined audiotaped therapy sessions of over 
four hundred patients. McCullen and Conway adopt a cognitive-linguistic framework 
for metaphors, and reduce the often-varied wording and form of metaphors, into basic 
conceptual metaphors. These basic metaphors, McCullen and Conway argue, can be 
traced to the various ways of thinking about depression and the way these have 
evolved historically. Given their basic conceptual nature, therefore, they argue that 
these metaphors are universal and thus commonly used across different cultures. 
Before proceeding to detail these metaphors and their use, some details of the 
cognitive-linguistic framework for metaphors and how it accounts for the formation 
and the use of metaphors, as adopted by McCullen and Conway in their research, 
needs to be in place.  
3.2.1. The cognitive-linguistic framework of metaphors 
This framework for the understanding of metaphors, originally put forward by George 
Lakoff and Mark Johnson, emphasises the cognitive significance of metaphors. 
According to this account, “metaphors are pervasive in both thought and language” 
because the ways we conceptualise our experiences are fundamentally metaphorical 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 45). On this account, given the vast scope of our 
“subjective mental life” (Ibid.), which includes the subjective judgments that we make 
about abstract notions such as importance, morality, similarity, etc., as well as our 
subjective experiences of desires, emotions, affection, etc., we often need to make 
use of metaphors in articulating and communicating such experiences and thoughts 
to others. Thus, it is argued, “much of the way we conceptualize [these experiences], 
reason about them, and visualize them comes from other domains of experience” 
(Ibid.), namely, our sensorimotor experiences of, and in, the physical world. In this 
sense, then, metaphors are seen as a mapping from some target domain, often 
understood as an abstract conceptual domain, to a source domain, construed as a 
more physical one. For example, we conceptualise the understanding of an idea, as a 
subjective experience that is construed in abstract terms, in terms of grasping an 
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object, which is based in our sensorimotor experience in the physical world, and talk 
of ‘grasping an idea’.   
The cognitive-linguistic account of metaphors makes use of various theories in order 
to account for the complexity in the construction, as well as the use of metaphors. The 
account is constructed in four parts: the conflation of concepts in the course of 
learning, the construction of complex metaphors from primary ones, the neural 
component in the construction of metaphors, and the conceptual blending of 
metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). I will briefly look at how these components are 
put together to frame the cognitive-linguistic account of metaphors.  
Within the cognitive-linguistic framework, “metaphors are based on embodied human 
experiences” (Kövecses, 2005, p. 2), which are often traceable to our experiences in 
childhood. According to ‘the theory of conflation’, associations between our non-
sensorimotor subjective experiences and sensory experiences are developed very 
early on, during the time when the two types of experiences are conflated. Although 
later on we do indeed differentiate between these two forms of experience, the 
associations built up during the conflation period remain with us and form the basis 
for primary metaphorical conceptualisations (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 46). An 
example of this kind of conceptualisation is the primary metaphor AFFECTION IS 
WARMTH (small capital letters denote concepts rather than words). Understanding 
affection in terms of warmth, can naturally be understood in terms of our embodied 
experiences and the theory of conflation. This is since, for an infant, the experience of 
affection is often concurrent and correlated with the sensory experience of warmth 
and being embraced by the parents. This correlation of the two experiences means 
that the two are undistinguished from one another during the period of conflation, 
when associations between affection and warmth are built up. According to this 
theory, these associations remain in place in our minds even after the experiences are 
differentiated and form the basis of the way we conceptualise affection, leading us to 
speak of ‘warm smiles’ or ‘having a warm relationship’. Primary metaphors formed in 
this way, it is argued, are most often universal in their use, since they arise as a result 
of universal experiences. Although it is conceivable that these metaphors do not 
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appear in each and every culture, it is argued that their use is widespread enough for 
them to classify as universal metaphors.   
According to Lakoff and Johnson, primary metaphors, with their minimal structure, 
arise “naturally, automatically, and unconsciously through everyday experience by 
means of conflation, during which cross-domain associations are formed” (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999, p. 46). The construction of primary metaphors in this way is aided by 
the neural activities in the brain. It is argued that during the conflation of experiences 
in childhood, the associations arise via “neurally instantiated correlation” between the 
sensorimotor and subjective experiences, so that the conflation of the two is the result 
of “simultaneous activation of the respective neural network” (ibid, pp.54-55). 
Following this account, then, the neural connections established in the period of 
conflation “project” inferences “from the sensorimotor source network to the 
subjective judgment target network” (ibid., p.55), thus forming the basis for the 
mapping of primary metaphors. It is through this network of cognitive and neural 
learning that the conflations of domains of experience form the basis for the future 
learning and developing of primary conceptual metaphors. This is since, in the 
differentiation stage, domains of experience that were previously seen as concurrent 
and correlated “are differentiated into metaphorical sources and targets” (ibid., p.49).  
Primary metaphors are significant in this framework since, in addition to offering a 
way for placing metaphors within our conceptual framework, they also form the 
constitutive parts of more complex metaphors, which form a large part of our 
conceptual system, affecting the way we think and what we care about (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999, p. 60). These complex metaphors, in turn, and due to their 
pervasiveness in our thoughts, form the basis for further metaphorical combinations, 
both ordinary ones used in our everyday language, as well as poetic ones (Lakoff & 
Turner, 1989). The construction of complex metaphors makes use of two distinct, but 
closely connected theories. Based on the ‘theory of primary metaphor’, complex 
metaphors have a molecular structure, with primary metaphors as the atomic 
constitutive parts of the overall structure. The way in which primary metaphors are 
brought together to make complex metaphors, is through conceptual blending. This 
mechanism is in place when new inferences are constructed through connections that 
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are made across conceptual domains. In other words, this happens when we learn new 
long-term connections between experiences, which in turn “coactivate a number of 
primary metaphorical mappings” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 49). As such, conceptual 
blending works by way of “the fitting together of small metaphorical ‘pieces’ into 
larger wholes” (Ibid.). The way in which primary metaphors ‘fit together’ to make 
complex metaphors is, to some extent, dependent on the culture where they are 
constructed. This is since the cultural models and/or the folk theories and belief 
systems guide the structure of complex metaphors, ensuring that they reflect the 
widely-held beliefs and ideas in the culture where they are formed. 
An example of a complex metaphor constructed in this way in the American culture, 
as noted by Lakoff and Johnson, is ‘A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY’. This metaphor 
follows the folk model in the American culture, partly influenced by the teachings of 
the Bible, that people ought to have a purpose in life and to act so as to reach that 
purpose, while those who do not have one, are seen as ‘lost’ and ‘without a direction 
in life’. This cultural model itself is made up of primary metaphors: PURPOSES ARE 
DESTINATIONS, and ACTIONS ARE MOTIONS, as can be seen by the metaphorical 
statement of the cultural belief that ‘People ought to have destinations in life, and 
they ought to move as to reach those destinations’. The final element constituting the 
complex metaphor is the fact that a journey is made up of a long trip to a series of 
destinations. In this way, the metaphor A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY is seen to 
entail “a complex metaphorical mapping” from the abstract to the physical, including 
A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY, A PERSON LIVING A LIFE IS A TRAVELER, LIFE GOALS ARE 
DESTINATIONS, and A LIFE PLAN IS AN ITINERARY. (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 61). 
3.2.2. Four universal metaphors for depression 
With this framework in mind, McCullen and Conway argue that the various formations 
and wordings of metaphors, most commonly used among patients suffering from 
depression, can be reduced to four basic conceptual metaphors. These metaphors, in 
addition to tracing the historical development of conceptualising and understanding 
depression, as will become clear, can be traced to the physical experiences of 
depression, and as such are argued to be universal. The first conceptual metaphor is 
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DEPRESSION IS DARKNESS, which takes various forms, such as likening depression to a 
cloudy, rainy weather, as well as the patients describing themselves as feeling dark or 
being blue. As McCullen and Conway put it, “inherent in these phrases is … the sense 
of decreased clarity of consciousness and pervasively negative attitude and affect that 
are two of the hallmarks of depression” (McMullen & Conway, 2002, p. 170). 
Additionally, these metaphors indicate the descent of depression upon the patient, 
seemingly autonomous and independent of the patient themselves. The second 
metaphor, often used to describe a sense of carrying a load around, is DEPRESSION IS 
WEIGHT. This metaphor is used to convey a sense of being weighted as felt in the whole 
body, rather than any particular part of it. McCullen and Conway see this as possibly 
amounting to not only a sense of being burdened, but also “of having one’s freedom 
to move somewhat curtailed” (ibid., p.171). Similar to this is the metaphor DEPRESSION 
IS CAPTOR where patients communicate a sense of restriction, talk of feeling trapped 
by the illness and trying to break out and free themselves from it.  
Despite the numerous variations of these metaphors, McCullen and Conway claim that 
these three metaphors only account for less than ten percent of all the metaphorical 
talk around depression, while the remaining ninety percent of instances of the use of 
metaphors is taken up by the most dominant metaphor: DEPRESSION IS DESCENT. This 
metaphor incorporates various expressions of being low or down, as the central 
descriptions of the patients’ states, as well as “numerous metaphorical entailments or 
elaborations derived from our knowledge and experience of descent” such as the slow 
and difficult experience of pulling oneself up and out of an unwanted state or 
situation, after a quick and easy fall (ibid., pp. 171-2). As such, this conceptual 
metaphor fits in neatly within the framework advocated by Lakoff and Johnson in the 
sense that it conveys details of our knowledge and embodied experiences by means 
of mappings between the source domain and the target domain. These four 
metaphors also resonate with the embodied experience of depression, which will be 
looked at more closely in chapter 7.  
One way of looking at the widespread use of the metaphor DEPRESSION IS DESCENT, is 
thinking of it as a fundamental, basic metaphor of emotions, insofar as depression 
includes emotional changes and manifestations in the patient. Seen within the 
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framework advocated by Lakoff and Johnson, the DEPRESSION IS DESCENT metaphor 
follows from the orientational metaphors of emotions. Lakoff and Johnson, as 
mentioned earlier, see primary metaphors as arising from our embodied experiences. 
In this sense, our primary metaphors for basic emotions, which are argued to be 
(largely) universal (Kövecses, 2000, 2005; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), follow from our 
bodily sensations and posture when we experience them. For example, the primary 
metaphors of HAPPINESS IS UP, SADNESS IS DOWN have a physical bodily basis: 
“drooping posture typically goes along with sadness and depression, erect posture 
with a positive emotional state” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 15). DEPRESSION IS 
DESCENT follows directly from the place of such orientational metaphors in culture, 
and incorporate within them the conceptualisation of depression as an undesirable, 
negative state, escaping from and ‘pulling oneself out’ of which requires immense 
effort and often proves difficult.  
If the metaphor DEPRESSION IS DESCENT is indeed universal, then one would expect to 
find instances of it across different cultures. Indeed, in the case of depressed patients 
in Iran, there are various instances where people talk of ‘falling into’ depression, or 
trying to ‘pull oneself out of’ depressive states. In addition to indicating the embodied 
feeling of falling and being low, these metaphors also signify certain 
conceptualisations of depression as a dark pit or dungeon, which once one is fallen 
into, draws one in deeper. This sense of deep descent, together with the physical 
sensations like heaviness of the body, make the escape from this state ever more 
difficult. The presence of these metaphors in the Iranian sample further prove the case 
for the universality of this metaphor.  
#18(M) – My depression world is like I have fallen into a dungeon/oubliette 
(siyāh-chāl). 
#13(M) – [When depressed] I want to sink into blackness even more. 
FB#3 – … I am conscious that life in a city without sunshine, loneliness and 
being far from family and other personal elements have once again pushed 
me towards that black pit.  
#10(F) – [Depression] is like a marsh that every moment sucks you in deeper 
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Elements of the other three metaphors construed by McCullen and Conway as 
universal can also be seen in the above examples. Depression is viewed as a black and 
dark state which one falls into, and like a heavy weight pulls one in ever deeper. This 
way of understanding and describing depression further resembles the state of being 
captured by a force that does not allow for an easy escape. Although the metaphor of 
DEPRESSION IS DESCENT is more easily identifiable in the responses from the Iranian 
sample, some of the culture-specific metaphors used by the respondents also 
resemble the themes explored by McCullen and Conway, as I show in the following 
sections.  
3.3. Culture-specific metaphors for depression 
Given the discussion so far, and the prominent account for metaphors, namely the 
cognitive-linguistic framework, the question remains as to how we ought to account 
for culturally variant metaphors. The cognitive-linguistic framework for metaphors, 
seems to leave little room for cultural variation in metaphors, since for the most part 
the account is concerned with universal experiences and biological elements that 
factor into the construction of metaphors. Recall that in this account, the role culture 
plays in the formation of metaphors is limited to complex metaphors. Specifically, it is 
argued that cultural modes of thinking guide the way in which primary metaphors fit 
together to form complex ones. But primary metaphors are formed as the result of 
experiences which are themselves largely universal, such as the experience of the 
infant being embraced by her parents.  And as Lakoff and Johnson argue in their 
account, “universal early experiences lead to universal conflations, which then 
develop into universal (or widespread) conventional conceptual metaphors” (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999, p. 46). If this were the case, one would expect to see that metaphors 
of depression across cultures are largely reducible to the few basic conceptual 
metaphors which are thought to be universal.  
In what follows, I will present two examples of metaphors used by depressed patients 
in Iran. In the first case, I will argue, the cognitive-linguistic framework can indeed 
account for the variation, whereas in the second case, one needs to say more to 
account for the role of culture in the formation and use of the metaphor. Using these 
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examples, I will then seek to explain whether these instances of variation and 
universality tell us something significant about variation in experiences of depression 
across cultures. 
3.3.1. Metaphors of colour 
Talking in metaphors is customary in Iran, and it can be thought of as following from 
the long history of literature and poetry and their incorporation in everyday life and 
discourse of Iranians (as noted in §2.1). One of the most widely used metaphors is that 
of colours, which gives a certain quality to a given situation. Such use of colour 
metaphors can be traced back to at least the 12th century in the works of Rumi, where 
different colours are associated with different emotions, states of being and attitudes. 
For example, Rumi uses the colour red to signify, among other things, health and well-
being, wealth and worth, and sometimes anger. Whereas green signifies life, 
nourishment and youthfulness, yellow is associated with shame, fear, and ailments. 
The colour black in these works is one often used to describe sadness, sorrow, 
mourning, and bitterness (Ansari, et al., 2012).  Such use of metaphors of colours 
continues to be commonplace both in contemporary literature, as well as in everyday 
discourse. It should also be noted that the metaphorical power of colours does not 
come solely from the association they have acquired in works of literature, rather, 
some colour terms are inherently metaphoric, in virtue of how they are named. The 
colour grey, for example, khākestari, literally means ‘of or relating to ash’. The 
metaphorical uses of this colour term, in turn, can be interpreted in ways that go 
beyond the associated meaning as a colour term. Similarly, in other cases where the 
colours are named after different entities, such as water (colour blue) or different 
flowers (variations of purple and red), they take on the metaphorical meanings 
associated with those entities themselves, which are found in the works of literature, 
idioms, and everyday language.  
As such, given the wide range of meanings associated with colour terms, it is not 
surprising that they have found their way into the everyday language of Iranians. In 
this context, metaphors of colour are most often used to positively state the existence 
of a certain mood or emotion as felt by the individual, or to convey a certain way in 
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which the individual perceives the world. It is not uncommon, for example, for one to 
state that ‘one’s life has become black’ (roozegāram siyāh shod ) to state a disastrous 
state of one’s being as a result of an event or a loss, or to wish someone to be happy 
and well by wishing them ‘to be green’ (sabz bāshi!). Given this outline of the place of 
colour metaphors in the Farsi language, I would argue that a look into the way these 
are employed by Iranians in describing their experiences of depression, can be 
informative in understanding what may be considered the dominant mood of 
depression, as felt by Iranians.    
As noted in §2.3, previous studies on depression in Iran emphasise the importance of 
sadness and sorrow in the culture, and in experiences of depression (Good, et al., 
1985). Given these findings and the use of the colour term black in signifying emotions 
of sadness and dysphoria, one would expect to find different descriptions of 
depression making use of this metaphor. However, the use of this colour term, rather 
than representing a common theme, was limited to only a few instances.  
#17(F) – The world seems black to me and I think it is not worthy at all. Every 
day is the same and repetitive … [the sadness] just becomes longer and like 
a black aura which takes over my whole being and entangles my whole life.  
#13(M) – [I felt] the story of my life becoming black. 
In contrast, the most frequent use of the concept of colour in people’s articulations of 
their experiences of depression seems to be different to the common way of 
employing these terms. Whereas in everyday contexts colour terms are employed to 
state and describe an existing mood or emotion, in describing their experiences of 
depression, Iranians mostly talk of ‘lack of colour’, ‘fading colours’ or the world ‘losing 
its colour’. Furthermore, the fact that such statements can be seen with regards to 
various aspects of life in depression, such as ways of seeing the world and one’s 
relation to it, as well as effects of medication, I would argue that these statements give 
an account of the mood in depression generally, as it is felt by Iranians.  
#1(F) – [When taking medications] sexual matters become colourless (bi 
rang) and even grotesque (maskhare). 
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#6(F) – [In depression] the positive aspects [of life] lose their colour (kam 
rang) and sometimes even vanish altogether. 
#3(F) – […] in the end life is always a little bit interesting, but it can lose its 
colour (kam rang). 
#10(F) – Life is vain (bi-fāydeh), colourless, tasteless and unreal. 
#16(F) – [My relations with others] really faded in colour. 
What is interesting here is the replacing of the usual use of colour terms as a 
descriptive tool and one that attaches certain qualities to different experiences and 
entities, with an image of the world with fading colours, or in some cases, a blank, 
colourless image where the existence of any attitude or feeling towards the world is 
uncertain. The metaphorical phrases used here are heavy in terms of the meaning they 
convey, as the images of a colourful vs. a colourless world are powerful in antithetical 
ways. A world full of colour is construed as one full of energy, representing emotionally 
meaningful possibilities and motivation to strive towards the future. In such an image 
the perception is one of a mobile world, where one can conceive of change, as 
opposed to being threatened by a mundane daily routine. This is while the colourless 
world is idle, and idly meaningless (the theme of meaninglessness will be explored 
further in Chapter 4). The atmosphere and mood in such a world is one of frustration, 
indifference and stillness. There is no motivation to move forward, since there is no 
perception of conceivable change. In such a world the only colour that could be seen 
is that of an enduring grey, if one counts grey as a colour at all.  
#8(M) – [I feel] cold and grey.  
FB#5 – [Depression] was grey (khākestari) … It was like a filter on my eyes. 
[Like] big grey eyeglasses that reveal a grey life. 
These various elements of meaning embedded in these metaphors serve to give a 
good general picture of the mood in depression in Iran. This picture is further 
reinforced by the direct descriptions of inability to find meaning in life and everyday 
activities, by the lack of change, lack of hope, etc. What is further interesting, is the 
fact that sadness and sorrow are not emphasised as strongly as part of depression 
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experience. Lack of colour and the colour grey, which signify neutrality and idleness, 
rather than sadness, are used considerably more in the responses in describing the 
mood in depression, compared to the colour black which is often used in everyday 
language to convey a sense of sadness and sorrow. It seems, therefore, that one of the 
main constitutive parts of the experience of depression in Iran can be characterised 
through the ramifications of the perceived colourlessness of the world.  
Depression is often portrayed in the UK and US with colours associated with sadness: 
black, and various shades of grey. Perhaps the most familiar example of such portrayal 
is the often-cited representation of depression as ‘a black dog’ which follows one 
everywhere (Johnston, 2007). Or, as seen in the study conducted by McCullen and 
Conway, as the grey colour we associate with cloudy and rainy weather. Indeed, I 
would argue that the metaphors of colour themselves can be understood in terms of 
the conceptual universal metaphor THE WORLD IS COLOURFUL. This conceptual 
metaphor can further be traced to our physical experience in, and of the world we live 
in. Due to our biological make up, and the physical properties of our visual system, 
people from different cultures, have access to the same colour palettes, and we all 
perceive the world as colourful. The cultural variation in these metaphors is seen in 
the association of different colours with different associations, with the universal 
conceptual metaphor intact. For example, whereas ‘feeling blue’ for English speakers 
means feeling sad or having a low mood, the colour blue in the Iranian culture, is often 
associated with the feeling of calm and tranquillity. This is while the colour black in 
both cases is associated with a sense of sadness, loss, and sorrow. As such, both 
similarities and differences in the use of colour terms could be said to arise from the 
conceptual metaphor THE WORLD IS COLOURFUL.  
In depression, however, the cognitive and emotional change that one goes through 
amounts to an altered perception of the world, which, despite some differences in 
representation across cultures, remains an integral part of the experience of 
depression. The perception of the world in depression as grey, in some sense amounts 
to the alteration of this perception of the world, changing our ordinary experience of 
the world as colourful into a colourless one. In this sense, I would argue, the message 
conveyed by Iranians, when they describe their various experiences and feelings of the 
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world in depression as ‘colourless’, ‘faded in colour’ or ‘losing colour’ could indeed be 
equated with the message conveyed by patients in the US or UK, who talk of ‘cloudy’, 
‘rainy’ and ‘grey’ world. This variation can also be seen to be due to certain 
geographical characteristics. The use of metaphors of rain and cloudy weather, in the 
US and UK, to signify the idleness of the world in depression can be traced to the 
abundance of such weather and the sense of familiarity and cultural associations with 
it which drive the metaphors. The absence of such metaphors in Iran, can in turn be 
linked to its different climate where rain and cloudy weathers are less frequent, and 
therefore carry a different symbology in the culture and a weaker sense of familiarity. 
I would argue, however, that despite the differences in the metaphors used to 
describe the prevailing mood in depression, the basic experience of depression that is 
conveyed in these different metaphors remains the same. In other words, the basic 
metaphor DEPRESSION IS COLOURLESSNESS can be extracted from both sets of patients. 
This metaphor arguably arises from the observation that there is a basic existential 
change (Ratclife, 2008; 2015) in the way one perceives the world around her in 
depression, in ways that amount to feelings of idleness, lack of motivation and the 
struggle to find meaning, in a world that was previously seen as colourful and one that 
presented itself with various possibilities.  
This way of accounting for the variation in metaphors across cultures, points to the 
fact that one’s sensorimotor experiences can vary in accordance with the geographical 
and environmental context of the experiences. Such external variations, therefore, can 
give rise to various experiences that in turn give rise to variation in conceptual 
metaphors. As pointed out above, for example, the significance of rain in different 
geographical locations can give rise to different metaphors. In a country with a largely 
wet weather, rain can take on metaphorical meanings that capture the inconvenience 
of rain or the gloominess of a rainy weather. This is while in a different location where 
it rarely rains and the weather is largely dry, rain can come to symbolise happiness and 
fertility. A similar argument can be made for the dominant values in a society, which 
form the basis of cognitive conceptualisations of phenomena, which in turn give rise 
to conceptual metaphors. Thus, in a culture, such as Iran where sadness has a 
prominent place, metaphors of depression might aim to highlight other aspects of the 
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illness such as the prevalent sense of meaninglessness and idleness (see chapter 4), 
rather than the persistent sadness entailed in it. Such examples show that variation in 
metaphors across cultures, is not only found in complex metaphors which are formed 
in accordance with the cultural modes of thinking, but also in primary metaphors 
which are based in fundamentally different experiences brought about as a result of 
different cultural values, as well as environmental factors.  
Indeed, there have been attempts within the cognitive-linguistic framework to modify 
the account in order for it to be more accommodating to cultural variation (e.g. 
Kövecses, 2005). Kövecses argues that there is much more to be done for the 
cognitive-linguistic framework to become a comprehensive account of metaphors, 
one which could accommodate the universality of certain metaphors, as well as their 
cultural variations. Although Kövecses leaves the scope open for various sources of 
variation, he argues that these can be broadly attributed to two types of causes. On 
the one hand, variation in metaphors can arise due to differences in our experiences, 
while on the other hand, our metaphors vary due to the variation in cognitive styles 
and preferences we use in the creation of abstract thought. One of the advantages of 
defining these two broad classes of causes is the large scope it leaves for the influence 
of culture, since variation in both experiences and cognitive preferences can arise, at 
least partly, due to variation in culture. However, there might also be a disadvantage 
in having such a large scope for variation, since personal variations could leave us with 
a theory of metaphor that is person-dependent: where meaning of metaphors are to 
be found through intimate relation with the person using the metaphors, rather than 
having a pre-defined basis for interpretation. This, in fact, would cause further 
problems, since part of the assumption behind the use of metaphors, is the existence 
of a shared space of meaning between people of the same social group.  
What is undeniable, is the fact that there are indeed different ways of constructing, 
interpreting, and using metaphors. I could take a reasonable guess at the meaning of 
a metaphor uttered in a language and a culture where I am not a native, as I could 
understand the experience or the rationale behind the construction of it. However, 
the fact remains that some metaphors are so deeply rooted in the language and 
culture of a people, that understanding their message would be near impossible 
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without at least some inside knowledge of that culture. This observation can cause 
problems, especially in cases where the communication of emotions or the state one 
finds oneself in is crucial for one’s wellbeing. In the next sub-section I will discuss 
metaphors of water, as used by Iranians in talking about their depression. This 
presents a case where an extensive knowledge of various historical and cultural 
trajectories is needed for the understanding of the metaphor.  
3.3.2. Metaphors of water 
The metaphor of colour can be seen as an example of a universal conceptual 
metaphor, one which has developed similarly in different cultures and thus can be 
used to convey similar meanings. However, there are other metaphors used in the 
description of depression, which arise from within the cultural conceptualisations and 
social settings and are thus not reducible to a basic universal conceptual metaphor. 
An example of such a metaphor, found in Iranians’ descriptions of their experiences of 
depression, is that of water. I would argue that this metaphor should be classed as a 
cultural, rather than a universal cognitive metaphor. The story of how this element 
came to occupy a central place in the Iranian domain of metaphors needs to be told in 
order to serve as a justification for classifying the metaphor in this way.  
In ancient Persian mythologies, water was the symbol of life and was seen as a holy 
entity from which every material thing was created.8 In the pre-Zoroastrian mythology, 
it is said that following the creation of the heavens, Hormozd (the ancient Persian God) 
created the Earth and all within it from water: “such is said, that the first creations 
were all from water, except for the people and the animals, since these are descended 
from the essence of fire” (Bahar, 1997, p. 44 – my translation). From the story of the 
creation of the world from water, we find the first symbology of water in the Persian 
texts, namely one associated with creation and birth.   
 
8 This symbology of course, is not unique to Ancient Persia and is in fact seen in mythologies 
of Ancient Egypt, Babylon, and India. 
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The second mythological symbolising of water, which follows from the earlier one, is 
the association of water with second birth. This is since water is seen as “an archaic 
symbol of the womb and of fertility; also purification and rebirth” (Hall, 1994, p. 111). 
This rebirth does not only correspond to a second life after death (as is found in ancient 
Egyptian mythology), it rather encompasses any form of psychological rebirth and is 
thus representative of change in one’s life. This sort of symbology is best seen in the 
Persian epic stories rooted in ancient mythologies, namely the Shāhnāmeh (The Book 
of Kings). In many of the stories in this book, water presents the heroes with changes, 
in the form of newly found strengths, which later on allow them to achieve their goal 
and overcome the obstacles. As the prominent Iranian mythologist Bahar put it; 
Passing through water has a special importance in Iranian mythology. Most 
of the heroes pass through water before achieving an immense success. This 
is probably based on the belief that with each passing through water, a new 
birth occurs. Water is associated with a mother’s womb and a new birth 
represents purity, holiness and new power. (Bahar, 1997, p. 260 – my 
translation) 
This idea is also found in Christianity and baptism, pointing to a common history of this 
symbology. But as will become clear, this shared history does not guarantee a shared 
metaphorical language, with similar (if not the same) meanings.  
Following from this symbolising of water, the third one is that of water as the source 
of immortality. In various stories from ancient Persian mythologies, as well as Islamic 
stories that appeared much later, one sees the notion of ‘Water of Life’ (āb-e hayāt), 
as one which many heroes and characters of the stories seek in order to gain 
immortality.9 It is worth noting, however, that in these mythical stories, the heroes are 
never successful in gaining immortality, as if they chase only an imaginary notion, the 
Water of Life always slips from them. The only story in which the hero finds the Water 
of Life, found in the Shāhnāmeh, represents immortality as becoming one with the 
 
9 In the West, this notion can be seen in the Fountain of Youth, although the portrayal and the 
stories that follow are slightly different. 
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heavens, rather than living on Earth, among material things forever. This could in fact 
be traced to the earlier perceptions of water as holy and in a sense, with supernatural 
qualities.  
The mythological and ancient symbols are important here, since they offer a way of 
understanding the development of the metaphorical language and symbology 
surrounding water, which persist today. It can be argued that the reason why 
symbology of water in Islam was readily accepted into the Iranian culture, was due to 
the existing conceptions of water as holy, and as the source of all life. In Islam too, 
water is seen as the origin from which all was created and the holiness of it is seen in 
the teachings which see water as a tool for cleansing dirt and impurities. Although such 
a symbolism dates back to Mithraism as practiced in the then Persia (circa 6th century 
BC), and is seen in the retelling of the mythological stories, such as the Shāhnāmeh, 
the place of this notion in today’s Iran has been further established through the Islamic 
teachings, which also see water as purifying.  
This purifying character of water is in large part only associated with flowing bodies of 
water, such as rivers, and this association has given rise to further modes of thinking 
about flowing and standing bodies of water. Flowing bodies of water, in addition to 
being seen as having a purifying quality, are also a symbol of change and mobility. The 
juxtaposition of the two ways of symbolising bodies of water, have led to various 
metaphorical expressions, in poetry as well as the everyday life, which sanctify flowing 
water, while conversely, the standing bodies of water symbolise the opposite. In this 
symbology, then, a stagnant body of water would soon lose its quality of life-giving 
and fertility and instead give rise to an undesirable and unworthy environment in 
which no hope of life and fertility could be found. This undesirable character arises 
from a lack of change and idleness of the water and represents a trap leading to 
nothingness and death. As such, whilst flowing water was seen as a symbol of life and 
fertility, stagnant and static bodies of water came to be known as symbols of idleness, 
worthlessness, and death. The undesirability of stagnant bodies of water is also seen 
in the names given to such bodies. Most notably, for example is the compound name 
‘mordāb’, literally meaning ‘dead water’. Although scientifically this word designates 
marshes, due to its inherently metaphorical name, in the everyday language it is used 
  66 
to signify stagnant bodies of water generally, which would include, in addition to 
marshes, swamps and ponds. Such a name, as seen also in the case of inherently 
metaphorical colour terms in Farsi, plays a significant role in the conceptualisation of 
stagnant bodies of water. The way mordāb is defined in the Farsi lexicon is also 
interesting, as the definition relies on the contrast between flowing and stagnant 
bodies of water: “mostly applied to non-flowing water, which is standing and 
unmoving, as opposed to water of river which has movement and way” (Dehkhoda, 
1962 – my translation). 
In the context of talking about their experiences of depression, Iranians make use of 
this extensive symbology of water, conveying various meanings traceable to the 
development of the place of water, as a symbol, in Iranian culture. Although the use 
of such metaphors has been limited in the questionnaire, the few existing ones are 
noteworthy in highlighting the place and meaning of such metaphors in Iran, as well 
as being informative of aspects of the Iranian conceptualisation and experiences of 
depression.  
The first way in which Iranians use the metaphor of water to describe their state in 
depression, is seen in the likening of depression, to a stagnant body of water, in which 
they are trapped and cannot get out of.  
#10(F) – It’s like a mordāb, that every moment sucks you in deeper. 
Such characterisation and understanding of depression as a mordāb is commonplace 
in publications and websites that aim to educate people on the topic. A phrase that 
can be found repeatedly in describing the experience of depression is ‘floundering in 
the mordāb of afsordegi’ (dast va pā zadan dar mordāb-e afsordegi), to signify the 
struggle involved in the experience of depression and the attempts at overcoming the 
illness  (e.g. Beytoote.com, 2015). The simile is seen time and again in self-help 
publications as well: “There will be instances when your determination against 
unanswered questions and feelings of hopelessness will be challenged. But it is 
precisely in these moments that you must pull yourself out of the inner mordāb ever 
more forcefully” (Ghahremani, 2014 – my translation) 
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Although there have been a few cases of people drowning in marshes in Iran (e.g. Aftab 
News, 2014), the term ‘mordāb’ gets used as an umbrella term for different stagnant 
bodies of water which represent a danger. In addition to the use of mordāb, with the 
associations described earlier, it is worth noting here the parallels with the research 
done by McCullen and Conway in which the conceptual metaphor DEPRESSION IS 
DESCENT was found to be the most dominant metaphor for depression in the US. The 
quote from the Iranian sample and the common ways of thinking about depression in 
Iran, as noted above, serve as evidence for the universality of this way of 
conceptualising depression. Namely, as a state that makes the individual suffering 
from it descend to a lower place, whether it is one’s low mood that makes one droopy, 
or the sense of drowning or getting sucked in. And as such I would argue that the above 
quote can serve as an example of a complex conceptual metaphor, one which despite 
drawing on universal basic metaphors, is developed in a way as to reflect the cultural 
framework for thought and popular beliefs specific to the cultural context in which 
they are used. Such a metaphor, as seen earlier, arises from the embodied experiences 
of depression, part of which would be conceptualised by metaphors for basic 
emotions, but one that is formulated in culturally familiar terms, which conform to the 
established cultural beliefs, thoughts and conceptions of depression. 
This metaphorical way of talking about depression is significant, as it says something 
about the perceived nature of depression among the Iranian patients. Following the 
associations of stagnant bodies of water, depression is seen not only as an undesirable 
state, but also as a dangerous trap, carrying notions of idleness and decay, posing as a 
destructive threat to the self. This portrayal to some extent resonates with the 
associations found in the use of colour metaphors, namely the view of depression as 
transforming one’s life to an idle, unchanging state, but goes further in the 
characterisation of depression as not only undesirable but dangerous and deadly. 
Once one is fallen in such a trap, an overwhelming strength, stemming from the inner 
self or an external force, is needed in order to find a way out. It can therefore be 
argued that, although the basic conceptualisation of depression is the same as that 
found by McCullen and Conway, the story that is told about this conceptualisation, 
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through this metaphor, is a uniquely culture-dependent one, one which arises from 
deeply rooted cultural notions, symbols and associations.  
There are also instances of metaphorical descriptions of experiences which are more 
difficult to place within the cognitive-linguistic framework, and seem to be constructed 
following only the cultural associations and frameworks for thoughts. For instance, 
although the cultural associations around water view it as a cleansing and purifying 
entity, there is also the idea that if water itself becomes a source of impurity, then 
ridding oneself of pollutants could become impossible and unthinkable: 
FB#21 – I realised that the soil of my being is too close to the sea of 
depression … just a little digging makes the foul water of depression come 
out, and as soon as your hand is dirtied with this water you are no longer 
scared of getting wet. Once your hand is dirtied with it, precisely like an 
irresistible addiction you keep digging and make that hole deeper … after a 
while you realise that there is nothing left of you, and you yourself have 
become a big hole that now is always full of water.  
The metaphor of depression as a foul fluid that disturbs the inner purity of the 
individual, and with its insidious nature slowly takes over one’s being, is consistent with 
understanding of depression in other cultures as an intruding entity that takes over 
one. However, the cultural symbology of water is also noteworthy here; that which is 
supposed to maintain and restore purity, itself becomes a source of impurity, and fills 
one up in a way that restoring the pure nature of oneself seems out of reach.   
Although in this case the understanding is one of water filling one up and 
fundamentally changing the nature of one’s being, the metaphor of water can also be 
used to talk about one’s very nature. Talking of the self in depression as a rough and 
stormy body of water, as seen in the following example, represents another instance 
where the cultural use of metaphor does not correspond with the universal 
metaphorical ways of talking about depression:    
#12(F) – I was like a puddle that kids had jumped into. Worried, messy, 
confused. Meditation didn’t show me the future but calmed that water and 
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created a self-confidence, that although I don’t know who I am or what I will 
do but certainly nothing bad will happen to me. 
The above quote can be thought to be representing feelings of anxiety that often 
accompany depressive symptoms. What is interesting here is the conceptualisation of 
the self as a body of water, one that loses its tranquillity due to illness. Such a 
perception of the self as a body of water can be traced to the literature and poetry of 
Iran after Islam. The Islamic symbology of water and the thoughts following from the 
framework defined by this symbology, has been further developed in the Iranian 
literature, and especially in the Mystic and Sufi poetry. In these works of literature 
water is seen as symbolising both the spirit of the human beings, as well as a purifying 
and cleansing entity. The association of water with the self follows from the symbol of 
water as the origin of all things, as well as the qualities of change and rebirth – of the 
soul more than the body – as seen in the ancient mythologies and the Islamic 
teachings. These symbols, in turn, have found their way into the everyday language of 
people and are often used in metaphorical forms to convey various messages.  
One example of such portrayal of the self can be seen in Rumi’s poetry. In his poetry, 
Rumi sees the human soul and mentality as a body of water, one that needs to be kept 
calm and tranquil, to keep it from physical and mental impurities (Obeydinia & 
Valinezhad, 2009, p. 38). In other words, in this portrayal, one’s health, as a body of 
water, is measurable by the calmness it enjoys, whereas the storminess and the waves 
of water can be seen as representative of a loss of balance and thus a symptom of ill 
health. This is to some extent in association with the way in which traditional Iranian 
medicine conceptualises ill health, namely as a loss of balance in the physical and 
mental forces (see §2.3.1). Depression, in this picture, is presented as disrupting the 
calmness of the self, turning the waters stormy and causing the imbalance in the 
mental life, and thus the perception of the self.  
Metaphors of water, given the cultural ways of thinking that give rise to them, can be 
thought of as an example of culture specific metaphors that cannot be seen as drawing 
on a basic universal conceptual metaphor. The cultural rootedness of these metaphors 
makes it difficult to see how, if at all, this way of thinking and talking about depression 
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can be understood in terms of universal cognitive systems. It rather finds its meaning 
largely against the backdrop of cultural ways of thought and interpretations of the self 
and the world.  
Culture-specific metaphors, in addition to drawing on cultural understandings and 
symbology, often draw on individual experiences and interpretations of these 
symbols, making it difficult to have a clear-cut way of interpreting the metaphors, in a 
way that is generalizable to the broader cultural context. The complexity of the use, 
and the messages conveyed by these metaphors, however, does not mean that they 
are unhelpful. On the contrary, they provide an insight into some of the ways in which 
people in Iran conceptualise themselves, depression, and their relation to depression, 
which in turn could be informative of not only their experiences of depression, but 
also their behaviours in response to it. For example, seeing patients articulating their 
experiences in terms of a metaphor, which is traceable to the traditional ways of 
conceptualising illness and health, could be informative about their help seeking 
behaviours. This could be seen in Iranian patients’ reluctance in seeking mainstream 
medication in treating their depression, and instead seeking traditional alternative 
remedies to alleviate their symptoms. Viewed in this way, the metaphorical language 
used in articulating experiences of depression, can point to significant differences in 
patients’ responses to depression across cultures, as arising from cultural ways of 
thinking about and interpreting depression.  
3.4. Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter has been to examine the various metaphorical ways of talking 
about depression and experiences of it, and the implications these have for the 
variation in the way patients in different cultures experience depression. If we adopt 
a cognitive-linguistic framework for understanding metaphors, we also would have to 
accept that metaphors, their formation as well as their use, are rooted in conceptual 
frameworks for understanding and interpreting different phenomenon. As such, a 
study of metaphorical articulations of experiences of depression can be significant, in 
that it offers a way of understanding depression that takes into account the different 
cultural ways of conceptualising and interpreting depression. In cases where the 
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metaphors are wide-spread enough to be considered universal, one could argue that 
the cognitive framework of understanding the illness is shared across cultures. This 
assumption would also hold for metaphors which, despite their slight variation in 
form, are rooted in an identifiable underlying universal conceptual system. 
Nonetheless, for those metaphors that are deeply rooted in cultural ways of thought 
and interpretation, and thus irreducible to universal conceptual metaphors, the 
underlying cognitive framework would be unique to the culture in which these 
metaphors are formed and used. Furthermore, given the emphasis placed on 
experiences in the formation of conceptual metaphors in the cognitive-linguistic 
framework, it follows that in cases of (largely) universal metaphors, the underlying 
experiences are largely similar. If there is a universal conceptual metaphor for 
depression, such as DEPRESSION IS DESCENT, then one would expect to see variations 
of this metaphor in different cultures, confirming that, regardless of the culture and 
context of experience, patients experience this aspect of depression in more or less 
the same way. As the preceding arguments show, there are indeed metaphors used 
by Iranian patients which confirm this.  
On the other hand, metaphors that are unique to the cultural setting in which they are 
uttered, point to frameworks for understanding and interpreting experiences that are 
unique to that culture. As examples of such metaphors in Iran illustrate, the formation 
and use of these metaphors are deeply rooted in the cultural and folk belief systems 
and thus encompass various meanings and symbologies unique to the culture. I have 
argued that in such cases, studying the use of metaphors offers a way of understanding 
cultural conceptions that in one way or another, can influence the individuals’ 
experiences of depression, and their way of encountering it in light of cultural 
understandings.  
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4. Death-Consciousness and Absurdity10 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I start to consider some of the features of depressive experiences that 
seem to vary between Iran and the UK. Whilst sadness is one of the most frequent 
complaints among the UK sample, only 16% of Iranians complain of feeling sad in 
depression. As seen in Figure 2 (p.15), feelings of meaninglessness and absurdity 
(32.6%) and hopelessness (39.5%) comprise some of the most frequently complained 
about symptoms among Iranian patients. Although hopelessness is a key feature of 
experience of depression across the two cultures, I argue that in Iran such feelings are 
closely related to complaints of absurdity.  The presence of these feelings of absurdity, 
as a point of divergence between experiences of depression in Iran and the UK, can be 
shown to be rooted in cultural and religious frames of thought dominant in Iranian 
culture. In this chapter I aim to show how a culture of death-consciousness, present in 
Iran, significantly affects experiences of depression and the way people interpret these 
experiences.  
Inevitably, the experience of any sort of serious illness, as the closest one could get to 
a bridge between life and death, would be affected by one’s attitudes towards death. 
Furthermore, depression brings about existential feelings that can serve to amplify 
thoughts of death, which in turn influence the way one experiences depression and 
responds to it. Given these observations, I will argue that certain symptoms and 
manifestations of depression among Iranian patients can be analysed and accounted 
for through the examination of the death-conscious culture of Iran. These include the 
existence of a sense of absurdity with respect to oneself and one’s life, as well as the 
different attitudes and responses towards suicide and suicidal thoughts. Such an 
analysis, in addition to accounting for the phenomenological significance of these 
 
10 A version of this Chapter has been published as: Mirdamadi, M. (2018a). “How Does the 
Death Conscious Culture of Iran Affect Experiences of Depression?”. Culture, Medicine and 
Psychiatry. Published online first 9th August 2018. DOI: 10.1007/s11013-018-9597-4. 
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experiences, also serves to explain the way in which these experiences vary due to 
cultural differences.  
In the first part of this chapter, I will outline what I mean by the culture of death-
consciousness in Iran, as a pervasive way of understanding and relating to the world, 
before turning in the second part to the discussion of how this culture contributes to 
the variations in experiences of depression, as seen in Iran and the UK. 
4.2. Iran as a Death-conscious Culture 
Schopenhauer identifies the ‘denial of the will to live’ with an ascetic attitude of 
renunciation and resignation, one that is reached by most people in proximity to 
death, in actuality but also in awareness and knowledge.  He observes that this denial 
and the practices arising from it, are “further developed, more variously expressed, 
and more vividly presented, in the Sanskrit language than could be the case in the 
Christian church and the Western world” (Schopenhauer, 1969, p. 387). As such he 
points to a cultural difference between the East and the West, one that could be 
characterised in terms of the extent of preoccupation with death; the death-conscious 
nature of the Eastern cultures (San'ati, 2004).11 Schopenhauer highlights these 
differences and praises the philosophy of life as practiced in the East, through 
mysticism and asceticism as the kind of practice that stays true to the nature of our 
being – with death as one of the pillars of this existence. Such a culture, manifestations 
of which would be visible in various domains of life, such as religious and social 
practices, is phenomenologically significant, since it offers a way for articulating, 
understanding, and interpreting one’s experiences. Indeed, preoccupations with 
death exist in every culture, as a universal human and existential concern. However, 
 
11 Mohammad San’ati, a psychoanalyst and literary critic in Iran, claims that a broad range of 
behaviours seen among Iranians can be attributed to, and explained by, the observation of the 
culture as a death-conscious one (alternatively termed ‘death culture’) (San'ati, 2004). This 
account is mostly brought out in terms of works of literature, and aimed at explaining the 
everyday and routine behaviours of Iranians. Whilst borrowing the notion, I aim to give a more 
general understanding of the culture, and use it to account, specifically, for experiences of 
depression in Iran. 
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as I describe here, the nature of the relationship Iranians have with death, and its 
pervasiveness in the culture and cultural conceptualisations, distinguishes the death-
conscious culture of the country from the broader concern with death, seen 
universally across cultures.  
The Iranian preoccupation with death can be seen in various domains of culture and 
social life, with a long history and tradition that has arguably resulted in such concerns 
being engrained in the cultural framework for thought and practice. Indeed, the 
preoccupation with death, both as a physical end to the worldly life, as well as a 
gateway to heaven and hell, can be seen and traced in various cultural domains, such 
as the religious practices, the works of literature and poetry, as well as in social 
domains. The collective experiences of war and the devastating effects it has had on a 
large part of the population has also shaped, in large part, the existence of the culture 
of death-consciousness as presently seen in Iran. Although this collective experience 
itself has shaped a large part of the Iranian consciousness today, as I will show, its 
continuing power in framing cultural ways of thought and interpretation is in part due 
to the pre-existing cultural and religious landscape in Iran. In examining this death-
conscious culture of Iran, the role of the Islamic Revolution and the establishment that 
resulted from it ought to be considered. Being ideological in nature, it has had the 
power of directing this culture in a way that is pervasive throughout all aspects of one’s 
being. This is seen clearly in the discourse of war, as well as the way religious elements 
of death-consciousness are taught in schools and talked about in mass media on a daily 
basis. Although the focus here is on historical and cultural roots of death-
consciousness in Iran, the undeniable role of the governing regime ought to be borne 
in mind, as a powerful force in shaping the dominant culture and values in Iran today. 
It is, of course, important to note the variety in the approaches to understanding and 
encountering death in the Iranian culture. My argument, rather than implying that this 
form of death-consciousness is the only way of thinking about death in the Iranian 
culture, should be taken as highlighting that it is a dominant way of doing so. This 
dominance is due in part, as noted above, to the ideological nature of government 
which tends to highlight a particular narrative, and in part due to the recent history of 
Iran, which has further strengthened this narrative. As such, whilst this culture, due to 
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its dominance and presence in the daily lives of Iranians, has a large influence on the 
common ways of thinking about death, it is by no means the sole narrative.12 
4.2.1. Iran-Iraq war 
As mentioned in §2.1, in the 1980’s, Iran went through one of the longest wars in the 
20th century with Iraq. The war started in September 1980, only a year after the Islamic 
Revolution which resulted in regime change in Iran, and went on for eight years until 
it ended in July 1988 following the United Nations Resolution for a ceasefire. The 
devastation of the war reached far beyond the border with Iraq and affected every 
single area of the country, following ‘war of the cities’, a bombing campaign by the 
Iraqi forces which targeted civilian areas to “help to break the enemy’s will” 
(McNaugher, 1990, p. 8). Such bombing campaigns were in addition to the use of 
chemical weapons on the Iranian population which killed many and caused lifelong 
injuries to many more. Official statistics by the Iranian Military, which were not 
published until 2015, estimate that a total of five million Iranians were directly 
involved in the war – including military, voluntary, and logistical forces. By the end of 
the war, 190 thousand were killed, 16 thousand of these during the bombing of 
residential areas, and the rest in the frontlines. Among the dead were 33 thousand 
school students and over 3.5 thousand university students. The number of those who 
suffered lifelong injuries, chemical or otherwise, stood at 672 thousand, while there 
were 42 thousand who were taken hostage and returned to Iran following the end of 
the war (TarikhIrani, 2014). About 5 million of the population from the worst hit areas, 
were displaced and sought sanctuary in the central parts of the country.  
With the population boom in the country during the years of war, as mentioned in 
§2.1, a large part of the current population of Iran was either born, or spent a 
significant part of their childhood during the war. The traumatic experiences of war, 
 
12 For instance, much of the mystic poetry and literature is seen as hopeful in the way it 
celebrates life. Yet this aspect can be overshadowed by the life-denying elements of these 
works due to, for example, the state-imposed censorship, preventing these elements to be 
brought out in the open as much as other aspects.  
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and the memories which remain in the collective consciousness of this generation, 
such as the sounds of the sirens warning of airstrikes and urging citizens to take shelter 
in underground shelters, remains part of the generational sense of identity of the 
young population of Iran (e.g. Behrouzan, 2016). As such, the experiences of war, 
rather than limited to those who fought at the frontlines, affected everyone in one 
way or another.  
Such experiences, furthermore, have not been limited to those who lived through the 
war. As noted in §2.4.3, government policies act not only to keep the memories of war 
alive, but also to sanctify the horrors of the war. Tales of those killed and injured 
continue to be part of the compulsory school curricula, while their giant murals remain 
visible on the face of different cities in Iran. Streets and alleys in every town across the 
country are named after those who lost their lives in the war. And for those who 
disappeared in the warfronts or were never identified, streets are named as ‘shahid-e 
gomnām’ or ‘unnamed martyr’. The dominant discourse further continues to sanctify 
the horrors of war: it is not a ‘war’, but ‘The Holy Defence’, and those killed are not 
‘casualties’ but ‘martyrs’. Various national ceremonies aim at keeping the stories and 
memories of the lives lost alive. In addition to such efforts, the traumatic experiences 
of the war continue to haunt, not only those families whose children’s remains were 
never found and for whom loss remains a timeless pain, but the whole nation. People 
continue to lose their lives in minefields which are yet to be fully cleared (BBC Persian, 
2017). In 2015, the bodies of 175 divers who had been taken captive in 1986 were 
found, after they were buried alive over thirty years earlier, and as recently as 
September 2017, the remains of a 13-year-old boy, killed in the war was returned to 
Iran to be buried after 34 years. 
The memories of war and its traumatic experiences, centred around death and lost 
lives, far from representing an event in the distant past, are part of the daily routines 
and preoccupations of Iranians, and continue to shape people’s lives, thoughts and 
feelings. Not only do the memories continue to haunt those who experienced the war, 
but even for those born after the end of the war, the wounds and the aftereffects of 
it remain a tangible force. One of these effects, I would argue, is the relationship 
Iranians have with death, as something always near and always looming. Arguably, 
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with the immense shared sense of loss, and with daily reminders of death, this 
relationship with death goes a step further than the existential feeling every human 
being, regardless of culture and society, is preoccupied with in their lives. This constant 
awareness and consciousness of death, as seen in Iranian society today, however, 
despite being amplified by the effects of war and the devastation it has inevitably 
brought, and which has lasted for years after its end, is also traceable to other 
elements of Iranian culture with a much longer history. It is the combination of 
historical context and current sense of life and experiences that gives rise to the 
culture of death-consciousness in Iran.  
4.2.2. Shi’ite teachings  
It is widely thought that in religious societies, fear and anxiety towards death is 
considerably lower than non-religious societies (e.g. Soenke, et al., 2013, Koenig, 
2009), due to the comfort gained through faith in the afterlife and the existence of a 
realm beyond the physical one inhabited during one’s life. However, there is a tension 
that should be noted in discussing the link between religious teachings and beliefs, 
and the notion of death as conceptualised in religious teachings. These teachings often 
involve the reassurance that death should be seen not as an end but simply a gateway 
to another, more permanent realm closer to God. This is while believers are 
simultaneously invited to be aware and fearful of death in every instance of their lives. 
This dichotomous portrayal of the notion of death and how one ought to relate to it, 
could arguably lead to a confusion that could further enflame the anxieties people feel 
towards death. The teachings of Shi’ism, for example, can serve to show this tension.  
One of the most important texts in the teachings of Shi’ism is Nahj al-Balagha, the 
collection of letters and sermons attributed to Hazrat-i Ali, the first Imam for Shi’a 
Muslims, and the cousin of Prophet Mohammad. As seen in §2.3.2, Hazrat-i Ali 
embodies, for Iranians, the ideal character, with all virtues attributed to him. Seen by 
Iranians as a role model, then, it is not surprising that Nahj al-Balagha, which 
encompasses his teachings and thoughts, both on religious matters but more generally 
about how one ought to think about oneself and one’s life and the best way for living 
this life, has remained one of the most important texts in Shi’ism and one that Iranians 
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adhere to.  The notion of death and the individual’s relation to it is one of the topics 
covered extensively in these teachings, so much so that this particular text is 
considered to put forward one of the most important narratives of death in Shi’ite 
thought (Nejati Hosseini, 2013). The teachings regarding death in this text cover a wide 
range of issues including the fear of death, the inescapability of death, the constant 
remembering and the impossibility of forgetting death and death as the end of one’s 
(physical) life.   
One of the most important points of emphasis in this text, is the necessity of ‘death-
consciousness’ (marg-āgāhi). It is argued that this way of being offers a way for the 
believer to “know themselves, and in turn, find a way of understanding the meaning 
of life” (Taheri Sarteshnizi & Moosavi, 2012, p. 177 – my translation). On this point, 
the life of a person who has forgotten death, and in turn has forgotten the afterlife, is 
likened to the state of the one walking in complete darkness, lost and led astray by the 
darkness (Letter No. 31). Such a person should be reminded that “with death, the 
darkness is removed and the truths [of the world] are illuminated” (Taheri Sarteshnizi 
& Moosavi, 2012, p. 180 – my translation). Thus, it is claimed that remembering death 
at every living moment, would in fact give one a better understanding of the world 
and how one ought to live in it. This kind of encouragement is further justified through 
ethical obligations and the encouragement to be good. The belief in a heaven and hell, 
as the eternal place for reward or punishment based on the actions one commits in 
this world, act both as an encouragement to be good, and a deterrent for doing bad. 
Since in the Islamic teachings, our life is merely a preparation for the afterlife, the 
belief in the immanency of death would serve as a reminder for the believers that they 
need to do good, as there might not be time to make up for any bad or unethical deeds 
they commit. As such, there are short bold reminders of the immanency of death in 
this text: “anticipate your death by good actions … and prepare yourselves for death, 
since it is hovering over you” (Sermon No.64).  
In illuminating the true meaning of life, consciousness of death also serves as a 
reminder of the illusory value we tend to attach to material things that bring us joy, or 
otherwise present themselves as valuable. This again can be understood through the 
portrayal of this world and our lives in it. As the Islamic teachings hold, this world is 
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merely a passageway to the afterlife, and is a means of preparation for the good life 
one could lead in the more permanent afterlife. Meanwhile, this world is portrayed as 
deceptive, with various material things or events that could distract one from the main 
aim, namely preparation for the afterlife. As such, remembering death, is in a sense a 
reminder of the life awaiting the believer and can serve as a preventive force against 
the distractions of the material world: “surely the remembrance of death has kept me 
away from fun and play while obliviousness about the next world has prevented him 
from speaking truth” (Sermon No. 84).  
In this latter justification of death consciousness, another element closely linked with 
it is manifest, namely the denial of earthly pleasures and joyous acts and things, since 
these are construed as distractions from the real values and the real meaning of life. 
This element of denial of life, in the face of awareness of death is in itself noteworthy 
in the process of viewing life as inherently meaningless and absurd, which due to the 
existential change, is heightened in depression. If there is already a strong disposition 
dominant in the religious culture against attachment to joys and pleasures of life, then 
in the face of depression, this disposition could come to the foreground, bringing the 
motivation and process for feeling joyous again in life and freeing oneself from 
depression into question. The religious teachings of Shi’ism (and especially in Islamic 
mysticism which dominate some of the most important literary works of Iran), are 
filled with such claims regarding the value we tend to mistakenly attach to the material 
things. This lengthy, but important part of a Sermon in Nahj al-Balagha can serve as an 
example of this thinking: 
Certainly this world is a dirty watering place and a muddy source of drinking. 
Its appearance is attractive and its inside is destructive. It is a deception, a 
vanishing reflection and a bent pillar. When its despiser begins to like it and 
he who is not acquainted with it feels satisfied with it, then it raises and puts 
down its feet (in joy), entraps him in its trap, makes him the target of its 
arrows and puts round his neck the rope of death taking him to the narrow 
grave and fearful abode in order to show him his place of stay and the 
recompense of his acts. This goes on from generation to generation. Neither 
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death stops from cutting them asunder nor do the survivors keep aloof from 
committing of sins. (Sermon No. 83) 
There are various other examples from the Islamic, and in particular Shi’ite teachings 
that encourage consciousness of death and embracing death rather than life. 
However, the emphasis placed on the notion of death in Iranian culture is not limited 
to the religious texts and teaching, but is also found in old and recent works of Iranian 
literature. 
4.2.3. Iranian literature 
The preoccupation with death in the Iranian literature can be traced back to the 12th 
century to poets from the mystic tradition such as Rumi, Attar and Omar Khayyam. 
Islamic mysticism, and in particular Iranian Sufism, emphasises the importance of the 
spiritual message of Islam and “attempt to live the modalities of this message in a 
personal way through the interiorization of the content of the Quranic Revelation” 
(Corbin, 2014, p. 187). As such, in the poetry inspired by this tradition, the personal 
experience and relation with God and God’s religion is emphasised. Reflecting this 
deep personal relationship, the concern with death as the ultimate bridge that would 
bring the Sufi and God together, as well as the question of life and how one ought to 
think about the dichotomy of life and death, are explored extensively in the Sufi 
literature and poetry. Given the spiritual nature of these practices and traditions, they 
reflect the denial of earthly pleasures and attachment to them, as seen in the Shi’ite 
teachings, while at the same time highlighting the inevitability of death and the 
important role it plays (or should play) in the way one conducts oneself.  
In his Masnavi, which is one of the most important and influential works in Sufism, 
Rumi extensively talks about the awareness of death and how this awareness ought 
to play a part in what we consider to be the right way of life. One example of this is 
the story of The Arab and His Wife. In the story, the Wife speaks out complaining about 
the sufferings of their family, due to being poor and not having enough to enjoy their 
lives: “How very poor we are! What hardships have we borne! The whole world lives 
in pleasures; we're the butt of scorn!” (Rumi, 1881 [1273], p. 220). The response from 
the Arab, is one emphasising that such anxieties and sufferings are portions of death, 
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reminding them that the pleasures of life are only temporary and that in order to live 
a good life and afterlife, these sufferings are necessary: 
All those anxieties that fall on us like darts, 
Are but the vapours, tempests, of our human hearts. 
Those cares are like a sickle, made to cut us down. 
This is a fact, though we are slow the truth to own. 
… 
Our troubles are the heralds of our death to come. 
Turn not thy face away from herald, as do some. 
Whoever leads a joyous life finds death severe. 
And he who's slave to body, mars his soul's career. 
When sheep come home from pasture in the meadows green, 
The fattest ones are slaughtered, soon as they are seen. (Ibid., p.222) 
What is striking about the portrayal of death and one’s relation to it in this passage, is 
the association of all earthly sufferings with death and awareness of it; just as death is 
inevitable, so is suffering in this world. And, furthermore, if one is wise, one ought to 
embrace this suffering, since denying it would amount to denial of death as a 
necessary element of life, and thus ultimately living a lie. In contrast, the more one 
embraces the suffering in this world, whatever form it takes – recall that being good is 
always associated with having to suffer, and good people necessarily endure immense 
suffering – an easier and ‘sweeter’ death and afterlife will be rewarded.  
Attar’s portrayal of death is also along the same lines, albeit put more boldly and 
clearly. In The Conference of the Birds (~1177), Attar states that we are all born just to 
die and despite our attachment to the joys of life, these are merely trivialities in the 
face of death, and this is clear to anyone who is aware of death. And furthermore, he 
states that the only cure from death is death itself, as seen in the following extract 
from A viceroy at the point of death:  
The man replied, ‘except that every day 
I lived was wasted on what’s trivial, 
And now I shall be dust -- and that is all.’ 
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To seek death is death’s only cure -- the leaf 
Grows hectic and must fall; our life is brief. 
Know we are born to die; the soul moves on; 
The heart is pledged and hastens to be gone. 
… 
Look hard at death -- in our long pilgrimage 
The grave itself is but the first grim stage; 
How your sweet life would change if you could guess 
The taste of death’s unequalled bitterness. (Attar, 1984 [~1177]) 
These examples from the classical period of Persian poetry (12th to 13th century), show 
the way these giants of poetry viewed and responded to the notion of death, as a 
source of anxiety and fear, but also a notion that ought to be recognized and embraced 
in order to lead a good life. Both of these elements of the notion of death can be traced 
to the religious teachings and the dominant frame of thought and interpretation of 
the time. Preoccupation with death continues to be the subject of many works of 
literature through to the modern times, although with a refined attitude towards it. In 
the works of literature in the 20th century, the framework in which death is talked 
about tends to be more in line with the socio-political mood, rather than religious 
thought.  
In the contemporary setting, and with the focus shifting from religious thought into a 
more socially concerned attitude, the concern with death is framed with reference to 
dissatisfaction and even hatred of life itself. One of the poets in this time, whose 
thoughts on the interplay of life and death is clearly articulated in his work, is Mehdi 
Akhavan-Sales. For Akhavan, poetry was a way of fighting mortality (San'ati, 2013, p. 
152), and in many of his poems his frustration is clear to the extent that he proclaims, 
many times, his hatred of life. He points to the pointless repetition of life, sees life as 
“this futile, this fearful darkness” (Life, 1966 – my translation), and calls the pointless 
days following on from one another as “remaining futile and empty and filthy” 
(Mordāb, 1978 – my translation), and even more distinctly, he says of life: “I have seen 
for a lifetime its ups and downs, [I] spit on its face, damn its meaning” (Again, One 
Must Live, 1979 – my translation).  Despite this clear frustration with life, Akhavan also 
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says that he loves life, pointing to an internal polarity, and this is where, for him, death 
comes into play: 
I see life as friend, 
death as enemy 
Oh! But with whom can I say this, 
I have a friend 
From whom I want to take shelter and turn to the enemy (As a Thirsty Urn,1959 – my 
translation) 
The striking turn seen here, compared to the earlier poetry, with regards to death, is 
one where death-consciousness is not encouraged as a way of being good or leading 
a good life, but rather, death is seen as desirable in the face of the difficulty, absurdity, 
and even the injustices of life. Death is seen as the ultimate shelter from life itself. This 
way of thinking about death was seen earlier in the works of Sadegh Hedayat, from 
whom Akhavan also took immense inspiration (San'ati, 2013).  
What is shared between Hedayat and Akhavan, and many other modern writers and 
poets, is the critical attitude they take towards the issues in socio-political and cultural 
domains, and the way their writing is in sync with their personal experiences of these 
issues. It is through such experiences and their close study and awareness of the socio-
political, as well as the cultural developments of their time in Iran, that their work is 
formed and the struggles are articulated. In this change of tone and points of concern, 
Hedayat was one of the first intellectuals in Iran who wrote about and criticised the 
dominant cultural attitudes and norms, and a lack of critical reflection on these, in the 
Iranian society. Some of the cultural attitudes Hedayat was concerned with were those 
concerned with death; he was critical of these attitudes which in his mind deny the 
reality of death as the end of one’s being, while at the same time, pronouncing his 
dissatisfaction with life and his desire to escape from it. In Hedayat’s writings, as in 
Akhavan’s, one sees this tension between hating life and being fearful of death, 
suffering in life and awaiting death, whilst at the same time being critical of the way 
death and death consciousness have been encouraged in the culture. There is love for 
life but longing for death, both playing a part in their writings. This is seen in the 
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famous opening of The Blind Owl where Hedayat writes: “There are certain sores in 
life that, like a canker, gnaw at the soul in solitude and diminish it” (Hedayat, 1974 
[1937]). It is this kind of sores, these sufferings in life which, for Hedayat, act as a drive 
towards voluntary death, despite a deep fear of death. Sufferings which make life itself 
seem unworthy of living and death as the ultimate saviour.  
Hedayat was one of the first Iranian writers and intellectuals who not only was familiar 
with Western nihilism, but who also used this knowledge in his writings. The influence 
of French thinkers and writers, as well as other European thinkers such as Freud, and 
writers such as Kafka, is evident in his writings. It is in Hedayat’s works that the first 
instance of talking of absurdity of life and living is seen in the domain of Iranian 
literature. The Blind Owl, as his most celebrated piece of writing – also the most 
important work of Iranian literature in the 20th century – embodies Hedayat’s unique 
attitude to life and death. This is also because the Blind Owl, the narrator of the story, 
is supposed to represent Hedayat himself with all his points of concern and attitudes. 
‘The sores that gnaw at the soul’, for Hedayat (or for the Blind Owl) represent an 
unresolvable dichotomy; the social and cultural reasons and ways of life that bind one 
“because he cannot go further than the line drawn for him” (Hedayat, 1948, p.13 – my 
translation), but also “a closed condemnation that follows [him], that his encounter is 
only with absurdity (pooch) and the absurdity is the shallow and mortal life, thus the 
acceptance of the final nothingness” (Sanati, 2015, p.7 – my translation). This tension, 
being condemned to be face to face with the inevitable nothingness of life whilst being 
unable to escape from it, creates an existential anxiety that is manifest in Hedayat’s 
writings, and results in a turn to death. As Sanati puts it, “if this existential anxiety 
dazzled Kafka in an animal depersonalisation, caused Sartre nausea and drifted Camus 
into alienation and estrangement, for a mentality like Hedayat’s, it brought suffocation 
and death” (Ibid. – my translation).  
It is in the face of this anxiety, that in the course of The Blind Owl, the reader sees that 
the desire to live slowly disappears in the protagonist “and what consoles him is the 
hope of nothingness after death” (San'ati, 2015, p. 54 – my translation), whilst 
alongside this hope for nothingness, the paralysing fear of death grows and adds to 
the anxiety of his every living moment. The Blind Owl is written on the basis of the 
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dichotomy and the contrast between life and death, and the anxiety arising from this 
dichotomy is further strengthened by the opposition of Good and Evil, the contrasting 
forces dominant in the Iranian culture and society that limit the power of the Blind 
Owl to act and the constant remembering of which adds to his anxiety. The interplay 
of these various forces is striking in the novel, and the symbolism revealing the 
connection between these forces needs careful attention to be fleshed out. One such 
example is the character of Blind Owl’s wife (and cousin), who symbolises a 
“transcendental unloving”, and symbolises for the Blind Owl the world and life within 
it: “a death-inducing world in which one is always standing on the edge of the cliff of 
nothingness, and where relationships are unstable, and death is the manifestation of 
this unloving” (San'ati, 2015, p. 213– my translation).  
The Blind Owl remains the subject of various studies, psychological and sociological, 
as well as literary ones. But it also remains the first serious work in Iranian literature 
that talks boldly not only of death, but also fear of death, the absurdity of life in the 
face of this inevitable end, whilst criticising the way this notion is construed culturally 
and socially, and is thus largely influential. This influence is seen in the works of writers 
and poets that came after Hedayat, as has been seen in the works of Akhavan-Sales. 
What further adds to the influence of this work, is Hedayat’s own carefully thought-
out suicide which, among speculations and debates, has further brought his works and 
thoughts into the public domain. Many have argued that Hedayat was visibly 
depressed, and his suicide serves as evidence to this point. This argument, regardless 
of whether it is true (and many would argue that it is not), has helped the association 
of Hedayat’s thoughts and writings with depression; some would even go as far as 
framing their experiences in terms of Hedayat’s thoughts. Because of this perceived 
advocacy for absurdist thinking and suicide, for years, and especially after the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran, Hedayat and his works, in particular The Blind Owl, have been 
pushed to the side, dismissed as unworthy, censored and at times banned from being 
republished. There are some “who try so hard to portray him as a monster and a 
dangerous person who had nothing to do but to think about absurdity, bitterness, 
misfortune, and suicide. And thus adamantly try to erase him from the history of 
Iranian literature and do not mention his name in the media and advise young people 
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not to read him, even if it is only to save their lives” (Masoodiniya, 2017 – my 
translation). Despite such efforts, not only does Hedayat remain one of the most well-
known authors in Iran, but also the thoughts and frustrations he portrays in his work, 
remain an integral part of Iranian culture and society and so his works act as a 
reference point for many who feel similar frustrations.  
As can be seen from the exposition above, the emphasis on death and death-
consciousness is one of the central elements found in Iranian culture. This emphasis 
goes back to the religious teachings and has been one of key themes explored in 
literary works. This pre-existing culture, has been further strengthened through the 
experience of the war which continues to influence the collective consciousness of the 
population and the dominant discourse. This culture of death-consciousness is 
manifested in the experiences of depression among Iranian patients and can be used 
to illuminate some of the phenomenological differences of depression in Iran and the 
UK.  
4.3. Death-conscious Culture and Depression 
Having established the existence of a death-conscious culture in Iran, and the place it 
has in cultural conceptualisations and the dominant discourse in society despite its 
changes in shape and form (from the conceptualisation of death as the gateway to the 
afterlife in religious teachings, to the view of death as the ultimate saviour in the face 
of anxieties of life), in this section I examine the effects of this culture on the 
manifestations of depression among Iranian patients. I will first look at attitudes 
towards suicide and suicidal thoughts and the kind of responses people have to these, 
as informed by the death-conscious culture. I will then turn to depressive symptoms, 
such as feelings of hopelessness and the way patients’ articulations and experiences 
of these symptoms are informed by this pre-existing culture. I will argue that certain 
differences in experience between Iran and the UK, such as the presence of a strong 
feeling of absurdity among Iranian patients, can be accounted for through the 
difference in individuals’ relation with death.  
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In Iran, as elsewhere, depressed patients are preoccupied with thoughts of death and 
suicide: 
#4(F) – The world seems fake (alaki) and like a game and I wish my life would 
end sooner. 
#6(F) – I suddenly get free (rahā) of all mental and emotional bounds 
(ta’alogh) and I only want not to be. Although I always prefer not being, to 
being, but in episodes of depression I think about it more and get closer to 
it. 
#7(F) – [I] wish I would die. How long do I have to suffer here. To what end 
(ākharesh ke chi)? All levels of life are pointless and it ends in the end there 
is death! 
#10(F) – [In depression] the feeling of death becomes stronger in me. 
#16(F) – I think depression is a lack of desire to continue life. 
#20(F) – I feel I have had enough of life and want to end my life and die. 
FB#1 – Most of the time I think about death [and] I feel a big sense of 
emptiness inside me. 
Suicide is considered to be a cardinal sin in Islam, and in various religious texts it is 
seen as grounds for a long or even an eternal punishment. For example, in the Quran, 
it is said “…Nor kill (or destroy) yourselves: for God hath been to you most Merciful! If 
any do that in rancour or injustice, soon shall we cast them into the fire; and easy it is 
for God” (The Quran, 4.29-30).13 In a sermon attributed to Imam Sadiq, the sixth Imam 
of Shi’ite Muslims, it is also emphasised that whoever knowingly kills himself, will 
forever be in the fires of hell (Al-Koleini, 1990). This standing of suicide in religious 
 
13 The point regarding suicide appears alongside stealing and consuming another’s wealth 
‘unjustly’. The ‘rancour or injustice’ referred to here, can be in reference to the earlier line. 
Equally it could refer to suicide: since God as the creator of all individuals knows best when to 
start and end a life, taking the matters in one’s own hands is seen as an aggressive act of 
injustice to the pre-determined order of the world. 
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teachings has multiple influences. In Iran, with a religious state governing religious 
people, although suicide is not an illegal act, there is a noticeable lack of research, 
quantitative and qualitative, on suicide. To protect its image as an Islamic country no 
reliable statistics on rates of suicide are collected, since acknowledgement of the 
phenomenon would imply the existence of people disregarding religious rules 
prohibiting suicide.  
In the absence of such statistics, it is difficult to say in general terms what attitude 
Iranians take towards suicide. However, certain factors, such as the culture of death-
consciousness which sometimes amounts to denial of life, as well as the struggles of 
patients diagnosed with depression with social stigmas and lack of societal empathy 
(see chapters 6 and 7), make it plausible that suicide rates in Iran would be high. 
Although such a claim would be difficult to justify using statistical evidence, scattered 
first-person and eye witness accounts suggest that at least the rates of suicide 
attempts, regardless of whether they are successful or not, is high. In a newspaper 
article in October 2016, for example, the reporter writes about a night in an emergency 
room for poisoning at a hospital in central Tehran. In the twelve hours between 8pm 
and 8am, 33 people were brought into the emergency room, 26 of whom had 
attempted suicide by taking pills and/or poison (Samgis, 2016). All of those admitted 
to the hospital for attempted suicide were aged 16-40 and most of them had a history 
of psychiatric illness. The interviews with the staff at the emergency room suggests 
that such a rate of suicide attempts was common in that hospital.  
This report suggests that suicide attempts in Iran may be more common among 
younger people. If those who attempt suicide in Iran do tend to be younger, this would 
be in line with global trends – based on the World Health Organization’s findings, 
suicide is the second leading cause of death among 15-29 year olds globally (World 
Health Organization, 2018). But in addition, any difference in Iran might be a 
manifestation of a division between religiosity in different generational groups, which 
leads to different attitudes and interpretations of the death-conscious culture of Iran. 
Notably, the older generation tend to have stronger religious beliefs which adhere to 
a more literal reading of religious teachings, as compared to the younger generation. 
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Those adhering to the more literal reading of religious teachings are more likely to 
avoid committing suicide. Instead, as a psychiatrist in Iran has told me, patients 
suffering from depression in Iran, due to their religious beliefs which prohibit taking 
one’s own life, often resort to what is termed ‘passive suicide’ [in English]. This consists 
in praying for God to end and take one’s life, rather than acting themselves and taking 
the matter in their own hands. In other words, although almost all depressed patients 
are occupied with suicidal thoughts, given their fear of God, and following the Islamic 
teachings, which see suicide as one of the cardinal sins, the majority would rather not 
act upon these thoughts themselves (Moghimi, 2017, personal correspondence). 
Asking God to take their lives would mean they have fulfilled their wish to die to an 
extent by articulating their thoughts and desires to an all-powerful Being, whilst at the 
same time circumventing committing a punishable sin and going against their faith and 
beliefs.  
On the other hand, those for whom the faith and belief in various religious teachings 
are not as strong, death-consciousness would more easily translate to suicidal 
thoughts that potentially initiate action. The prevalence of a more individualistic 
approach to religion, which leaves space for personal interpretations of the religious 
values and teachings has been increasing and is now common among the younger 
generation in Iran (e.g. Alamzadeh & Rastegari, 2015; Shojaeizand, et al., 2006). Whilst 
those who take the literal readings of religion to heart would be more prepared to 
accept as given the teachings of Islam by a religious expert/cleric, those with a more 
interpretive and individualistic attitude to religion are more sceptical and tend to 
project their own values and personal feelings and experiences on the religious values 
and teachings. For example, one might accept prima facie that suicide is sinful, yet 
argue that each individual is the one responsible for how her life develops and ends. 
In the face of immense suffering, therefore, it would not be uncommon to hear 
reasoning along the lines that ‘even God would not want to see me suffer in this way’. 
Or, one might choose to prioritise other teachings over those that condemn suicide, 
and argue that, for example, the fact that God is all-forgiving takes precedence over 
suicide being a cardinal sin. 
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One important observation that needs to be acknowledged here is the role of religious 
beliefs in individuals’ wellbeing. It is generally accepted that religious beliefs have a 
positive role to play in wellbeing; one’s happiness and satisfaction of life, as well as 
hopefulness and optimism (Van Ness & Larson, 2002). However, the relationship 
between religiosity and fear and anxieties in the face of death, is less straightforward 
(e.g. Thorson & Powell, 1988; 1990). As can be seen from various studies done in Iran, 
“religion acts as a protection and improvement in the state of acceptance and 
readiness towards one’s own or another’s death” (Nejati Hosseini, 2013, p. 42 – my 
translation), whilst at the same time acting as a factor in fear of death. In a 2014 study, 
which examines the reasons and elements contributing to fear of death, the largest 
factor was found to be “pain and punishment in the afterlife”, with “failure to do 
religious duties” as a reason highly correlated with belief in religious teachings 
(Aflakseir, 2014, pp. 25-26). In other words, whilst everyone taking part in the study 
identified the afterlife as a main cause of their fear of death, those who hold religious 
beliefs, see failure to do what is required by their beliefs, arguably another 
manifestation of their fear of punishment in the afterlife, as the main reason for their 
sensed fear of death. As such, the argument presented here, in so far as it is concerned 
with anxieties arising from awareness of death as seen in religious teachings, rather 
than consolations received about these anxieties from religion, remains intact.  
4.3.1. Death-consciousness and depressive symptoms 
I will argue that certain symptoms and manifestations of depression seen in Iran, 
including feelings of hopelessness and absurdity, can be closely linked with the death-
conscious culture. Additionally, by giving rise to these feelings as seen in depression, 
death-consciousness can also have an effect on certain help-seeking behaviours in 
patients with depression, as well as other mental illnesses (e.g. San'ati, 2004). As such, 
I argue that the existence of these feelings among Iranian patients, and the 
phenomenological differences between these feelings as felt in Iran and the UK, could 
be attributed to, and interpreted in terms of this death-conscious culture. 
Some degree of hopelessness seems to be a universal part of the experience of 
depression. Based on the results from the questionnaire, I suggest that the emphasis 
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on loss of hope is higher among Iranian patients than those in the UK. Hopelessness is 
central to the Iranian experience of depression, so much so that often patients define 
depression itself in terms of hopelessness. 
#3(F) – I think depression has a strong correlation with hope, losing 
hope/becoming hopeless for whatever reason in my opinion is depression. 
#14(F) – In my opinion depression is the feeling of hopelessness and despair, 
which causes one to become incapable of doing the normal daily tasks. 
Ratcliffe argues that the sense of hopelessness in depression is rooted in the 
existential change one goes through in depression, since the existential loss of hope in 
depression is fundamentally different, and phenomenologically stronger than the 
intentional hopelessness one might feel in everyday situations (Ratcliffe, 2015).  As an 
intentional state, intentional hope is about something in the world; I hope that event 
x happens. Similarly, losing hope for event x can be construed as no longer having the 
intentional state of hope, for a certain event x. What defines existential loss of hope, 
Ratcliffe argues, is the transformation of one’s space of possibilities into one of 
impossibility, where hoping for a state of affairs to come to be becomes essentially 
irrational, since the very possibility of the desirable state of affairs is under question.  
While I agree with this characterisation of hopelessness in depression, I would argue 
that one needs to say more about how this process of transformation of space of 
possibilities into one of impossibility is brought about and how individuals respond to 
this transformation. In the case of Iranian patients, I would argue this process is 
intimately linked with the Iranian conceptualisations of life and depression, whilst the 
responses to this transformation are connected with thoughts and practices of death-
consciousness.  
#14(F) – I saw the world as uncertain (mobham), and full of hopelessness and 
despair (ya’as). 
#25(M) – [When depressed] the world has no meaning for me and I’m not 
hopeful about life. 
  92 
#28(F) – My depression has caused me to be dispirited about life and has 
caused me to continue life with hopelessness. 
#15(F) – Depression means moodiness (bi-hoselegi), restlessness, 
hopelessness. 
There are two elements at play here, understanding both of which is essential in 
understanding the feelings of hopelessness in depressed patients in Iran and the 
emphasis placed on this feeling as a central symptom of depression; namely, the 
Iranian conceptions of life itself, and the cultural conceptualisations of depression. As 
discussed in §2.3.3, the common conceptions of depression in Iran often attribute the 
cause of depression to an outside source, out of the control of the individual. As such, 
there is often an element of dissatisfaction with the world in which one dwells and a 
sense of one being a victim of these outside influences. In such a conception, one’s 
efforts in taking control of one’s life and protecting oneself against the outside 
influences are felt to have been in vain – and it is through the realisation of this effort 
in vain that depression comes about. Depression, from its conception to its 
manifestations as seen in Iran, seems to be the embodiment of the struggles of each 
individual against the world, and one which is, to a certain extent, the logical place 
these struggles lead to.14 This latter point is closely connected with the Iranian 
conceptions of life as fundamentally a fight, a struggle to strike a balance between the 
forces of Good and Evil (as seen in §2.4). In other words, the feelings of dissatisfaction 
and the sense of being a victim in the world can be thought of as the expression of the 
inherently unfair fight one is made to endure. In this sense, depression is thought of 
as the logical ending point, once one realises the nature of this unfair fight. Once one 
is fallen into depression, and due to the existential change one goes through in 
depression, which transforms one’s perception of oneself and of one’s world, the 
sense of helplessness becomes overwhelming, and it is in such a situation where any 
 
14 It could be argued that the hopelessness felt and talked about so often among Iranians, can 
be thought of as an idiom of distress, one which finds its expression in depression: depression 
is the means through which this already existing thoughts and feelings are expressed. I will 
look at this proposition in chapter 8. 
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hope for change and a move forward is lost. The very hope, that is, which up until this 
point would have fuelled the ongoing fight forward. The existential hopelessness in 
depression, then, brings into question the very meaning of life as a fight to be fought, 
and is therefore the hopelessness of even envisioning a change, and conceiving of an 
improvement in one’s life – no hope is left for even fantasising about a different world. 
This, I believe, is the impossibility Iranian depressed patients are faced with, one 
which, in altering the individual’s perceptions, brings into question the meaning of life 
and the motivation to strive forwards.  
I would argue that this could be an account of the way in which one’s space of 
possibilities is transformed into impossibility as a result of the existential change one 
goes through in depression. Once understood, this process can also illuminate the 
heavy emphasis placed on feelings of hopelessness among Iranian patients, as the 
defining symptom of depression. It follows from the arguments above, that the 
rootedness of this feeling in the Iranian culture and conceptions gives this feeling the 
importance and centrality that is expressed by those suffering from depression.  
Importantly, however, (and the way in which the feelings of hopelessness in Iranian 
depressive patients is distinguished from those in the UK), is the role of the culture of 
death-consciousness already prevalent in Iran, and its influences on the feelings of 
hopelessness. Specifically of importance here are the accounts of life and death as 
presented in the literature of 20th century Iran. As argued previously, in such works of 
literature, the message conveyed is one in which the dissatisfaction with one’s life, 
and a sense of having lost in the fight for a good life, forces one to come face to face 
with death as the ultimate end. Shown clearly in the poem by Akhavan, death becomes 
the only conceivable change, and thus the only goal one is able to hang onto. Death in 
such a scenario would be the only place one could take shelter from the hopelessness 
of life: death becomes the only remaining hope. This pre-existing culture which 
encourages the remembering of death both paves the way for this form of 
hopelessness, and offers a way of interpreting and understanding, and thus 
articulating one’s feelings of frustration and dissatisfaction. This existential 
hopelessness, therefore, places more emphasis on death, as the only possibility amidst 
the impossibilities of life. This form of hopelessness, one that forces one to remember 
  94 
death in such a way, is further strongly connected with another feeling expressed by 
Iranian patients, namely absurdity.   
#26(F) – I feel a sense of absurdity (poochi), nothing is interesting for me. 
#21(F) – I feel a sense of absurdity and feel as if nothing is right and 
everything is a lie. 
#9(F) – I think the world has no attractions even in the moment. Merely 
passing time and life without anything else. 
#35(F) – I feel sadness and sorrow and [a sense of] absurdity. 
#36(F) – I feel that the world is completely absurd and futile 
#41(F) – Depression means feeling absurdity, and life becoming meaningless. 
A linguistic point is worth making here regarding the meaning and connotation of the 
words used in this instance. The word used by Iranians, poochi (noun), which I have 
translated as absurdity, is derived from the adjective pooch which itself carries various 
meanings and heavy connotations. Among the dictionary meanings of pooch are 
empty, hollow, pointless, futile, nothingness, nonsensical, and lacking in meaning. 
Given these definitions, then, it can be seen that what Iranians mean in talking about 
feelings of absurdity or poochi in depression, is an expression of the way they see the 
world and themselves in it. Furthermore, given these meanings, the link between this 
expression and those of hopelessness become clear, since they are both rooted in the 
Iranian conceptualisations of life. The feelings of absurdity in this sense, emphasise 
the feelings of defeat and meaninglessness with regards to the fight which is life.  
Now with the preceding account of hopelessness, where consciousness of death plays 
a central role, and where death itself is highlighted as the ultimate inescapable end, 
this sense of meaninglessness and emptiness of the world comes to the foreground: 
nothing can change the fact that death is inescapable. The depressed patient who is 
overwhelmed by the feelings of existential hopelessness is confronted with this fact, 
and as a result, any attempt to fight this inescapable end is seen as meaningless, since 
one can never win the ultimate fight with death. This latter point overshadows, and 
makes meaningless any effort for improvement, giving one’s life and the world in 
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which one dwells a quality of emptiness and absurdity. Various writers and thinkers 
from a range of cultures have spoken of the inherent absurdity of life, but the sense 
of absurdity talked about by Iranians suffering from depression specifically finds its 
meaning against the cultural conceptions of life as a meaningful fight (§2.4). It is the 
sense of loss of meaning in depression, shaped by a sense of hopelessness against a 
death-conscious culture that is emphasised in complaints of absurdity among Iranians. 
One can see parallels here between these feelings of meaninglessness of the world, 
and the metaphors used by Iranians in talking about their experiences of depression, 
seen in chapter 3. As argued before, the image of a colourless world signifies an idle 
and meaningless state in which no change can be envisioned and thus any attempt at 
improving one’s state or hoping for a better future is seen as futile and absurd. Taken 
together, the metaphors of colour and the feelings of hopelessness and absurdity, 
make the argument for the existence of these feelings, as the defining features of 
depression in Iran, stronger. Furthermore, these feelings of absurdity as felt in 
depression can in effect place into question one’s previous understandings of oneself 
and one’s life: 
#3(F) – I am hopeless and at the same time feel absurdity (poochi) with 
regards to my life in the past, present and the future 
As if in receipt of a higher understanding, the feelings of absurdity and hopelessness, 
in the face of consciousness of death, force one to think about the way one has led 
one’s life up to this point and all previous conceptions of life and the world. Death is a 
sublime which makes one realise one’s own mortality and insignificance and such 
feelings further force one to rethink how one has conducted oneself throughout one’s 
life, and it all seems meaningless, empty, and absurd.  
Additionally, following the earlier discussions from the religious teachings which 
encourage the remembering of death as a preventive force against the earthly joys of 
life, this feeling of absurdity and the meaninglessness of life in depression, can affect 
the behaviours patients have in response to depression. The tendency to deny life, 
brought to the foreground in light of the feelings of the absurdity of life, could in 
instances dampen the motivation to seek help. The unwillingness of the patients to 
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find help and an effective treatment, presents a challenge for mental-health 
professionals. Looking at such issues in psychotherapy in particular, San’ati notes, in 
societies such as Iran, individuals “are prepared to use modern psychotherapies as 
modern cures, but they have been nurtured with a culture of death which is there, at 
least, in the back of their mind, challenging therapeutic attempts for change” (San'ati, 
2004). Such resistance, and the view of change as futile and meaningless, can further 
be explained through the conceptualisation of every suffering as ‘a portion of death’, 
and therefore as inevitable as death itself. If the suffering as a result of depression is 
conceptualised in this way, and if, as a result of the feelings brought about by 
depression, the thought of death and its conceptualisations in the culture is brought 
to the fore of one’s attention, then one might see this suffering as necessary, and to 
be embraced rather than treated and gotten rid of. In instances where these various 
elements are seen to be in play together, the unwillingness to seek help and treatment 
can be explained against the backdrop of the cultural conceptualisations of death and 
death-consciousness. 
4.4. Conclusions 
In this chapter I have first argued that Iran has a death-conscious culture. As I have 
argued, the existence of this culture is manifest through the religious teachings, as well 
as the large domain of literary works, religiously oriented and otherwise, and its 
dominance has been further cemented through the collective experience of war and 
its destructions. Death-consciousness, as I have used the phrase, encompasses a range 
of attitudes towards death, centred around the awareness and remembrance of 
death, whether as a means of remembering the afterlife in case of religious teachings, 
or as a desired state in the face of dissatisfactions with life in the case of the modern 
literature. All the while, these attitudes are heavily influential in the way Iranians 
conceptualise themselves and their lives, and their relation to the world in which they 
dwell, and are therefore phenomenologically significant.  
Secondly, I have examined the effects of this pre-existing culture on the experiences 
of depression, as seen in Iran. I argue that death-consciousness has a direct effect on 
certain symptoms of depression as experienced in Iran, and provides a basis for 
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comparison, and a point of divergence between experiences in Iran and the UK. 
Attitudes and reactions towards suicide and suicidal thoughts, feelings of hopelessness 
and absurdity, and some help-seeking behaviour, are shown to be largely a 
consequence of views towards death in the culture.  
The exposition presented provides an example of where the dominant culture and the 
cultural ways of thought and interpretation influence the experiences of depression, 
and shape the manifestations of depression. Whilst I concede that many of these 
mechanisms and frameworks remain largely unconscious, an examination of the 
dominant forces of influence in the culture demonstrates the pervasiveness of such 
cultural modes of thought and interpretation. By bringing these mechanisms and 
frameworks to the foreground of consciousness, whilst acknowledging the fact that 
experiences find meaning against the backdrop of culture and dominant ways of 
thought, the role played by such mechanisms in shaping parts of experiences of 
depression within the culture are demonstrated.  
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5. Interpersonal Relationships I – Impersonal Interpersonal 
5.1. Introduction 
An important, and universal part of experiences of depression, is its influence on 
interpersonal relationships. This influence, manifested in the breakdown of the 
interpersonal bond, can be seen in different domains of relations with others; namely 
one’s relation with the indefinite, collective, ‘impersonal’ others, as well as one’s 
relations with specific, determinate, ‘personal’ Others. I suggest that although the 
breakdown of the interpersonal bond can be thought of as a universal part of 
experiences of depression, the manifestations of the breakdown can be culturally 
specific, and in accordance with cultural norms and conceptualisations that govern our 
relations with others.  
In Iran, as a collectivist society, often the boundaries between the social and the 
private, and the norms governing relationships in the two spheres, are blurred.  In such 
a society, the experiences and goals of the individual are seen to be in the service of 
the collective, whilst the collective force of the society in setting the norms and 
dominant ways of being, remains powerful in the private spheres of life. As such, one 
of the complications when analysing a phenomenon such as depression is the 
inseparability of the social from the interpersonal, and therefore the ‘impersonal’ from 
the ‘personal’ relations with others. Noting this interconnectivity, in this chapter and 
the next, I aim to give an account of the changes one goes through in depression, as 
related to relationships with others, in both domains of life. The account presented 
offers a way of understanding cultural variations and their role in shaping experiences 
of depression, whilst demonstrating how the dynamics governing the two spheres of 
social life shape and influence one another, as contexts where experiences arise and 
are made sense of.  
The importance of relationships with others and the phenomenological significance of 
these cannot be overstated. How we relate to other conscious beings in the world, 
both as a collective and as individuals, forms an important part of our being-in-the-
world, and provides a background for furthering our self-awareness and self-
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knowledge. As I will show, these relationships also have a significant role to play in our 
emotional consciousness and experiences. Given these manifold influences and the 
significance of interpersonal relationships, an examination of the changes in the way 
we encounter and relate to others in depression, as well as the role played by culture 
in shaping these changes, is crucially important.  
In giving an exposition of these factors, as manifested in depression, I argue for the 
importance of interpersonal conflict, seen in every domain of our relationships with 
others. As I will argue, due to the existential change one goes through in depression, 
this inevitable, and ever-present conflict between I and Other is brought to the 
foreground of consciousness, and as such plays an important role in shaping our 
interpersonal experiences in depression. In discerning the importance and the 
workings of this conflict, I will use accounts offered by Heidegger (present chapter) 
and Sartre (next chapter), for whom the interpersonal conflict is central in 
understanding our relationships with others. While different notions and concepts 
from the two phenomenologists are introduced and used to account for the 
significance of the particular Iranian experiences under discussion, the choice of using 
theories developed by Heidegger and Sartre has been informed primarily by the 
central place they give to the interpersonal conflict that they view as necessary and 
ever-present in human relationships. Furthermore, this choice allows a natural division 
in the discussion between social and interpersonal relationships, while maintaining a 
close link between the two through the presence of the interpersonal conflict. 
Heidegger’s account focuses on one’s relationship with others as a collective, powerful 
entity, which dominates our social norms and values, and therefore is concerned with 
the interpersonal conflict as it arises between one and the society at large. Sartre, in 
contrast, focuses on the interpersonal, one-to-one encounters and relationships with 
a particular Other and the inescapable conflict that governs the dynamics of these 
relationships. Despite their different focal points, the two accounts should be viewed 
as complementary rather than contrasting, as together they offer a holistic account of 
the significance of relationships with others. These phenomenological accounts, 
together with the exposition of cultural factors which create the backdrop to 
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interpersonal experiences in depression, provides a framework for understanding 
some of the cultural variations in experiences of depression.   
In this chapter, I will first outline the theoretical background of the analysis, detailing 
Heidegger’s accounts of our social mode of being, and of moods and attunements in 
the world. I will then explore the implications of the misunderstandings of depression 
in Iranian society, as an instance of what Heidegger characterises as a conflict between 
an individual and the collective others. One consequence of such misunderstandings, 
I argue, can be seen in changes in individuals’ possibilities for action and expression. 
Furthermore, these misunderstandings create a mood of unhomelikeness in 
depression, which forms the background against which social and interpersonal 
experiences in depression can be accounted for.  
5.2. Dasein, Das Man, and the Social Mode of Being  
For Heidegger, our being as humans is always situated within a broader context. The 
significance of this situatedness is seen in the term ‘Da-sein’ denoting our way of 
being, as a Being-there; out there in the world, where we are thrown, and in which we 
dwell. But in Heidegger’s account our being out there in the world, rather than being 
solitary, is always related in various ways to other beings like ourselves. This relation 
is such that our being-in-the-world is essentially a social way of being; Being-with. 
Other people are constitutive of our world in which we dwell, and this constitutive role 
of others is best seen in Heidegger’s account of the work-world and the use of tools; 
In our description of the … work-world of the craftsman … the outcome was 
that along with the equipment to be found when one is at work, those 
Others for whom the work is destined are ‘encountered too’. If this is ready-
to-hand, then there lies in the kind of Being which belongs to it (that is, in its 
involvement) an essential assignment or reference to possible wearers, for 
instance, for whom it should be cut to the figure. Similarly, when material is 
put to use, we encounter its producer or supplier as one who ‘serves’ well or 
badly … The Others who are thus ‘encountered’ in a ready-to-hand, 
environmental context of equipment are not somehow added on in thought 
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to some Thing which is proximally just present-at-hand; such ‘Things’ are 
encountered from out of the world in which they are ready-to-hand for 
Others – a world which is always mine too in advance. (BT, 26: 153-4)15 
This passage reveals three senses in which others are constitutive of Dasein’s Being. 
Firstly, other people form a new class of being that Dasein encounters in its everyday 
life, in addition to tools and objects; since there is a consideration of others in 
everything Dasein does on a daily basis. Secondly, the work-world of Dasein is always 
related to others, since the work done by Dasein is always provided by, and destined 
for others. For example, while working in the library on a piece ‘destined’ for a certain 
audience, I also have a consideration not only of those working in the library as I am, 
but also those who have worked in building and maintaining the environment in which 
I work. The third and last factor is the social context of the use of equipment: the use 
of a tool is determined, not by the way any individual Dasein employs it, but rather, by 
observing how a community of individuals does so. In other words, if a tool is handy 
for a given task, it is so for any Dasein capable of employing it. Therefore, not only is 
the presence and significance of others evident in our encounter with different tools, 
objects, and things, but also through different acts Dasein takes, it is inevitably 
maintaining a sort of relationship with others. Through this exposition, therefore, 
Heidegger makes the case for the claim that that the very Being of Dasein is inherently 
social: the Being of Dasein is Being-with.  
This notion of the individual’s Being as essentially Being-with, is crucial for Heidegger’s 
characterisation of Dasein. This is since for Heidegger, “Dasein’s capacity to lose or 
find itself as an individual always determines, and is determined by, the way in which 
Dasein understands and conducts its relations with Others” (Mulhall, 1996, p. 67). This 
is since Dasein’s understanding of itself comes from the realisation of how it is 
different from others. “[W]hether that difference is merely one that is to be evened 
 
15 All the quotes from Being and Time (BT for short) are taken from the translation by 
Macquarrie and Robinson (Basil Blackwell, 1962). For purposes of clarity, in referencing 
quotes, I signify the section and page number respectively, as they appear in this translation.  
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out, whether one’s own Dasein has lagged behind the Others and wants to catch up in 
relation to them, or whether one’s Dasein already has some priority over them and 
sets out to keep them suppressed.” (BT, 27: 126-127) It is in contrast to others that 
Dasein finds itself, as an individual Being.  
This point is of great importance for Heidegger’s understanding of inauthentic 
individuality. We often perceive these differences either as something to be 
eliminated altogether, thus seeking conformity with others, or as something to be 
emphasized and developed, in an attempt to distinguish ourselves from the others. In 
both of these cases, one allows one’s individuality to be determined by others, 
resulting in an inauthentic individuality. This loss of authentic individuality, arising 
from Dasein ‘distancing itself’ from the Others, through identifying its differences from 
others, is what Heidegger terms the ‘average everyday distantiality’. This absence of 
individuality, further, must apply to most – if not all – individuals Dasein encounters, 
since it is what defines the way human beings generally relate to each other. 
Importantly, however, these Others, what Heidegger calls das Man, are not to be 
thought of as a group of genuine individuals whose way of being dictates everyone 
else’s way of being: “[das Man] is neither a collection of definite others nor a single 
definite Other; it is not a being or a set of beings to whom mineness belongs, but a 
free-floating, impersonal construct, a sort of consensual hallucination to which each 
of us gives up the capacity for genuine self-relation and the leading of an authentically 
individual life” (Mulhall, 1996, pp. 68-69). As such, das Man can be thought of as the 
society in which one finds oneself. The norms dictated by one’s society and culture, 
are independent of any individual member of that society or culture, yet they influence 
the way any single person within that society conducts herself, perceives and 
understands herself. In other words, in every instance during one’s daily life, one is 
representative of one’s society, since one necessarily conforms to the norms and 
values set and dominated by das Man. Therefore, for Heidegger, the average everyday 
being of Dasein is inauthentic since it takes the form of das Man, such that its self is 
one of das Man’s.  
Two important notes should be borne in mind in talking about the influences of das 
Man on Dasein’s Being. Firstly, it is not the case that in its everydayness, Dasein’s self, 
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as one of das Man, is less real or less itself. On the contrary, since according to 
Heidegger, authentic and inauthentic modes of being are complementary rather than 
opposing, this everyday inauthenticity could help Dasein’s quest in finding its 
authentic self. In other words, in finding the path to authenticity, Dasein would always 
have to return to the inauthenticity of its everydayness, since it provides the necessary 
background for authenticity. It is through acknowledging the everyday inauthentic 
mode of existence that Dasein can identify and take action in what would lead to its 
authenticity. For example, one could decide to change one’s subject of study, due to 
concerns raised by others regarding one’s employability following a degree in 
humanities, or due to one’s personal passions and plans for the future. Thus on this 
account taking action purely as a result of others’ concerns would constitute an 
instance of inauthentic decision making. This is while making a decision based on one’s 
own passions and plans for life, while acknowledging the difficulties that might follow 
this decision, as raised by others, would be a more authentic process.  
Secondly, it should not be deduced from the preceding arguments that leading an 
authentic life necessitates cutting all ties with others and leading an isolated life. To 
the contrary, since Dasein’s Being is essentially Being-with, its inherent social form 
provides a condition of its way of being as a human being. An authentic form of life, 
therefore, requires a different way of relating to others, rather than detachment from 
all others. Heidegger’s account of what this alternative relation to others consists of, 
raises more questions than it answers. However, for our purposes it is sufficient to 
note a) that the averageness of Dasein and the influence of das Man is not a purely 
negative aspect of Dasein’s Being, and b) that the authentic mode of being does not 
necessitate the elimination of all ties with others.  
This exposition makes manifest the conflict Heidegger observes between an individual, 
and the society in which she dwells. This is since, in one’s quest for authenticity, the 
norms and values set out by das Man present a constraint, one which is immensely 
difficult, if not impossible, to overcome since it encompasses one’s very being. This is 
despite the fact that the everyday inauthenticity is conceptualised as necessary for 
attaining authenticity, since the phenomenological experience of a blockade in one’s 
quest remains a negative, frustrating aspect of one’s relationship with das Man. The 
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conflict between Dasein and das Man, can also be seen in another aspect of Dasein’s 
Being-in-the-world, namely Being-in, as will be discussed in the next section. Within 
this aspect, the mechanism through which das Man affects Dasein’s space of 
possibilities is made clear.  
5.3. Being-in, Moods, and Possibilities 
Being-in refers to the way in which Dasein inhabits, and relates to the world, in virtue 
of the way it perceives the nature of this world. Central to Heidegger’s account for 
Being-in are the two notions of ‘Befindlichkeit’ and understanding. Befindlichkeit 
refers to Dasein’s capacity to be affected by the world, in ways that it does not always 
have complete control over.16 The most familiar manifestation of this existentiale17 is 
the phenomenon of mood. Moods, for Heidegger, are basic to our being in the world. 
They “make manifest ‘how one is, and how one is faring’” (BT, 29: 173), since they 
open up the world to us as significant and meaningful. Separate from emotions, which 
have a direct object, and sensations, which carry distinctly bodily feelings, moods lack 
a distinct object. They rather “colour the way everything appears to the self” 
(Svenaeus, 2014, p. 6). Furthermore, moods do not come from the outside or from the 
inside, they are rather states into which one is always thrown, slipping from one to 
another or slipping off into bad ones. They are therefore passive states we find 
ourselves in, inflecting every aspect of Dasein’s relation to the world and the entities 
in it. As such, we find ourselves there in the world, “always already busy with different 
things that matter to us, and this ‘mattering to’ rests on an attunement, a mood-
quality which the being-in-the-world always already has” (Ibid., p.7).  
 
16 Befindlichkeit translates to the English ‘state of mind’, however, as seen from the description 
of how Heidegger uses the term, it can be seen that the English translation does not fully 
capture the meaning. Hence I will use the German term for clarification purposes. 
17 This is the equivalent of the term ‘category’, however, since for Heidegger Dasein’s being is 
distinct from different entities the use of this term as related to Dasein is forbidden. 
Existentiala (plural) are certain characteristics or elements of Dasein which are revealed 
through the analysis of its existence, as such.  
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It should be noted that Dasein’s moods arise from its Being-in-the-world and are thus 
socially determined. This follows from the earlier arguments and the point that 
Dasein’s Being is essentially Being-with, meaning the states Dasein finds itself in, such 
as moods, not only affect, but are affected by its relations to Others. Dasein’s 
membership of a group, for example, can lead to her being “thrown into the mood 
that grips that group, finding herself immersed in its melancholy or hysteria” (Mulhall, 
1996, p. 79). This social nature of moods is further reinforced by Dasein’s everyday 
mode of being as one of das Man: “Publicness, as the kind of Being that belongs to 
[das Man], not only has in general its own way of having a mood, but needs moods 
and ‘makes’ them for itself” (BT, 29:178). What this entails, is the fact that the 
individual’s social world fixes the moods in which she is thrown, through this world’s 
norms, practices, or values. And although individuals are capable of transcending or 
resisting the dominant social moods, it does mean that the range of possible moods 
itself is socially moulded. One is more likely, for instance, to find herself in a mood of 
elation in a society that values and encourages happiness and expressions of it, both 
through the expectations that arise as a result of such a valuation, as well as through 
seeing the way others are in the society. 
The pre-existing culture in Iran, as seen in §2.4, values the feeling and expression of 
sadness insofar as it values being good in an eternal fight between Good and Evil. This 
culture, together with the state-sanctioned ceremonies and events which enable such 
expressions, can be seen to facilitate a dominant social mood of sadness and 
dysphoria. In this discussion, the role of the state should be emphasised, not only as a 
force that encourages displays of sadness through sponsoring nation-wide ceremonies 
(§2.4.1), but also as one that forcefully discourages displays of happiness. Young 
people in Iran are regularly arrested and punished for such public displays of 
happiness. A well-known example is Pharrell Williams’ fans, who were sentenced to 
lashings in 2014, for publishing videos showing them dancing (Kamali Dehghan, 2014). 
More recently, in 2018, a 17-year-old was arrested for publishing videos of herself 
dancing in her room, on her Instagram page (Kamali Dehghan, 2018).  
Again, it should be noted that in saying that sadness is the dominant mood in the 
Iranian society, I am not claiming that every individual’s way of being in that society is 
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dominated by the mood of sadness, but rather that the dominant mood of the society, 
of das Man, the “free-floating, impersonal construct” that influences each individual 
within the society, is one of sadness. And given the influence of das Man on one’s way 
of being, both in personal as well as the social domain of interpersonal relationships, 
the fact that such a dominant mood would have an influence on one’s way of relating 
to and being with others is clearly demonstrated. The social nature of moods is clear 
in this case. This social mood, over which Dasein has no control, figures prominently 
in the way Dasein finds itself in the world among others. And furthermore, the effects 
of this mood are seen in the various emotional feelings and attunements Dasein has 
individually.  
The second notion crucial to Dasein’s Being-in, represents the active aspect of this 
Being: if Dasein is thrown into the world with a certain attunement, understanding is 
the mode of Being, characterised by moving forward and confronting one’s 
possibilities, given this thrown-ness into the world. Understanding, for Heidegger, is 
the act of projecting oneself onto one or other existentiell18 possibility as defined by 
the world and its attunement. This projection presupposes a grasp of the world Dasein 
inhabits, meaning a grasp on the possibilities for action each situation allows for 
Dasein. In this sense, then, understanding concerns a practical competency, it is the 
knowledge of how to do certain things and how to engage in certain practices. But it 
is important to note that this practical competency is related to certain existentiell 
possibilities: My relation to the objects around me is determined by the task for which 
I make use of these objects, but I perform the task itself for the sake of a more general 
existentiell possibility which defines who I am. As such, a grasp on the world into which 
Dasein is thrown, and the moods in which Dasein finds itself, together with the objects 
around it serve Dasein’s self-understanding and finding itself in terms of the 
 
18 ‘Existentielle’ in Heidegger’s terminology refers to someone’s personal understanding of 
their existence. As such, an existentielle possibility is a possibility observed by the individual 
in light of their understanding of themselves and their existence in the world.  
  107 
possibilities presented to it. It is thus that for Heidegger, the true existential medium 
of Dasein is characterised by possibility: 
Any Dasein has, as Dasein, already projected itself; and as long as it is, it is 
projecting. As long as it is, Dasein always has understood itself in terms of 
possibilities … As projecting, understanding is the kind of Being of Dasein in 
which it is its possibilities as possibilities. (BT, 31:185) 
In choosing to actualise one possibility over others, Dasein is once again faced with the 
problem of authenticity. In making such decisions, Dasein can either project itself upon 
a mode of existence in which to express its individuality, or one where it would fail to 
do so – either through a misunderstanding of its world and possibilities, or through 
losing itself in das Man and letting das Man determine its choices. As such, this 
projective understanding itself can be authentic or inauthentic. But in either case, it is 
always conditioned by the social and cultural situations in which Dasein dwells. The 
existential possibilities and the freedom to choose to actualise one possibility over 
others are in turn shaped by the concrete situations in question. As Ian Hacking has 
shown, social labels and descriptions influence the space of possibilities of actions 
presented to an individual. In this sense, who we are is defined not only by the actions 
we take, but the possibilities of actions presented to us, i.e. what we might have done 
or what we might do. However, this space of possibilities is itself bound to social and 
cultural descriptions: “What is curious about human action is that by and large what I 
am deliberately doing depends on the possibilities of description … Hence if new 
modes of description come into being, new possibilities for action come into being in 
consequence” (Hacking, 2002, p. 108).  
The two elements in Heidegger’s account of Being-in, can be used to illuminate how 
individuals’ actions and tendencies in depression are shaped by the social context of 
their experiences. This is since the social context, by setting the dominant mood and 
understanding, in this case of depression, also affect the individual’s space of 
possibilities in response to the experience they are having. Therefore, various actions 
and attitudes can be characterised in terms of the relational nature of our being as 
inherently social. In the next section I will bring out specifically the way in which these 
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theoretical considerations can be applied to account for the Iranians’ social 
experiences of depression.  
5.4. Misunderstanding as Conflict 
A general picture of the social experiences of the individual with depression in Iran, 
can be gained through the first-person accounts published on Facebook. As noted in 
§1.2, these accounts were written unprompted, and as such, the themes individuals 
chose to write about can be thought to represent what they take to be some of the 
most important aspects of their experiences. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the nature 
of the Iranian society as a collectivist one, where relationships with others, including 
their judgments and opinions of one, are emphasised, the majority of these accounts 
are concerned with interpersonal relationships, with a particular emphasis on social 
understandings and attitudes towards depression. What these accounts indicate is the 
presence of a conflict between individuals and their society, arising in large part due 
to misunderstandings, of the notion of mental illness generally, and depression in 
particular. Such misunderstandings are not limited to an abstract definition of 
depression, but also have implications for judgements and expectations; what they 
take to be characteristic symptoms of depression, what an individual in depression 
looks like, and what it means to be depressed. Following the preceding exposition, 
such misunderstandings can be taken to be an example of inauthentic understanding 
characteristic of das Man, which creates a tension and conflict with individuals 
experiencing depression.  
5.4.1. Misunderstandings of depression as a mental illness 
The first theme patients talk about concerns the misunderstanding in the society, as 
to what depression is. It seems to be that in Iranian society there is a generally 
accepted conception of illness in society as a purely physical phenomenon, 
manifestations of which can be perceived. Such a view is in line with the previously 
discussed cultural conceptions of health and illness as inspired by traditional medicine 
(see §2.3.1). On this conception of illness as something observable, depression, which 
is taken to be a supposedly purely mental illness with no such observable 
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manifestations, becomes problematic. It becomes difficult for Iranians to accept that 
such a condition can be a ‘real’ illness. It should be noted that when Iranians expect 
an illness to have physical manifestations what is meant are directly observable 
symptoms of illness, such as tissue damage, or X-ray images of a broken bone. Those 
behavioural changes that arise in depression, or other mental illnesses, do not seem 
to be ‘physical manifestations’ of the right kind. An example illustrating this 
conception, that gets used frequently by Iranians contrasts depression with ‘a broken 
leg’: 
FB#4 – [Regarding expectations from others to engage in social activities] 
Nobody expects someone with a broken leg to go hiking … but the difference 
is you can see a broken leg, but you can’t see an ill soul.   
FB#13 – [Regarding the shame and judgments around depression] There is 
no shame in breaking your limbs. People seek medical help the first 
opportunity they get and get treatment … but when it comes to depression 
or mental illness, a lot of people choose silence or denying that the illness 
exists. 
I would argue that this misconception is an instance of the inauthentic understanding 
of das Man. Recall that in Heidegger’s characterisation, das Man exists in the mode of 
inauthentic understanding, and is seen as being representative of the widely-held 
beliefs in a given society and seeking conformity with this society. Noting these 
characterisations makes it clear that such an understanding of illness as always 
accompanied by directly observable symptoms, and consequently the understanding 
of depression as a ‘less real’ illness in the absence of such symptoms, is characteristic 
of the inauthentic understanding of das Man. This inauthentic understanding creates 
a tangible conflict between the society and the one suffering from depression, as seen 
in the above quotes. This conflict, which arises from the lack of mutual understanding, 
underlies the shame that patients feel they are made to endure in talking about their 
depression, as well as social stigmatisations and judgements that result from this 
misunderstanding and mischaracterisation of depression.   
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One response to this misunderstanding, seen in the accounts by depressed patients, 
seems to be aimed at challenging the supposedly the hard division between physical 
and mental illnesses. Some patients present the various observable manifestations of 
depression as being close to physical symptoms. One instance of such a response is 
talk of ‘uncontrollable crying’ as the most stated symptom of depression among the 
Facebook sample:  
FB#3 – ... I would wake up in the morning and start crying. My friend would 
find a new job I would cry. Stepping on a snail and crushing it would make 
me cry. It rained, metro was delayed, ATMs were broken, or any other simple 
reason would make me cry. 
FB#4 – [While depressed] any excuse would make my tears flow… . 
FB#12 – I was done, the me for whom crying was the hardest thing in the 
world, would now cry when seeing a tiger who had lost its pups on a nature 
documentary, my soul was extremely weak, so was my tolerance threshold… 
. 
FB#14 – Without wanting to, I would cry, without wanting to.  
I suggest that, crying can be seen as a physical manifestation of a non-physical illness. 
In a society with a tendency to dismiss mental illness as ‘unreal’ due to not having 
physical manifestations, then an observable manifestation of it, such as crying in the 
case of depression, could be hoped to play a legitimising role.19 Crying is also seen 
repeatedly in the responses to the questionnaire – as can be seen from Figure 2 (p.14), 
 
19 It is worth making a note here on self-harming behaviour as a result of social expectations 
for an individual to legitimise her illness. There is no data on self-harm as a behaviour among 
depressed patients in Iran, and studies that do exist on the subject often conflate or equate 
self-harm and suicide attempts, making it difficult to draw precise conclusions about the 
matter (e.g. Zarghami & Khalilian, 2002; Maghsoudi, et al., 2004). Although self-harm has not 
been a common form of behaviour among Iranians, in recent years, the increase in rates of 
cutting as a form of self-harm among teenage school girls has been reported, sparking worries 
and a national discussion, especially on the social pressures on young girls in the country (Ilna 
News, 2017).  
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about 28% of the respondents talk about crying as one of their symptoms of 
depression. Offering a characterisation of depression that fits in with the widely-held 
beliefs regarding illness generally, would naturally have the effect of eliminating at 
least some of the stigmas that arise as a result of such misconceptions.  
However, crying in this context has another legitimising role, namely that of 
distinguishing between the pathological depressive mood and the normal state of 
sadness which is only to be expected. The general attunement towards sadness in Iran, 
and the positive valuation of it, together with the belief that sadness is a necessary 
and inescapable part of human life, as noted in §2.4, give rise to the social expectation 
that every individual should be able to cope with this necessary sadness. Moreover, as 
a result of this expectation regarding how individuals should be, there exists a negative 
attitude towards those individuals who complain about the presence of sadness in 
their lives. These are often viewed as weak individuals incapable of dealing with what 
is seen as a necessary aspect of life. This view is further applied to those suffering from 
depression: sadness exists for all and complaints about the hardships of life are a mark 
of a weak character. Uncontrollable crying in such cases acts as an indicator of a 
deeper form of sadness than what one is expected to endure, or a different form of 
sadness altogether, one that goes beyond the general attunement of the world and 
should be considered pathological.  
These points serve to indicate the way in which a conflict between individuals and 
society, between Dasein and das Man, shapes the behaviours of the individuals. Lack 
of an authentic understanding of depression in society, or even the perception of such 
a deficiency, forces those suffering from depression to act in a certain way in order to 
legitimise their suffering and gain the acceptance they need. As I will argue, this lack 
of understanding, or perception of it, has far reaching effects that extend beyond the 
social domain and into personal relationships. However, it is important to note here 
the fact that the influence of such misunderstandings is not limited to the observable 
behavioural changes. Rather, there are phenomenologically significant consequences, 
which shape the way in which patients understand and interpret their experiences. 
One example of such a consequence is the effect of these social misunderstandings on 
the space of possibilities presented to an individual in depression.  
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5.4.2. Misunderstandings and possibilities of action 
The social judgments and stigmas, stemming from an inaccurate understanding of 
depression, have practical implications as well. The second context in which social 
relationships are talked about concerns such implications. Specifically, social 
judgements have the power to shape possibilities for action, as perceived by 
depressed patients. It is the interplay between the description a community holds, and 
the individual experiences within the bounds of that description that is of interest 
here.  
Recall that understanding, for Heidegger, is the mode of moving forward in the world, 
through having a grasp on the world and the possibilities it presents to Dasein. This 
mode of understanding and the resulting actions are always socially and culturally 
determined and the presence of das Man, and in turn the possibility of inauthenticity 
is always embedded in our actions. This sociocultural nature of the mode of 
understanding and das Man’s contribution to it, can have a significant influence on 
one’s grasp of the world in which she dwells and, consequently, the actions or 
inactions she chooses to take. This can be seen clearly in the case of Iranian patients 
struggling to identify and carry out their chosen actions in response to depression.  
An instance of this interplay is seen in the case of depressed patients who choose 
medication as their preferred treatment for depression, but who face judgments in 
light of this decision. Many of the Facebook posts note that taking medication for 
depression is looked down upon in the society, and that such attitudes result from the 
lack of understanding of the nature of depression itself: 
FB#8 – [The most difficult thing is] explaining to people, making them 
understand that the state I’m in is not called laziness and is different from 
short-term and temporary episodes of depression in others, which comes 
about after emotional crises and failures in employment and studies, that I 
am trying to get rid of it and of course it crossed my mind, before it crossed 
theirs, to do something for myself. That it has nothing to do with inculcation 
… A pain that others, even those closest and dearest to you enforce on you, 
because they do not know how to act around you so that you do not endure 
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more pressure. That medication is necessary for depression, just like it is for 
heart disease and diabetes and migraine, that they’d stop blaming you for 
taking it and recommending herbal remedies and other alternatives. 
If, as I have argued, such negative attitudes and judgments towards an individual with 
depression arise from misconceptions of depression rooted in traditional medicine, 
then it would not be surprising to see these attitudes extend to the medical treatment 
of depression as well. As seen in §2.3.1, following traditional Iranian and Islamic 
medicine, the prevalent conception of illness and disease, is one arising from an 
imbalance in the body, due to environmental, dietary, or stress-inducing factors. In 
this conception, therefore, one can rid the body of illness through restoring this 
balance by natural means. Given these folk understandings, herbal remedies and 
natural alternatives to pharmaceutical medicine have retained a strong preference 
among Iranians (Loeffler, 2007). Through time, however, the success of 
pharmaceutical medicine has been accepted for somatic illnesses, such as heart 
disease and diabetes referred to in the above quote. The effectiveness of these for 
mental illnesses, however, remains controversial in the eyes of the Iranian public. 
If we accept, therefore, that there is a negative attitude in society towards taking 
medication for depression then given our preceding arguments, such a prevalent 
attitude could have a significant influence on how individuals seek help for depression 
and the actions they take in treating it. This is again due to the social nature of the 
world we live in; social and cultural elements not only influence the way we identify 
our space of possibilities, but also how we choose to act and actualise these 
possibilities. Given the cultural values of Iran as a collectivist society, the importance 
of the shared values held by the society and the influence they have on the life choices 
of the individual, the saliency of this point in the context of Iran is clear. As such, it is 
not surprising that in some cases attitudes and judgments regarding medication in 
treating depression are powerful enough that they result in individuals having an 
altered space of possibilities of action, which in turn influences their choice in which 
action to take. Therefore, in this context, within a society that not only views 
depression as somewhat inferior to other, more ‘real’ physical illnesses, but also has a 
history of folk theories of illness and treatment which have a negative view of 
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pharmaceutical drugs, the possibility of action for those inclined to such medication 
as treatment of depression are compromised: 
FB#1 – When my family found out about the medicine, they got really upset, 
it was hard for them to accept that their daughter took antidepressants and 
this topic is still unacceptable in today’s Iran and most often people label you 
as a mental patient (bimār-e ravāni). I stopped taking the medication … I 
know I need help but my negative personal experience of seeking help from 
a psychologist, as well as being mindful of my family, and the negative 
attitude of the society towards those who take medication, stop me from 
seeking help from psychiatrists and psychologists. 
The altered space of possibilities as a result of sociocultural conceptions and 
misunderstandings of depression, is not limited to taking medication. Iranian patients 
often complain about their inability to express themselves and their experiences, due 
to fear of being judged, labelled, or misunderstood. In a society where expressions of 
one’s emotions is encouraged, and where there is an expectation that others would 
be able to listen and help an individual suffering from unpleasant experiences, the 
inability to express depression experiences can be seen as a direct result of 
misunderstanding and misconceptions of depression. These common 
misunderstandings in this case, not only limit one’s possibilities of action, but further 
adds to the suffering of the individual, who feels that she has to endure these 
experiences alone. In the interpersonal domain, such feelings would further add to the 
patients’ feeling of, and tendency towards isolation, as will be discussed further in 
§6.5.3.  
FB#3 – I had doubts about writing about my experiences [of depression]. Not 
because I’m embarrassed, but because those around me clearly see my 
confession of being depressed as attempting to look intellectual, they think 
confessing to being depressed has now become fashionable.  
FB#12 – I know that writing [about depression] is not going to be without 
cost for me, I will certainly be judged, blamed, and even sabotaged by friends 
and acquaintances, colleagues, and even people whom I don’t expect.  
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#33(M) – [In my relations with others I have] an inability to express words, 
and [therefore] I suffer internally and am unable to express what must be 
said.  
Without being concerned about the authenticity or inauthenticity of such actions (or 
inactions) taken in light of the social valuations, what is of importance here is the role 
played by society in shaping the experience of depression in Iranians. What is striking 
is a sense of uncertainty and unfamiliarity associated with depression and its 
experiences and treatments. This sense of uncertainty is accompanied by a tension 
between what an individual experiences in depression, and what the prevalent ideas 
of society, or better of das Man, think acceptable for any individual in that situation. 
What is interesting is the fact that such social attitudes have a determining influence 
on individuals’ actions, while at the same time having a colouring influence on the 
individuals’ experiences of depression.  
In addition to the phenomenological significance of these influences, the cultural 
dynamics that contribute to this influence in the case of Iran are worth pointing out. 
The importance of social and personal relationships in the Iranian culture, and the 
norms and expectations around this importance have already been noted. For 
Iranians, having and maintaining a healthy social presence and relationships are of 
crucial importance. This cultural emphasis and importance is further reinforced by 
social mechanisms, since having a well-connected network of friends and 
acquaintances can define an individual’s path in life. This centrality of social 
relationships in Iranian culture and society has been reaffirmed in some empirical 
studies on cross-cultural beliefs and attitudes towards one’s social standing. For 
instance, Safdar et al. have shown that “for Iranians, paying attention to one’s social 
network (maintaining harmony within it and being sensitive to its complexity) is a way 
both of getting things done (and thereby gaining a sense of mastery) and of receiving 
enough positive reinforcement to feel that life is satisfying” (Safdar, et al., 2006, p. 
128). Given this strong background and context to the influence of social valuations 
and understandings, it can be seen that these attitudes and the possibilities of action 
arising from them, contribute to the ‘who’ of depressed patients in Iran, and the ‘how’ 
of their experiences. The possibilities presented to an individual suffering from 
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depression, are determined by the social descriptions of illness and depression, which 
are themselves culturally determined. The decision to stop taking medication for 
depression finds significance when considered within the cultural and social context 
of the decision and the descriptions and judgments that enforce such decisions. And 
the significance of feeling unable to share one’s experiences of depression, even with 
those close to one, is seen further when considered against the backdrop of 
sociocultural norms which attach a considerable importance to social relationships.  
These considerations, important as they are in themselves, have further 
consequences. I would argue that the misunderstandings and misconceptions of 
depression in Iran, and the attitudes and judgments they give rise to, create and 
maintain a mood of unhomelikeness in the world for the individual in depression. 
Arising from a sense of not being understood by others, and contributing to a feeling 
of lack of empathy, this mood dominates the interpersonal relationships in depression. 
As such, the mood of unhomelikeness can be thought of as a linking point between 
interpersonal relationships in the broader society, and those in the personal domain. 
Before looking at how this mood dominates personal interpersonal relationships in 
depression in the next chapter, I will give an account of how it arises in the social 
sphere and ‘spills over’ to the personal domain of relationships.  
5.5. Unhomelikeness in the World, and Empathy 
As has been noted earlier, at the heart of the interpersonal experiences in depression, 
is a sense of breakdown of the interpersonal bond, as a result of the existential change 
brought about by depression. I would argue that this breakdown, which underlies 
particular experiences of being with others in depression, can be explained and 
accounted for through the perceived lack of empathy, and its contribution to 
maintaining a sense of unhomelikeness already prevalent in depression. Furthermore, 
through discussion of empathy and unhomelikeness, links can be drawn between the 
interpersonal relationships in the social domain and those in the personal domain of 
experiences.  
Recall that for Heidegger, our being as Dasein is a being-in-the-world, a being that is 
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thrown into, and dwells in the world. Since the world and the entities in it find meaning 
for each individual in a unique way, there is always a way in which I feel at home in the 
world and attach a mine-ness to this world. However, this familiarity of our world, or 
the sense of ‘homelikeness’ of the world, is simultaneously pervaded by a sense of 
homelessness arising from the realisation that one does not fully know or control the 
world one inhabits. This is a necessary phenomenon since we are thrown into the 
world with everything and everyone already in it and our being, as Dasein, is a being 
there in the world that finds its own meaning within the disclosed entities. The 
disturbance of our sense of being at home in the world is always a possibility, and one 
instance in which this disturbance can be seen clearly is in anxiety arising as a result of 
the realisation that whilst being mine, the world does not entirely belong to me, thus 
realising the limitations of my control and effect over the world in which I live. Fredrik 
Svenaeus, making use of this notion and realising that this sense of ‘unhomelikeness’ 
is a necessary aspect of our understanding of the world and so of ourselves, offers an 
account of illness characterised by this sense. Despite its necessity for an authentic 
way of life, Svenaeus argues that if persistent, this sense of unhomelikeness becomes 
characteristic of illness, one which influences our perception of the world and of 
ourselves within it. (Svenaeus, 2000a; 2000b; 2011).  
According to Svenaeus, illness can be understood as a natural event, as a result of 
which one feels alienated, from one’s body, and from her past and future. This 
alienation leads to an altered view of oneself as well as the world around, one that no 
longer has the sense of familiarity it once did, thus transforming the homelikeness of 
the world into unhomelikeness. On this definition, then, while health, as a state of 
homelike being-in-the-world, is characterised by being balanced and in-tune with the 
world, illness is the state of being off-balance and alienated from all those once 
familiar. Thus illness in this sense is “a state in which the meaning-structure of one’s 
life is challenged, as one’s previous state of health is seen in a different light and one 
is faced with the possibility of creating a new life-meaning” (Kayali & Iqbal, 2013, p. 
32). The manifestation of the unhomelike quality of the world is different depending 
on the nature of the illness, yet what remains common in different cases is a change 
in the way one relates to the world and to oneself in illness.   
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One example of this unhomelike being-in-the-world is the altered perception of one’s 
body, in an illness which affects one’s physical ability. In a state of health one is able 
to perform one’s daily task without taking notice of one’s body. This is while in illness, 
one becomes aware of one’s body through taking notice of the difficulty with which 
the previously undemanding tasks are performed. In this awareness one takes notice 
of the limitations on one’s bodily capabilities, which in turn affect the way one 
perceives of the world around her and the possibilities presented to her. One’s 
previous possibilities are seen as less accessible in light of the illness, and the 
limitations on what one can or cannot do brings home the fact that one is not in control 
of her body in ways one had previously taken for granted.  
In the case of depression, this sense of unhomelikeness can be seen in one’s altered 
perception and understanding of the world and entities within it. In depression, due 
to the existential change one goes through, one’s relation with the world and things 
in it is transformed: the colourful is now seen as colourless, and the meaningful as 
meaningless. It is in such a case that one in depression loses one’s sense of mine-ness 
in the world, since the world that was mine no longer is. And it is in this sense that one 
feels a sense of unhomelikeness in the world in depression. This feeling inevitably 
affects one’s perceptions of, and relations with other people as well, since one’s 
perception of others and their dwelling in the world is altered. The perception of 
others as kind and loving is changed to one of hostility and untrustworthiness, and it 
is in this light that one in depression navigates the world and one’s relations with 
people in the world.  
It is worth noting here the relation between the senses of un/homelikeness and 
in/authenticity. Based on Svenaues’ account, the authentic understanding of the 
world (i.e. the philosophical reflective understanding), insofar as it reveals the limits 
of one’s control over one’s world, often leads to an unhomelike attunement, which 
characterises an unhealthy being-in-the-world. However, as Svenaeus points out, this 
observation does not mean that everyone leading an authentic life is ill, since, as 
pointed out earlier, authenticity and inauthenticity are complementary modes of 
being:  
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Authentic, philosophical understanding (which according to Sein und Zeit is 
reached in the moment of anxiety) would obviously not always be identical 
with a healthy being-in-the-world. The phenomenologist could be 
temporarily ill, but still have an authentic understanding, or she could indeed 
reach it while (or even through) being ill. Also, the phenomenologist would 
indeed always have to return to the inauthentic understanding of her daily 
life, since it provides the necessary background for authentic understanding, 
by being precisely that which is thereby explored as a pattern of meaning. 
(Svenaeus, 2000b, p. 128) 
This point can also be made with regards to das Man as the inauthentic everyday being 
of Dasein: despite the contempt with which Heidegger describes the modern public 
life, his account should not be taken to mean that all those who dwell in this mode of 
being are ill.  As such, what is of interest in this understanding of health and illness, on 
Svenaeus’ account, is not the question of authenticity, but rather the sense of 
homelikeness in the world, which is challenged in illness.  
Adopting this notion for depression is consistent with the nature of the experience of 
depression as “a creature invading the self and taking control over it” (Svenaeus, 2014, 
p. 4). In depression, the consequence of this apparent loss of self and the taking over 
of the illness, can be seen in the way in which one’s world is coloured by depression 
itself (or drained of colour as a result of it). This new way of perceiving and 
apprehending the world, which is not necessarily true to the actual reality of the world, 
can be attributed to the mood and attunement one finds oneself in, in depression. 
Since, as noted before, the world finds meaning and significance for Dasein based on 
the mood one finds herself thrown into. In other words, the mood in depression 
colours Dasein’s world in a new way: one which introduces a different understanding 
of the world, things within this world, and the possibilities for action presented to one. 
The sense of unhomelikeness in the world is, therefore, one of the ways in which the 
presence of this mood is felt. One of the main advantages of adopting this account of 
depression, as opposed to non-Heideggerian accounts, such as those viewing 
depression as a biological dysfunction, is its ability to cover a wide scope of elements 
related to the illness. The present account can, in particular, account for the far-
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reaching ramifications of depression that go beyond the personal experiences of the 
illness, which can challenge not only our views on individual cases of depression, but 
the more general conceptions of depression as an illness. (An example where these 
more general ramifications are examined with regards to this account is Kayali and 
Iqbal, 2013.)  
In the case of depression in Iran, the misunderstandings of depression as an illness, 
and the consequent attitudes and judgments directed to one in depression, which are 
prevalent in the society, contribute and exacerbate the sense of unhomelikeness. 
Because of this prevalent lack of understanding, the individual in depression no longer 
views her social world and people within it as familiar as they once were, since the 
possibility of mutual understanding is removed from her space of possibilities, thus 
the presence of interpersonal conflict as an inevitable and ever-present force 
governing these relationships is highlighted. The feeling that others cannot 
understand one and one’s experiences, creates for the individual a sense that others 
can no longer empathise with one. The removal of the possibility of empathy from 
one’s space of possibilities, can be seen as a breaking of interpersonal bond. And 
further, the feeling that others are unwilling or unable to understand one and one’s 
experiences, exacerbates one’s sense of unfamiliarity in the world, strengthening the 
mood of unhomelikeness already felt in depression.  
There is an important linguistic note to be made here, regarding the complaints made 
by Iranian patients about the misunderstanding of depression, and the link between 
understanding and empathy in Farsi language. Despite there being a word denoting 
empathy (hamdeli), Iranians often talk about feeling understood by others when 
talking about feeling empathised with. Understanding is seen as the necessary step for 
empathy, so much so that in everyday language, the two are often seen and used as 
synonymous. In such a case, therefore, the existence of misunderstandings in the 
society of what depression entails and what the appropriate actions in the face of 
depression are, create a feeling of not being understood, not being empathised with.  
This move between understanding and empathy is of crucial importance for the 
discussion at hand, since it makes clear the experience of individuals that goes beyond 
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the perception of a dominant misunderstanding. The conflict between an individual 
suffering from depression and the society which misunderstands what depression is, 
adds to a feeling of unhomelikeness in the world, already present in depression. This 
loss of homelikeness is seen even more clearly when one considers these 
misunderstandings, as perceived by depressed patients, as instances of lack of 
empathy on the part of other people. The inability or unwillingness of other people to 
empathise with the depressed patient, as a central failing in interpersonal 
relationships, I would argue, represents the breaking of the interpersonal bond in 
depression. This perception, which adds to the feeling of unhomelikeness in 
depression, underlies further feelings and attitudes that exacerbate the failings in 
interpersonal relationships with specific others, as I will show in the next chapter.   
5.6. Conclusions 
Impairments in one’s ability to connect and maintain relationships with others are 
central to experiences of depression. I have argued that the breakdown of the 
interpersonal bond in depression can be accounted for through conflicts between one 
and Others. In this chapter, focusing on interpersonal relationships in the social 
domain, i.e. those between the individual and the broader society, I have argued that 
this conflict arises from inauthentic understandings, which are characteristic of das 
Man. In the case of Iran, this conflict is formed and manifested through 
misunderstandings and misconceptions of depression, as arising from the cultural 
beliefs and folk theories of health and illness based on traditional medicine. 
Establishing a link between such misunderstandings and perceived lack of empathy on 
the part of the individual in depression, I argued that such misconceptions exacerbate 
the mood of unhomelikeness in the world, which is characteristic of illness. This mood 
of unhomelikeness governs one’s perceptions and relations with others in depression, 
both in the social domain, as well as the personal domain of experience, as I will 
explore in the next chapter.  
The misunderstandings of depression in the broader Iranian culture and society, as has 
been seen, has implications for how the individuals experience their depression, as 
well as for their space of possibilities when it comes to taking action in the face of 
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depression. Additionally, some of the examples presented here suggest how these 
social and cultural ways of understanding depression have concrete implications for 
intimate interpersonal relationships. However, as I will suggest in the next chapter, the 
sense of unhomelikeness arising from these misunderstandings has further 
implications for one’s subjectivity and emotional experiences in depression. As I will 
argue, unhomelikeness acts as a backdrop against which personal relationships with 
others, and the emotional experiences in this domain, find meaning and can be 
understood.   
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6. Interpersonal Relationships II – Personal Interpersonal20 
6.1. Introduction 
As seen in the previous chapter, one’s relationship with others and its changes as seen 
in depression, form a central part of the overall experience of depression. In the 
preceding arguments, the was focus on interpersonal relationships in the social 
domain, as relationships between one and a collective, impersonal Other. I argued that 
in depression the inherent conflict embedded within one’s relationship with the 
society one is part of (as argued by Heidegger) comes to the foreground of 
consciousness, influencing one’s experiences of these relations. In the case of Iranian 
patients, this conflict can be seen as a form of misunderstanding on the part of the 
society, of what depression is and how it might be dealt with. In the context of the 
Iranian linguistic and cultural understanding of empathy, this misunderstanding tends 
to be interpreted and experienced as a lack of empathy by depressed people on the 
part of the larger society. This feeling of lack of empathy, as I have shown, exacerbates 
the sense of unhomelikeness, as the dominant attunement in depression. 
The feeling of empathy, or lack thereof, and the strong feeling of unhomelikeness as a 
result of it, can be thought of as the linking point between the problems with others 
in the social domain, and those in the personal domain. In this chapter, taking these 
feelings as the starting point, I will aim to show how the interpersonal problems with 
a specific Other can be understood as arising from these feelings. One of the striking 
differences between the experiences of Iranian patients and those from the UK, is 
indeed in the manifestation of the breaking of the interpersonal bond in depression. 
Most notably, whilst those in the UK complain of feeling lonely in depression, as a 
result of their inability to connect with other people, Iranians talk about wanting to 
isolate themselves and ‘escape’ from other people. This difference points to a conflict 
in interpersonal relationships made manifest in depression among Iranian patients: It 
 
20 A version of this chapter has been published as: Mirdamadi, M. (2018b). “A 
Phenomenological account of Emotional Experiences in Depression among Iranian patients”. 
Discipline Filosofiche, 28(2), pp. 177-198 
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is not the case that people feel unable to connect with other people, but rather that 
the very desire to do so is lost in depression, and replaced with the desire to seek 
solitude. In order to understand the significance of this difference, I would argue that 
it is important to understand first, the significance of the feeling of empathy in 
depression and the emotional responses to the perceived lack of empathy and 
understanding, as the basis of one’s relationship with the Other.  
As mentioned before, in the analysis of individual relationships with a determinate 
Other and the emotional components of this relationship, I will be using Sartre’s 
account of Being-for-others. Similar to Heidegger, Sartre’s account rests on the 
premise that at the heart of any relationship there necessarily exists an unresolvable 
conflict. What I will aim to show here is the way in which this conflict is brought to the 
foreground of one’s consciousness in depression and the way it manifests itself in 
certain emotions and attitudes towards the Other. It should be noted that Sartre’s 
account, as I will be using it, gives an account of the universal nature of our being and 
consciousness and as such, when it comes to culturally specific behaviours and 
patterns of thought and interpretation, his account will only provide a guide for 
framing the analysis, rather than providing a theory to be simply applied to the case 
at hand. Therefore, in the case of culturally specific behaviours and emotions, the 
account given here will draw also on empirical observations relevant to the 
psychological factors at play within the Iranian culture and society.  
6.2. Relating to others as persons 
As seen previously, Heidegger’s account of Dasein and das Man is invaluable in the 
analysis of social situations and the dynamics of the relationship between the 
individual and the society. Sartre’s account of relations with particular Others, on the 
other hand, provides important insights for the discussion of the interpersonal domain 
of relationships. Furthermore, as has already been noted, at the heart of both of these 
accounts lies an inevitable conflict, one which for Heidegger arises from the 
inauthenticity of das Man, presenting difficulty for Dasein’s quest of authenticity. For 
Sartre, however, this conflict is much more deeply placed, arising from the conflicting 
nature between the way an individual sees herself and the way the Other sees her. As 
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such, in order to understand the dynamics of our relations with the Other and the 
conflict at the heart of this relation, it is first important to note the way in which one 
relates to individual Others as persons, as conscious beings like ourselves.  
A detailed account of the nature of our being is no doubt beyond the scope of this 
work, however, without diverging from the subject matter, a few observations, made 
by Sartre, about the nature of our being, illuminate the matter at hand. Sartre 
observes that the fundamental element in our human consciousness is intentionality 
– the fact that our consciousness is first and foremost directed outwards and is 
consciousness of something, out there in the world. It follows from this 
characterisation that our conception of ourselves, the way we see ourselves in the 
world is fundamentally as subject: my being for my solitary self is one of a self-aware 
conscious subject. With intentional consciousness as the defining feature of our being, 
we are subjects with the ability to take things out there in the world as objects of our 
consciousness. In our awareness of ourselves and the world, therefore, we are 
conscious subjects aware of other things that comprise our sense of the world in which 
we dwell, and these other things are always taken as objects of our consciousness, i.e. 
as things that we are consciously aware of. It is this conception of oneself as inherently 
a subject, which is fundamentally transformed in one’s encounter with the Other. 
In the presence of the Other, my being as a subject is transformed to one of object. 
This is since, through the recognition of the Other as a conscious being such as myself, 
i.e. as a person, I realise the possibility that as a subject, the Other can take me as the 
object of his consciousness. This recognition of the Other as a person like myself, 
Sartre claims, comes from certain emotions that I can only feel in the presence of the 
Other, such as shame and guilt. Sartre argues that the very existence of these 
emotions, the very possibility of feeling these emotions, makes evident the essence of 
the Other as a person for whose consciousness I can be an object. In such a situation, 
I realise that the Other can see me, and this being seen by the Other, reveals me to 
myself anew. This is since I now see myself through the eyes of the Other, as I appear 
to the Other, as an object, and through the judgements that the Other can pass on me. 
“By the mere appearance of the Other, I am put in the position of passing judgement 
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on myself as an object, for it is as an object that I appear to the Other” (Sartre, 2003, 
p. 246). 
The presence of others opens up new possibilities for me. Possibilities which rely on 
the recognition of others as persons, and which include those of meaning-making, the 
feeling of certain emotions, and understanding of oneself and the world in which one 
dwells. In Sartre’s terminology, in the presence of the Other, my Being for myself – 
being-for-itself – is transformed into the mode of being of things – being-in-itself –, in 
the eyes of the Other. And this new mode of being found only in the presence of 
others, bears no resemblance to what I know myself to be: “I am unable to bring about 
any relation between what I am in the intimacy of the For-itself, without distance, 
without recoil, without perspective, and this unjustifiable being-in-itself which I am for 
the Other” (Ibid.). This transformation is crucial for me to realise my being fully, since 
it makes possible a more complete knowledge of myself, and the feeling of certain 
emotions, which exist only in the presence of the Other. It is because of this crucial 
transformation and the new possibilities brought about by it, that Sartre (much like 
Heidegger), argues that our being as humans is essentially social; it is through our 
relationships with others that our being is made complete. Sartre argues “I need the 
Other in order to realize fully all the structures of my being” (Ibid.). And it is thus that 
our being, as a For-itself, is inherently, and essentially, a being-for-others.  
This transformation, however, despite opening up new possibilities for one’s being, 
also gives rise to conflicts with the Other. This conflict arises due to the unfamiliar 
nature of myself in the face of the Other: the Other forces me to see myself in a new 
way, one which bears no resemblance to the image I hold of myself, i.e. as a subject 
with certain characteristics. This objectification of my being by the Other is naturally 
met with fierce resistance and leads to an unresolvable conflict in which both I and the 
Other attempt to establish our subject-ness by escaping the inevitable objectification 
of the other. This struggle is seen in various modes of one’s relationship with the 
Other, as Sartre argues, from loving to hateful to indifferent, at the heart of all kinds 
of relationships remains an unresolvable and necessary conflict.  This is since in all 
instances, different in appearance as they might be, the struggle to save one’s 
subjectivity from the look of the Other will be present. “Everything which may be said 
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of me in relations with the Other applies to him as well. While I attempt to free myself 
from the hold of the Other, the Other is trying to free himself from mine, while I seek 
to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me. We are by no means dealing with 
unilateral relations with an object-in-itself, but with reciprocal and moving relations” 
(Sartre, 2003, p. 386).   
However, it is because of this conflict, this constant objectification of myself by the 
Other, that the possibility of experiencing emotions such as guilt and shame are 
created. This possibility is important for a moral way of being, but is also crucial in 
one’s understanding of oneself. As such, the fact that such emotions are made possible 
and find meaning in the presence of the Other, makes clear the importance of 
interpersonal relationships in our emotional lives, despite the existence of an ever-
present and unresolvable conflict. Such emotions are made possible because of, rather 
than despite, the existence of this conflict. It is through interacting with others, and 
therefore being taken as object of the Other’s consciousness, that one sees an image 
of oneself that might otherwise remain concealed from one’s consciousness and 
therefore experiences. It is not only that through the judgement of others one 
becomes able to articulate a certain experience or emotion that one was already 
feeling. Rather, the emotional experiences themselves are brought about through the 
interaction with others and through the judgements made by others about one. Given 
the importance of Others in creating such emotions, and the importance of emotional 
experiences, especially in depression, in addition to an account of our relations with 
the Other, it is important to have an account of the phenomenology of emotions.   
6.3. A Phenomenological Theory of Emotions 
In Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions (1962), Sartre offers an outline of a 
phenomenological account of emotions after considering, and deeming as weak, the 
classical and psychological accounts of emotions. Importantly, Sartre argues that the 
psychological account of emotions fails because it fails to consider emotions within 
the context in which they occur, thus removing the significance of emotions in the 
wider context of one’s being, in the world and in relation to the world. This objection 
is constructed around the principles of psychology as a science, one which takes facts 
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as its starting point. This principal starting point is what Sartre takes issue with: “To 
wait upon the fact is, by definition, to wait upon the isolated; it is to prefer, positively, 
the accident to the essential, the contingent to the necessary, disorder to order” 
(Sartre, 1962, p. 17). This approach fails, according to Sartre, since it neglects the fact 
that “the notions of the world and of ‘human-reality’ are inseparable” (ibid., p.18). As 
such, the psychological account of emotions, which examines, and accounts for 
emotions as isolated phenomena, falls short of a comprehensive account of a 
phenomenon inherently linked with our mode of being and our relation to the world. 
Within such a framework, the significance of emotional experiences is lost. As Sartre 
notes, from a phenomenological standpoint emotions are significative of the human 
reality, of the whole of one’s consciousness; “emotion is therefore an organized form 
of human existence” (Sartre, 1962, p. 28).  
Emotions, like other acts of consciousness, are intentional and are directed towards 
the world. In feeling fear, one is afraid of something out there in the world, and in 
feeling love, the emotion is directed to a certain object or person out there in the 
world. Emotional consciousness, therefore, is consciousness of the world, and because 
of the relational nature of emotions, the subject and object of an emotion are “united 
in an indissoluble synthesis” (ibid., p.57). Emotions, Sartre argues, form a specific 
manner of apprehending the world in which we dwell. For example, take the sense of 
irritation at one’s inability to solve a problem. Whilst solving the problem, one is out 
there in the world, aware of different things out there in the world that contribute to 
the problem, or to the attempt at solving the problem. In finding oneself irritated when 
unable to solve the problem, the irritation itself is a way in which the world appears 
to one. The experience of irritation is both a reaction to the world, and a way of 
understanding and apprehending the world. It can be seen, therefore, the way in 
which our emotions are entangled with the world and the way it appears to us. Thus 
emotions are always significative of our human reality: the way in which we find 
meaning in the world where we dwell, and the way in which we see the world itself.   
Emotions, Sartre argues, are transformative of the world we live in, since in their 
presence, we see the world in a new way and therefore are presented with different 
possibilities that this new world offers. This transformative nature of emotions, rooted 
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in imaginative consciousness (Sartre, 2004), is what differentiates emotional ways of 
apprehending the world from other ways of doing so. It is argued that we perceive our 
environment “as a complex of instruments, a medium in which, provided we know 
certain rules or techniques, we can manipulate people and things so as to achieve 
certain ends” (Fell, 1965, p. 15). This perception of the world is made possible due to 
our intuitions about the nature of the world as orderly, as “ruled by deterministic 
processes” (Sartre, 1962, p. 63). It is only based on our presumptions that the world is 
regular, that we assume certain actions would guarantee certain ends. In emotions, 
however, this perception is transformed: 
When the paths before us become too difficult, or when we cannot see our 
way, we can no longer put up with such an exacting and difficult world. All 
ways are barred and nevertheless we must act. So then we try to change the 
world; that is, to live as though the relations between things and their 
potentialities were not governed by deterministic processes but by magic. 
(ibid.) 
Sartre provides a simple example to clarify the way in which our emotional behaviours 
and responses to a situation are transformative of our understanding of the world and 
therefore our space of possibilities. Take the situation in which I reach to pluck a bunch 
of grapes, but am unable to do so as they are beyond my reach. In response, “I shrug 
my shoulders, muttering: ‘they are too green’” (Sartre, 1962, p. 65). Sartre argues that 
conferring the quality of being ‘too green’ on the grapes, acts as a substitute for the 
act which I intended or desired, but was not able to complete. In other words, the 
attractive quality by which they were presented to me – as ‘ready for gathering’ as 
Sartre puts it –, becomes intolerable when the possibility presented to me cannot be 
actualised. The tension created as a result of this inability to actualise a possibility is 
resolved when I confer a new quality onto the grapes; i.e. their being ‘too green’. Now 
of course, one cannot confer this new quality chemically, but rather through “putting 
on the behaviour of disrelish” (ibid., p.66). It is in such a way that I confer the quality 
onto the grapes ‘magically’, and it is thus that emotions come about: “In this case the 
comedy is only half sincere. But let the situation be more critical; let the incantatory 
behaviour be maintained in all seriousness: and there you have emotion” (Ibid.). 
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Emotions, therefore, are like other acts of consciousness, purposive: they are a way of 
acting. What Sartre means by an “act of magic” in this case, which underlie the 
transformative power of emotions, is “act of imagination” (Sartre, 2004). The 
transformation of one’s perception of the world, from a deterministic and pragmatic 
one, into a magical, or imaginative one, enables one to see new possibilities, new ways 
for achieving a goal. This is since, in imaginative transformation, the perceived object 
is transformed so as to conform to our desires directed to the object, it is in this sense 
that our feelings remake the object in imagination. It is through this remaking of the 
object of our emotional consciousness, that new possibilities arise: the deterministic 
nature of the environment no longer presents itself as a limiting condition, since the 
new quality projected onto the world (or a certain object within the world), presents 
to one’s consciousness a new way of apprehending the world. This new apprehension, 
then, presents new potentialities, new possibilities, and new ways to act upon one’s 
desires, by directing one’s emotional consciousness to the world.  
Imagination, therefore, can be thought of as a connecting point, having a fundamental 
role both in one’s perception of space of possibilities, as well as emotional 
experiences. Imagination can present to one certain possibilities – of action and of 
ways of being and apprehending the world – previously unknown. And it is in virtue of 
our perceived and imagined possibilities that emotions come about, and change our 
space of possibilities. As such, emotional experiences, as a fundamental part of our 
human reality, arise from the synthesis of perception and imagination. We perceive 
the world as limiting, as governed by deterministic processes. This is while 
“Imagination presents objects to me without their resistance, magically transformed 
so as to conform to my desires” (Fell, 1965, p. 42). Therefore, in having an emotion 
directed to the world, or a thing within the world, we are acting upon the world, by 
projecting our desires onto it, and in so doing, we find a new way of apprehending the 
world. Given this relational nature, Sartre’s theory offers a way of understanding 
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emotions, as significative of our being-in-the-world: “Emotion is a sign of the conscious 
interpretation man puts on his experience” (ibid., p.51).21   
6.4. Empathy and Unhomelikeness 
The feelings of empathy, or lack thereof, I would argue, forms the basis of the 
emotional difficulties felt in depression in relation to others. This principal importance 
of feelings of empathy, or more accurately, feeling empathised with, is seen through 
the fact that its presence or loss can have crucial implications for interpersonal 
experiences, including those that are often impaired in the course of depression. In 
giving an account of what empathy is, Ratcliffe argues that underlying the ability to 
empathise, is having “a kind of ‘openness’ to experiential differences” (Ratcliffe, 2015, 
p. 238). It is not the case that in order to empathise, one would necessarily have to 
experience what another person is experiencing, i.e. moving from the second-person 
to the first-person in access to a certain experience, giving rise to a “phenomenological 
isomorphism between the two parties” (ibid., p.239), as is suggested in various 
theories of empathy (e.g. empathy as simulation: Stueber, 2006; Goldman, 2006, and 
mirror or reconstructive empathy: Goldman, 2011; De Vignemont, 2010). Rather, what 
is important is to establish a connection through understanding, whilst acknowledging 
the phenomenological differences between experiences. This ‘openness to difference’ 
in experiences, would be manifested in one’s manner in relation to the person having 
the experience, in the form of curiosity to understand, for example in asking certain 
questions (or not asking others), being attentive to the Other’s needs, etc. Although it 
is noted that acknowledgment of the phenomenological differences in experience 
requires some grasp of the other person’s experiences, Ratcliffe maintains that “this 
 
21 It is worth noting that Sartre’s theory of emotions is broadly compatible with some 
contemporary theories of emotion, at least in the general outline as presented here. Goldie 
(2002), for instance, notes the importance of intentionality as a defining property of emotions, 
while Prinz (2006) has emphasised the perceptual nature and basis of our emotions. Morton 
(2013) makes similar remarks  to Sartre about the important connections holding between 
emotion and imagination. As such, focusing only on Sartre’s theory is not an idiosyncratic 
choice.  
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can remain vague, ambiguous, indeterminate, without amounting to a failure of 
empathy” (Ratcliffe, 2015, p. 239).  
As such, the central element in feeling and maintaining empathy is understanding. The 
depressed patient who seeks to be empathised with, is seeking others, as a society but 
also particular Others, to understand, or be willing to understand, her experiences in 
depression. This formulation of empathy is especially important in the case of Iranian 
patients, given that within the Iranian culture and the everyday language, 
understanding and empathy come close to being synonymous. It is given this 
characterisation, then, that the misunderstandings of depression, and the attitudes 
and opinions arising from this misunderstanding, create a feeling on the part of the 
depressed person that they are not being empathised with. And it is this feeling, which 
creates the mood of unhomelikeness in the world of personal relationships, and 
underlies the conflict seen between the individual and others.  
On the account given by Ratcliffe, empathy signifies a certain attitude one takes 
towards the experiences of another. An attitude which, whilst acknowledging the 
differences and the impossibility of gaining a first-person access to the Other’s 
experiences, seeks to understand and comprehend these experiences as had by the 
Other, by means of caring, attentiveness, and curiosity. Feeling empathised with, 
therefore, would mean the recognition of this attitude in the Other. This recognition 
requires an ability to ‘connect’ with other people, and it is this ability which, because 
of the existential change one goes through in depression, and as a result of the mood 
of unhomelikeness dominant in depression, is impaired; the very possibility of 
attaining and maintaining this interpersonal connection is lost in depression. As a 
result, therefore, a depressed person is unable to identify in others the empathetic 
attitudes directed towards her, giving rise to the central feeling of not being 
empathised with, or not being understood. Such feelings are in turn exacerbated by 
the continual misunderstanding of depression and the misguided conceptualisations 
prevalent in the society. I would argue that this prevalence creates a presumption 
against which the interpersonal experiences of empathy find meaning.   
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In this regard, therefore, empathy presents a linking point between the social and the 
interpersonal problems seen in depression. This fact is not a surprising find, since it is 
undeniable that our social and interpersonal modes of being-with-others are linked, 
and our encounters with others in the social setting influences our experiences, our 
expectations, and our attitudes in the interpersonal sphere. Inevitably, the general 
understanding of depression, and the attitude taken towards it in the social domain, 
are not distinct from those found in the interpersonal one, rather, they influence one 
another, since the norms and attitudes held by the society represent the attitudes of 
individuals to a certain extent, and the individuals within the society have the power 
to change the norms of the society. For the depressed person, the lack of 
understanding in the social domain creates the expectation of receiving the same 
behaviour in the interpersonal domain. This loop then carries within it feelings of 
unhomelikeness as the dominant mood colouring the experiences of interpersonal 
relationships.  
#15(F) – I felt like they didn’t understand me/empathize with me. 
#6(F) – When I’m depressed I feel like I don’t have an emotional connection 
with anyone. Nobody can be helpful with their presence. 
#2(M) – I feel like they do not have the capability (tavānāyi) to 
understand/empathise at all. 
The importance of the recognition of empathy as a linking point between the social 
and the personal is seen in the emotional experiences and difficulties between 
individuals and the Other, which, as I will argue, arise because of the perceived lack of 
empathy on the part of others. This perception, together with the realisation and the 
expectation that one’s encounter with the Other, would be  similar or representative 
of one’s encounter with others in the society, give rise to hostile emotions which 
underlie the breaking of the interpersonal bond. In the remainder of this chapter, I will 
look at emotional experiences of the interpersonal seen among Iranian patients, such 
as hatred and anger. I will argue that, not only are such emotions results of the 
perceived lack of empathy and the way one sees others in the attunement of 
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unhomelikeness, but also that these emotions can be viewed in the light of the 
necessary conflict between one and Other, as explained by Sartre.  
6.5. Emotional Experiences in Depression among Iranians 
The interpersonal experiences of depression, as talked about by Iranians, depend 
heavily on emotional experiences. In addition to feelings of lack of empathy and 
interpersonal connection, Iranians often talk about having negative emotions towards 
others, or being on the receiving end of negative emotions. These emotional 
experiences, in addition to being important in themselves, give rise to specific 
experiences and behaviours, an account of which would be incomplete without 
considering the role of the underlying emotions. Sartre’s account is especially helpful 
in analysing the totality of such feelings, experiences, and behaviours, for two reasons. 
Firstly, on this account emotions are a way of acting upon the world, transforming the 
world by projecting one’s conscious interpretation of one’s experiences onto the 
world. In this sense, then, emotions and experiences form a meaning-making loop: 
through our emotions we apprehend our experiences and the world, while our being-
in-the-world and our experiences of it form our emotions. Secondly, it is important to 
note the heavy emphasis Sartre places on the relation between emotional experiences 
and relations with others. This is since, as noted before, our being-for and –with others 
makes possible certain emotional experiences which give new meaning to our 
structure of being in the world generally.  
As pointed out earlier, I would argue that the lack of empathy, as perceived by 
depressed patients, underlies individuals’ various emotional experiences. As shown in 
Sartre’s account of emotions, perception and imagination present the mechanisms by 
which one comes to have a certain emotion. In the case of depression, the perceiving 
act, is one of lack of empathy on the part of others, the inability to recognise the 
empathetic attitude in others. In reaction to this perception, one’s imagination and 
apprehension of this perception, projected upon the world in emotions, is governed 
by the dominant mood of unhomelikeness in depression and defines the space of 
possibilities and one’s view of others and the world. It is in this dynamic that one fails 
to connect with other people: “a kind of interpersonal connection that many of us take 
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for granted seems impossible, absent from the world” (Ratcliffe, 2015, p. 218). Instead, 
what is highlighted in this dynamic, is the constant and everpresent conflict between 
one and Others. As such, this dynamic offers a way of understanding the way in which 
the interpersonal bond breaks down in depression; rather than considered in isolation, 
this breakdown finds meaning when considered in its entirety with different 
connected elements, emotional, behavioural, and cognitive alike. Throughout the 
following account, it should be borne in mind that the attunement of unhomelikeness 
dominates the way one thinks and apprehends one’s perceptions of others. 
#6(F) – I see what they do and their behaviours in a pessimistic/negative way. 
The routine (roozmarreh) behaviour of, for example, my parents become 
agitating (asabi) to me. 
This way of seeing others is key in the analysis, since it is against this background that 
emotions come about, and it is through this background that the possibility of 
apprehension in a positive way is removed.  
6.5.1. Negative emotions 
As mentioned before, the problems caused by misunderstandings of depression are 
prevalent in both social and interpersonal domains. A subtle difference between the 
manifestations of this misunderstanding in the two domains, however, is worth 
pointing out. Due to the intimate nature of interpersonal relationships, the 
misunderstanding of depression in this domain is manifested, not through general 
judgments and misunderstandings, but rather through various expectations of certain 
behaviours and explanations. Patients often complain of other people’s inability to 
understand their illness experiences, which in turn demands explanations that they 
are not always equipped to give.  
#1(F) – I’m not in the mood for having contact [with others] … everyone 
wants to know why I’m not the happy and smiling person I used to be and 
this makes me more isolated. 
#2(M) – The most important thing I can think of [is] the explanation as to 
why I sleep so much, why I cannot work, why I don’t take part in family 
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activities and why I have become so weak/powerless (nā-tavān) without a 
physical problem.  
#33(M) – [Others annoyed me] by saying ‘you don’t feel well, why are you 
like this, you look unwell, the way you speak is different’. 
What is noteworthy here is the fact that these expectations arise from the social 
misunderstandings and misconceptions of depression itself. It is not the symptoms 
themselves, such as lack of energy and fatigue, that are questioned, but rather the 
presence of these symptoms in the absence of a physical illness. Once again, the 
patients are seen to be asked to legitimise their illness in a way so as to conform to 
the pre-existing assumptions and conceptualisations of what constitutes an illness.  
However, there is an undeniable difference between the reactions to such judgments 
and expectations in the interpersonal domain, compared to the social sphere, namely 
the perceived personal nature of these judgements. It can be clearly seen from the 
responses from patients, that the lack of understanding and empathy, perceived in the 
interpersonal domain, does not concern depression itself, or one’s experiences. 
Rather, patients feel that they themselves are not being understood, and other people 
do not have the capacity to understand them, as a person.  
#17(F) – I feel like others also are not in the mood for [dealing/being with] 
me and … I feel like they don’t understand/empathise with me. 
#14(F) – I felt like they didn’t understand/empathise with me. 
This personal nature of the perceived judgment can be interpreted 
phenomenologically as the feeling of the Others passing judgements as to the kind of 
person that I am. As such, distinct from the specific experiences and the underlying 
causes, such a perception of the attitudes taken towards one can be interpreted as an 
unkind judgment on one’s very way of being, and thus can be an instance of the 
conflict that Sartre construes between the self and the Other. Once construed in this 
way, the attitudes and emotions that one takes as reactions towards the Other can be 
made sense of. However, it is not only on the grounds of the perception that others 
are not able to, or willing to understand one that these reactionary attitudes arise.  
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The perception that those close to one do not have the capability to understand one, 
against the backdrop of the attunement of depression as unhomelikeness, forms the 
basis of one’s relationships with others in depression. In this sense, then, one sees 
others as adopting a hostile view towards one. This perception of hostility, as an 
instance of the breakdown of the interpersonal bond, despite the differences in its 
manifestations, seems to be a universal part of the experience of depression. “All that 
others are perceived to offer is a distinctively personal form of threat, which might be 
experienced more specifically as derision, dismissal, ridicule, condemnation, 
aggression, or shame” (Ratcliffe, 2015, p. 220). These various manifestations of this 
perceived hostility are present among the Iranian patients as well, and they persist 
even in the absence of others.  
#14(F) – My sister didn’t apprehend that I had depression, she felt my aim 
was to get attention from the family. 
#25(M) – Others get upset and say that I’m trying to be classy. 
#17(F) – I feel like others … also talk behind my back and talk [badly] about 
me. 
#24(M) – My family hates me. 
#30(F) – [Others’ encounter] has made [my experience] worse – the way they 
are with me is really bad.  
What is clear here, is the perception of a wide range of negative attitudes, judgements 
and emotions directed to one in depression. This perception brings to the foreground 
the conflict between the individual and the Other, formed in this case, due to the lack 
of understanding on the part of others. Despite the fact that these feelings may be 
merely perceived, coloured by the dominant mood of depression, this perception is a 
necessary step for the creation of reactionary emotions, as seen in the account of 
emotions offered by Sartre. The perception of the world being a certain way, with 
one’s possibilities limited as a result of this, motivates the creation of reactionary 
emotions. These reactionary emotions, take the form of negative emotions towards 
others. These negative emotions can be accounted for through two separate but 
linked considerations. The first is the already mentioned theory of emotions: as a 
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result of the perception of negative attitudes and judgements directed towards one, 
and in the background of the mood of unhomelikeness which dominates one’s 
thoughts and outlook to the world, one comes to feel certain negative emotions 
towards others. Secondly, in the context of the conflict between one and the Other, 
the perception that the Other is passing judgements on one and sees one in light of 
these judgements in a way unfamiliar to the individual, one feels objectified by the 
Other. As seen earlier, when faced with such feelings, one inevitably moves to re-
establish one’s subjectivity by taking the Other as the object of one’s consciousness 
and one way of doing this is through one’s emotional consciousness towards the 
Other.  
#21(F) – I dislike everyone and nothing seems good to me. I feel hatred 
towards my children and family and want to escape from them. 
#7(F) – Sometimes in depression periods I would really really hate my father. 
#31(F) – I dislike them all [family and friends]. 
#28(F) – My brain didn’t believe what anyone was saying, like a person who 
hears something from one ear and it goes out from the other ear [Persian 
expression]. 
It is important to recall here the importance of such emotions, as instances of action 
taken by individuals in depression, but also as representative of their experiences and 
interpretation of their perception of the world around them. The feeling of hatred 
towards others, as well as being seen as a reaction to the perceived negative attitudes 
and emotions towards the individual, are representative of the way one interprets 
one’s position among others in the world. As such these emotions are also informative 
of the way one sees the world more generally. The feeling of being stuck and the 
general sense of dissatisfaction with life (as seen in Chapter 4 are echoed in the 
emotions towards others. Sartre, acknowledges this interconnectivity of one’s 
emotional consciousness, and sees this connectivity as an important pillar of 
emotional experiences as significative of the one’s being more generally. “The 
impossibility of finding a solution to the problem is apprehended objectively, as a 
quality of the world. This serves to motivate the new unreflective consciousness which 
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now grasps the world differently, under a new aspect, and imposes new behaviour – 
through which that aspect is grasped …” (Sartre, 1962, pp. 64-65). In this new 
apprehension of the world, one of the points that differs in experiences of depression 
in Iran and the UK, is aggression as a form of behaviour. 
6.5.2. Aggression and guilt 
One striking difference between the manifestations of depression in Iran, as compared 
to those in the UK, is the absence of feelings of guilt, and the presence of aggressive 
behaviour towards others. It would be worth pointing out here some important 
psychological and sociocultural factors that are in play in feelings of guilt.  
Feelings of guilt and shame are associated with being negatively evaluated, by the self 
or the Other respectively, as a result of one failing to meet certain norms and 
standards of what is considered right or appropriate. Therefore, such feelings are 
regarded as ‘moral’ emotions (Wong & Tsai, 2007). Additionally, shame and guilt are 
instances of ‘self-conscious’ emotions, “because they require a concept of the self, or 
an ability to see the self as an object of evaluation” (Ibid. p. 210). This concept of the 
self plays a central role in accounting for the absence of guilt among Iranian depressed 
patients and its replacement with aggressive behaviour.  
As mentioned previously (Ch. 5), an important cultural difference between Iran and 
the UK, crucial in the analysis of interpersonal problems, is the way in which social 
relationships are construed within the culture. As a collectivist society, Iranian culture 
places heavy emphasis on shaping and maintaining social relationships, where the 
aims and goals of the individual are thought to have a lower priority than that of the 
collective group. This is in contrast to the individualistic nature of the UK society, in 
which the aims of the individual take precedence over the goals of the group. One 
important point arising from this structural difference, is one to do with the 
construction of the concept of self. “Individualistic societies are best characterized by 
their conception of an independent self that is bounded, unique, and generally 
autonomous … social behaviour is generally judged to be driven from within and 
attributed to an individual’s internal attributes” (Goetz & Keltner, 2007, p. 158). This 
is in contrast to (mostly) non-Western, collectivist cultures, where “an interdependent 
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self is seen as part of an encompassing social relationship, recognizing that one’s ‘self’ 
is determined by one’s relationship with others and the group” (ibid.). Individuals in 
collectivist societies, further, tend to attribute the causes of events in their lives to 
external sources, events, or people, as seen in the responses of depressed patients as 
well, who attribute the cause of their depression to a source independent of 
themselves (see §2.3.3). In other words, in explaining events in their lives, individuals 
from collectivist societies are more likely to see external factors, including other 
people, as responsible rather than themselves. 
An example of behaviours arising from this conception of an interdependent self in 
Iranian culture, and the expectations one has of other people, arising from this 
conception, is worth pointing out. Iranians often do favours for one another, friends 
and strangers alike, without being asked to do so, for example putting up banners and 
streetlights to welcome a neighbour from a long journey, or congratulating them on 
an achievement. The expectation that others will always be there for one when one is 
in need, and will care for one, is central in the normal day to day relations with others. 
However, the perception of lack of empathy on the part of others, as seen in 
depression, can be thought of as an instance where this expectation is not met. As a 
result, Iranian depressed patients feel a sense of abandonment by others, as well as 
disappointment that their expectations are not met. Feelings of abandonment and 
disappointment are seen in the complaints of patients regarding the way others react 
to their depression experiences, and form the basis of holding others – at least in part 
– responsible for the pain that they go through. Such feelings are in direct contrast to 
the feelings of patients in the UK. For instance, whilst those in the UK talk about feeling 
as if they have become a burden on Others, in Iran patients talk about Others being 
bored and tired with their depression, and therefore adopt negative attitudes towards 
them. In other words, whilst for those in the UK, feelings of resentment and 
responsibility are turned inwards towards oneself, in Iran such feelings are turned 
outwards towards Others.  
#27(F) – I felt that others were also tired of my depression.
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#17(F) – Others get bored with my depression and always question/annoy 
me. 
Such way of reasoning, as a point of difference between patients in Iran and the UK, 
can in part explain the absence of guilt and presence of aggression among Iranian 
patients. Criticism and dissatisfaction directed towards oneself is more likely to 
translate into feelings of guilt and wrong doing. This is while, criticisms directed 
outwards to Others, as seen in the case of patients in Iran motivates an outward 
reaction in the form of aggressive behaviour. Furthermore, as seen in Chapter 4, a 
large part of the experience of depression for Iranians is centred around a feeling of 
dissatisfaction with the world and the people in it. While the object of one’s feeling of 
dissatisfaction with life and the world may remain vague, when such feelings are 
directed towards other people, the object of the feeling is very much accessible. 
Another factor that plays an important role in bringing about aggression, has to do 
with the interpersonal conflict that is brought to the foreground of consciousness in 
depression. As seen in the previous sections, part of what the interpersonal experience 
in depression involves is that depressed people tend to feel that Others are hostile 
towards them. Such a perception is seen through the negative emotions one feels as 
being directed towards oneself, which elicit emotional responses. In such cases, where 
one feels that her sense of self is being threatened by the negative valuations and 
judgments, and especially where one does not see oneself as responsible and is thus 
resistant to feelings of guilt, aggression and aggressive behaviours are more likely to 
come about (e.g. Stuewig & Tangney, 2007). The feeling of being misunderstood, 
receiving judgments which bring into question the ‘reality’ of one’s illness and one’s 
motivations for ‘appearing ill’, can be perceived as an attack on one’s sense of self, 
which warrants reactions of anger and aggression. As seen through Sartre’s 
characterisation of the interpersonal conflict, in relations with the Other one is 
constantly made to reassert oneself as a subject, in response to feeling threatened by 
the Other’s objectification of oneself. Against the backdrop of the breaking of the 
interpersonal bond, one in which lack of understanding, negativity and hostility define 
one’s encounter with the Other, aggressive behaviour could be thought of as a strong 
attempt to reassert oneself in response to the perceived attacks of the Other.  
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#20(F) – I become aggressive, I don’t answer the phone and am not in the 
mood for [being with] others, or I tell them not to call me or to stay away 
from me. 
#6(F) – I get aggressive. I don’t have the tolerance for the simplest 
disagreements or arguments. 
#7(F) – I’m either completely defeated (maghloob), or angry and aggressive, 
or quiet (sāket) and stagnant/static (rāked). 
#25(M) – I would get angry really quickly and easily … I can’t be kind to my 
children, I can’t go to my shop and I always want to commit suicide or kill the 
one who has betrayed me. 
Due to the variety and interconnectivity of the different elements at play here, it is 
difficult to single-out one element as the cause of the presence of aggressive 
behaviour in Iran and its absence in the UK. However, what should be clear from the 
analysis here is that a multiplicity of cultural norms and expectations and the severity 
of problems in the interpersonal and social domains in depression, and the range of 
emotions in reaction to these problems together give a convincing picture of the cross-
cultural difference. I would also argue that the totality of these problems can be seen 
in the frame of the interpersonal conflict, one that is exacerbated in depression, and 
from which the individual attempts to escape, when faced with its severity and the 
impossibility of finding a resolution. This conflict is the ‘problem’, as Sartre argues, that 
motivates one’s imagination to conceive of different emotional and behavioural 
reactions. And as one perceives the conflict as more difficult to resolve, so the 
reactions to resolve it grow in intensity. As seen in §5.4.2, in the social domain the 
conflict between one and the society alters the patients’ space of possibilities of 
action, for instance in the case of taking medication and expressing one’s experiences. 
The same misunderstandings and the resultant perception of lack of empathy on the 
part of Others, create the conflict in interpersonal relations. Importantly, in the case 
of Iran, due to the strong entanglement between individuals, as well as between the 
individual and the social groups and society, where the lines between private and 
public life, between one and the Other, are blurred, one is neither able to resolve this 
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conflict, since in light of the depressive mood such a possibility is not even conceived, 
nor to escape from it. And it is in this dynamic which the most prevalent and talked 
about differences between the depressed patients in Iran and the UK is seen, namely, 
voluntary isolation and escape from others.  
6.5.3. Isolation 
As mentioned in the introductory remarks (§6.1), the most notable difference in 
experiences of interpersonal relationships in depression, between Iran and the UK, is 
in the solitary tendencies people have. Ratcliffe shows that those suffering from 
depression in the UK often talk about a sense of solitude and loneliness, one that goes 
hand in hand with a sense of estrangement from the world more generally. On 
Ratcliffe’s account, this feeling of loneliness is closely tied with that of lack of empathy 
and not being understood: “there is a feeling that [others] do not understand, which 
could equally be described as a feeling that they unable to ‘relate to’ or ‘connect with’ 
the depressed person” (Ratcliffe, 2015, p. 202). As such, lack of understanding is 
construed as evidence of the breakdown of the interpersonal bond, which leads to the 
depressed person feeling estranged from others, overcome by a sense of loneliness 
and solitude.  
In the case of Iran, however, there is no talk of feeling lonely. Rather, Iranian depressed 
patients often talk about wanting to escape from others and to be alone. As seen in 
Figure 2 (p. 15) around 26% of the Iranian sample voice such a tendency towards 
isolation. Two important notes should be made with regards to this difference. Firstly, 
that the state of isolation from others is not only not complained about, but represents 
a desired state of being. Secondly, despite the feeling of lack of understanding present 
in both contexts, this feeling does not amount to a sense of estrangement from others, 
i.e. willing, but being unable to establish an interpersonal connection with others, as 
it does in the UK. I would argue that both of these elements can be accounted for 
through the interpersonal conflict which dominates one’s relationships with others in 
depression, and the differences in terms of the kind of society and the kind of 
prevalent norms in which the individuals are thrown.  
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#15(F) – I was always in a corner not talking to anyone [the phrase is ‘being 
in myself’] … I was hermitic/withdrawn (goosheh-gir), avoided gatherings, 
was not in the mood to be around anyone. 
#17(F) – I’m not in the mood to be in social gatherings with friends, and 
prefer more to be withdrawn/hermitic. 
#18(M) – [I] go back into my shell and stop interacting with others. 
#19(F) – When I’m depressed I don’t want to talk to anyone or go anywhere. 
#23(F) – When I’m depressed I isolate/withdraw myself and become hermitic 
… I am not really in the mood for them [other people], because I like to be 
alone when I’m depressed. 
#25(M) – I want to be alone, and have nobody around me. 
#27(F) – I am not even in the mood for myself and I like to be alone … I’m not 
in the mood for anyone around me … I’m not in the mood to be with others 
at all and only want to be alone. 
#28(F) – [I am] hermitic/withdrawn, I stay away from social situations … in 
most cases I isolate myself and don’t want to go see anyone, or let any 
visitors to come and see me … I don’t take part in any social gatherings, be it 
a funeral/mourning or weddings, and I’m not in the mood for [being around] 
my children and am mostly just with myself and isolated. 
From the preceding arguments, it can be seen that in the Iranian context, the conflict 
between one and the Other dominates one’s frame of thought and one’s relationship 
with others. The conflict, represented in the endless loop of not understanding, 
negative attitudes and emotions, and aggression, is seen to be unresolvable. In other 
words, due to the circle of negative experiences and negative thoughts and attitudes, 
the very possibility of re-establishing the personal bond, one that is constructive rather 
than destructive, is removed from one’s space of possibilities. In this case, then, the 
only change in one’s behaviour that could result in the reduction of the conflict and 
the negativity that comes with it, is to remove oneself from social interactions, i.e. to 
escape from the interpersonal relationships and the conflict that they present.  
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Furthermore, given the emphasis placed on personal relationships in Iranian culture, 
as a collectivist society, the case for the claim that the possibility of escape is the only 
possibility in reducing the suffering from the interpersonal relationships, becomes 
stronger. An example of this cultural emphasis on relationships, is the fact that despite 
certain changes, living alone remains an unacceptable way of life for most Iranians. It 
is generally accepted that the best way of life is one that puts family at the centre, and 
this means that the majority of people live with family members, either the one they 
were born into, or the one they married into. In contrast, a life separate from family is 
seen as a flawed and incomplete way of life. Ultimately, norms such as this mean that 
the only way one could have a personal space to oneself, is by retracting from the 
everyday way of life, which is defined by the constant presence of, and contact with 
other people. In such a scenario, one does not feel alone, as there is always an Other 
present and as has been seen, this presence often brings with it feelings of conflict. 
This ever-present nature of the interpersonal conflict forces one to try and retract 
oneself from the social situations.  
It is also worth pointing out that the cultural norms of interacting with others and 
being a certain way in the presence of others, could be seen as adding more pressure 
on the depressed patients and in turn add to the frustration and pressure already felt 
in interpersonal relationships. An example of such expectations, which is especially 
strong in the case of women, is that one is expected to visit one’s parents regularly, or 
be hospitable to anyone who comes to visit one, whether invited or not. Particularly 
in rural areas, where more traditional ways of life and roles are in place, women may 
be the ones in charge of taking care of the family and the house. Such gender roles 
help make sense of the fact that women are often the ones who complain of being 
unable to be hospitable, kind to their children, and visiting family members. About a 
third of all the female respondents express such complaints, compared to only one 
male respondent who complained of inability to care for his children well. Similarly, 
although most respondents complain of the disruption depression causes to their 
work routine, women are more likely to specifically talk about housework and caring 
duties, compared to men who complain of having to cancel business dealings, or being 
otherwise unable to work outside of the house. The fact that depressed patients talk 
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about not being able to act as social norms dictate, can be seen both as a way of talking 
of an inability in illness to legitimise the suffering they go through, as well as a source 
of pressure that makes the case for escaping from the social interactions ever so 
stronger.  
#21(F) – I isolate myself and really don’t like to interact with anyone, or if 
anyone comes to visit me I don’t feel like being hospitable. 
#28(F) – I stay away from others and stay at home alone and don’t have any 
relation with others, I don’t even go to my father’s house. 
6.6. Conclusions 
In this chapter I have offered an account of personal relationships and the ways in 
which they are affected and altered in depression. In addition to giving a 
phenomenological account of such difficulties, I have argued that cultural norms, 
expectations, and ways of life, have an undeniable effect on the manifestation and 
experiences of interpersonal difficulties. Since Iran has a collectivist culture and 
society, relationships with others have a high importance in one’s life, and 
consequently form a large part of one’s experiences of depression. Furthermore, 
traces of the culturally specific thoughts and interpretations can be seen clearly in the 
way people talk about their depression and the way it is experienced in Iran, as 
compared with the UK.  
As I have shown, therefore, there are two different but intimately linked elements at 
play when it comes to personal relationships, both of which must be acknowledged 
and taken into account in order for the analysis to be a comprehensive one. The first 
is the phenomenological account of the way we, as human beings, relate to other 
people and the way in which these relationships have an effect on our emotional 
experiences. I have shown how a Sartrean account of emotions and our relations with 
others can be used to illuminate the experiences of the interpersonal in depression – 
these include the ever-present conflict between I and Other, which comes to the 
foreground in depression and defines the emotional reactions to the presence and 
actions of Others. Second, is the importance of cultural norms, which can illuminate 
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the differences in behaviours and symptoms of depressed patients, as seen in Iran and 
the UK. These differences, most notably the presence of aggressive behaviour and the 
tendency towards isolation, as seen in Iranian patients, form a large part of the 
experience of depression in Iran. I have argued that any analysis of the cross-cultural 
differences in the interpersonal experiences of depression, would be incomplete 
without looking at both of these elements as they inform and shape one another, and 
ultimately the individual experiences and manifestations of depression.  
The arguments and analyses presented in this chapter and the previous one, show 
the important role other people, whether collective or individual, play in shaping 
experiences of depression. Although this importance is rooted in our way of being in, 
and relating to the world, and therefore universal, I have shown how cultural 
differences contribute to the variations in manifestation and extent of this influence 
when it comes to experiences of depression. In the context of experiences of 
depression, it is important not to view the social interactions with others as distinct 
from personal ones. Since, as I have shown, the two spheres of social life influence 
one another; sociocultural conceptions that are prevalent in society influence one’s 
expectations and modes of conduct in personal encounters with Others, while the 
dominant mood in one sphere carries through to the other, forming the background 
against which interpersonal experiences are shaped. It is through viewing these 
domains as connected and complementary, that a more comprehensive account of 
interpersonal relations and difficulties can be offered, one that can make sense of a 
wide-ranging emotional and interpersonal experiences as seen in depression.   
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7. Somatic Symptoms of Depression in Iran 
7.1. Introduction 
Somatisation of depression is a feature often talked about in cross-cultural studies of 
depression. One prevalent claim is that patients in non-Western cultures tend to talk 
more about physical symptoms in depression, as compared to those from Western 
cultures who predominantly complain of psychological and emotional difficulties (e.g. 
Kleinman, 1977; Tseng, 1975). Various arguments and reasons for this phenomenon 
have been suggested, such as that people from non-Western countries, as well as 
those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds are less able or less willing to express 
psychological and emotional distress (Crandell & Dohrenwend, 1967; Kleinman, 1982). 
On the other hand, another possible conclusion from the data is that patients in 
Western countries tend to overemphasise the psychological symptoms and 
underemphasise the physical symptoms that, they too, experience (Ryder, et al., 2008; 
Parker, et al., 2001; Kirmayer, 2001).  
What seems to be agreed is the fact of the presence of somatic symptoms, to different 
degrees and in different forms of manifestation across different cultures. Indeed, 
there are certain physical sensations which are thought to be a universal part of the 
experience of depression (Haroz, et al., 2017). As will become clearer later on, 
examples of these include the sensation of the body as heavy and leaden, and feelings 
of physical weakness. As such, what is of concern here is the comparison of somatic 
symptoms and the rationale behind somatisation of depression, as seen between Iran 
and the UK. Even though certain physical symptoms are seen universally, there are 
differences in the emphasis placed on different somatic symptoms which ought to be 
accounted for. Figure 3 shows the different physical symptoms Iranian patients talk 
about and their prevalence in the sample.  
As can be seen, Iranians complain of a range of different somatic symptoms in 
depression, some of which, such as lack of energy and fatigue are seen universally 
across different cultures (e.g. Naeem, et al., 2012; Martinez Tyson, et al., 2011). Some 
other symptoms, and the emphasis placed on them, are culturally significant. In what 
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follows, I will first give a clarification of what is meant by ‘somatisation’ in the 
discussion, before turning to previous research on somatisation in depression among 
Iranian patients. I will argue that some of the conclusions drawn in these studies ought 
to be revised. I will then offer a way of understanding somatisation in depression 
among Iranians given the influence of traditional medicine introduced in the earlier 
chapters.  
 
Figure 3. Somatic symptoms complained about by Iranian depressed patients  
With this background in mind, I will offer an account of the most frequent somatic 
symptoms, as seen in the questionnaire responses. Figure 3 shows the common 
physical symptoms Iranian patients with depression complain about, as laid out 
particularly in answer to the 4th question on the questionnaire, about physical and 
bodily feelings in depression. I have grouped similar complaints together to get a 
better picture of the frequency of different symptoms. For instance, respondents’ 
complaints of exhaustion and fatigue are often accompanied by complaints of feeling 
sleepy or ‘having a tendency towards sleep’. By grouping these two complaints 
together, I signify the fact that they often appear together, as well as differentiating 
this kind of complaint from those related to ‘sleep disturbance’ where people 
complain of sleeping excessively or not enough. Similarly, complaints grouped under 
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lacking in energy. The descriptions of the body, or its perception as heavy, shattered, 
beaten, or bent are grouped together to signify disturbances to the way the body 
appears to one, as a limiting force. Lastly, the grouping of feeling numb and leaden 
together is due to linguistic complexities, since the word used by respondents to 
describe this state, kerekh/kerekhti, can signify both the ‘numb’ and ‘leaden’ feelings 
in the body. Symptoms under ‘other’ represent scattered complaints that are few in 
numbers and unrelated to other groups. In this category there are complaints of 
anxiety and heart palpitations (3), hand trembling (1), sweaty palms (1), and the 
feeling of body in unrest (1) and an agitated state (1). 
In what proceeds, I will argue that somatic symptoms ought to be understood as part 
of the embodied experience of depression, thus explaining the presence of such 
symptoms universally across cultures. However, taking the example of pain reports by 
Iranian patients, I will argue that some of these somatic symptoms, particularly their 
manifestation and the emphasis placed on them can be accounted for through 
culturally specific frames of thought and understanding.  
7.2. Somatisation of Depression 
Before proceeding to the main argument, it is worth clarifying what is meant by 
somatisation in this chapter. Distinguishing different senses of the term is necessary 
to avoid certain confusions arising from the conflation of different meanings and 
understandings of somatisation in clinical setting and empirical studies.  
Kirmayer and Robbins have argued that the term ‘somatisation’ refers to a variety of 
phenomena and illness behaviours, which whilst overlapping, are conceptually distinct 
(Kirmayer & Robbins, 1991). They argue that despite the fact that researchers are 
often concerned with one definition and understanding of the term, there is a 
tendency to confound the different meanings, resulting in overgeneralisation of the 
conclusions drawn from various studies. As such, distinguishing the different meanings 
and indicating what is of concern in the present work, is crucial in avoiding such 
confusion. Simon et al. distinguish three different ways the term has been used in 
investigations related to depression (Simon, et al., 1999). In this characterisation 
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somatisation could be taken to mean 1) presentation with somatic symptoms, 2) 
somatosensory amplification, or 3) denial of psychological symptoms.  
In the first understanding of the term, patients with somatisation are those suffering 
from a psychiatric illness who primarily seek help for somatic symptoms. In such cases, 
the somatic symptoms are the primary source of concern for the patient, rather than, 
for example, any behavioural changes due to the underlying psychiatric illness. The 
second definition emphasises the association between depression and medically 
unexplained somatic symptoms, where psychological distress heightens the 
perception or the reporting of somatic symptoms, a phenomenon known as 
somatosensory amplification. On this understanding patients with somatisation are 
those suffering from a psychological disorder but who report various unexplained 
physical symptoms. Lastly, the third understanding of the term emphasises the lack of 
expression of psychological symptoms and the substitution of somatic symptoms in 
their place. On this understanding, linked to the inability to express one’s feelings and 
emotions, somatisation presents “a psychological defence against the awareness or 
expression of psychological distress” (Simon, et al., 1999, p. 1330). An example of this 
latter form of somatisation is Kleinman’s discussion of somatisation of depression in 
China, where expression of emotions and emotional distress is looked down upon 
(Kleinman, 1982). Kleinman has construed this form of somatisation as an instance of 
idiom of distress in cultures where psychiatric illnesses carry significant stigma 
(Kleinman, 1977).  
Somatisation of depression among Iranian patients, as I will show, can be analysed 
through various cultural and social elements which shape the understanding of the 
illness and the manifestations of it. This, however, is in addition to the 
phenomenological analyses which, in viewing the body as a medium of various 
experiences, see somatic symptoms as constitutive of the overall experience of 
depression, and therefore significant in their own right. Given this 
multidimensionality, determining which one definition of the term ‘somatisation’ 
applies to this group would be a complex matter. I will argue that there are elements 
of two conceptions of somatisation that can usefully be applied to Iranian patients, 
which would help in understanding both the variation in somatic symptoms as well as 
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the reasons why these are seen more frequently among Iranian patients suffering from 
depression, as can be made clear via considering pain reports. 
The most significant variation in the report of somatic symptoms between Iran and UK 
patients, is the higher prevalence of pain reports among Iranian patients (19%), most 
often in the form of headaches, which constitute over 60% of all pain complaints. 
Respondents to the questionnaire were asked to give details of the kind of symptoms 
they experienced which prompted them to seek help. As revealed by these responses, 
somatic symptoms, such as pain, are not the reason why patients initially sought help, 
but are rather secondary symptoms accompanying the psychological difficulties they 
experience, such as feelings of sadness, hopelessness, and suicidal thoughts. As such, 
the first definition of ‘somatisation’, as referring to cases where patients initially seek 
help for somatic complaints, does not apply to Iranian depressed patients. 
Additionally, given the wide range of psychological, cognitive, and emotional 
symptoms that encompass the experience of depression for Iranians, it cannot be the 
case that somatic symptoms are presented as a masking or a substitution for 
psychological symptoms, and therefore the third definition cannot be the correct 
characterisation of somatic experiences of depression. Within Iranian culture 
emotions and feelings are of central importance in the way one views oneself and 
relates to other people, and therefore, unlike some other cultures, such as China, 
expressions of emotional distress are not discouraged or looked down upon. Although 
given the previous discussions of misunderstanding and stigmatisation of depression 
in Iran, the higher emphasis on somatic symptoms can be attributed to patients’ 
attempts at countering the prevalent stigmas, somatisation in this group cannot be 
due to a masking of psychological distress, or the inability to express emotional 
experiences.    
As such, it would seem that the best way of characterising the presence of somatic 
symptoms among Iranians diagnosed with depression, is through the second 
definition; namely, that there is a heightened perception, or reporting of somatic 
symptoms in depression, which are associated with the experience of depression, yet 
remain medically unexplained. In this sense, I would argue that somatic symptoms, as 
the embodied experience of depression, are significant in shaping the overall 
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experience of depression, and should therefore be viewed and accounted for as such. 
Whilst this second definition of somatisation can be helpful in understanding the 
significance of bodily experience in depression, I would argue that elements from the 
third definition can be useful in accounting for the cultural factors that give rise to 
heightened somatisation among Iranian patients, as compared to those in the UK. As 
discussed in chapter 5, the stigma attached to depression in Iran, is in part due to the 
cultural way of understanding illness as one which, if not a purely physical entity, has 
at least some physical manifestations. This understanding of health and illness, 
traceable to traditional Iranian medicine, partly explains why complaints of somatic 
symptoms are seen more frequently in Iran compared to the UK. As I will argue, 
somatic symptoms in Iran, such as pain, can be seen as a means of escaping 
stigmatisation and legitimising depression as a ‘real’ illness (similar to uncontrollable 
crying seen in §5.4.1), since people tend to be more sympathetic to the suffering of an 
individual in illness, in the presence of physical manifestations and symptoms. In other 
words, somatisation of depression provides a stigma-avoiding strategy in Iran, similar 
to its role in China, not because of cultural norms against the expression of 
psychological and emotional difficulties, but due to cultural ways of understanding 
what constitutes an illness.  
Given these preliminary observations and clarifications, in this chapter I will offer a 
possible explanation for somatisation of depression in Iran, in light of the earlier claims 
made regarding traditional Iranian medicine, and the social stigma attached to 
depression, before looking at the phenomenological significance of somatic symptoms 
in depression as an instance of the embodied experience of the illness. First, however, 
it is important to look at some of the previous research concerned with this 
phenomenon as seen in Iran.  
7.3. Previous Research on Somatisation of Depression in Iran 
Some previous research has examined somatic symptoms and articulations 
accompanying depression among Iranians. Most notably among these reports, is 
Byron Good and Mary-Jo Good’s anthropological research, introduced in §1.1 and 
explored to an extent in §2.4. Good and Good reported a high prevalence of 
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somatisation of depression among Iranian patients. The most commonly complained 
about physical symptom, which they devote a sizeable part of their writing to, is heart 
distress (nārāhati-e qalbi), which they characterise as “a condition associated with 
physical sensations of heart palpitation, pressure on the chest, and a sensation of the 
heart being squeezed” (Good, et al., 1985, pp. 392-393). Noting that in Iranian popular 
culture the heart, as well as being a physiological organ, is the core of one’s self, they 
argue that “complaints of heart distress are often associated with feelings of sadness 
or dysphoria as well as anxiety” (ibid., p.393). Construing heart distress as an idiom of 
distress among Iranians, which carries cultural significance, they argue that this 
symptom ought to be regarded as a somatic framework in which depression and 
anxiety are often articulated. I will argue for an alternative understanding of their 
findings, one which takes into account the cultural ways of employing words denoting 
the body, or a certain part of it, in order to convey a message regarding one’s 
emotional experiences. Whilst Good and Good take the expressions of physical 
distress at face value and therefore offer an understanding based on the literal 
meaning of the complaints, I argue that in this instance the expressions of ‘heart 
distress’ should rather be understood metaphorically.  
Nārāhati-e qalbi is a general phrase, used commonly to the present day to describe 
various heart diseases, and denotes an exclusively physical illness. It is true that in 
addition to being a physical organ, the heart is significative of the core of one’s self 
and the source of all emotions and feelings. However, what is lost in translation is 
which meaning of ‘heart’ is intended on different occasions where the word is used. I 
accept that sometimes when patients complain of sensations involving the heart their 
complaints should be understood literally. For example, in the following remarks made 
by patients responding to the questionnaire used in this study, what is described is a 
physical experience that accompanies feelings of anxiety and distress. 
#14(F) – [I feel] an inner anxiety that would fill my whole self and I would 
have heart palpitations. 
#2(M) – [I feel] exhaustion and sleepiness. Sometimes accompanied by 
intense anxiety and heart palpitation. 
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#38(F) – [I had] heart palpitations, problems breathing, I felt something bad 
was going to happen to me.  
Such experiences are not exclusive to Iranian patients (Sartorius, et al., 1996; Lamers, 
et al., 2011) and therefore cannot be thought of as a cultural syndrome.  
Such descriptions are distinct from ones where talk of a sensation in the heart or 
another part of the body is used to convey emotional distress. In these latter forms of 
complaints, the metaphorical use of the word qalb (heart), or more commonly del 
(meaning the stomach as a physical part of the body, but also the heart, as the source 
of one’s emotions), for example in the expression of the sensation of one’s heart being 
squeezed, denotes a feeling of sadness and sorrow, often accompanied by tendency 
to cry and isolate oneself from the world, rather than any physical sensations. The 
same could be said for the various expressions centred around the heart, most of 
which express an emotional rather than a physical experience. The conflation of the 
two very different meanings and employment of the word in everyday language, 
causes difficulties in discerning the intended meaning of the complaints. I suggest that 
the fact that such expressions are commonly used in Iran to denote emotional distress, 
rather than physically felt symptoms, means that such reports cannot be taken literally 
as describing instances of somatisation. I suggest instead that such complaints should 
be taken metaphorically, indicating emotional, rather than physical suffering.   
Good and Good conducted some of their research in an Azeri-speaking part of Iran 
(Good, 1976).  Byron Good argues that heart distress is a disease category, with various 
physical sensations such as the pounding, trembling and fluttering of the heart, which 
are associated with feelings and emotions. This claim further finds support from the 
fact that people who complain of such sensations attribute the causes to various 
emotional difficulties, such as sadness, grief, and stress. Therefore, Good argues that 
heart distress, as an illness, “is perceived as a complex which includes and links 
together both physical sensations of abnormality in the heart beat, and feelings of 
anxiety, sadness, and anger” (Good, 1976, p. 36). I suggest instead that the various 
expressions used in describing these ‘physical sensations’ are used metaphorically and 
rather than referring to an actual physical difficulty and distress in the heart, are ways 
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of expressing emotional distress. In other words, heart distress is not an illness 
category which links physical and emotional experiences together, but rather, it 
represents a way of articulating one’s emotional state and the suffering resulting from 
some of these states, in terms of physical and bodily experiences. The fact that these 
expressions are linked with physical sensations in the heart should not be taken as 
evidence that these are somatic symptoms of mental illnesses, but rather, that the 
place of the heart in the Iranian culture is a fundamental one representing one’s 
emotions and inner state. And as such, the expressions are to be understood as 
statements regarding one’s emotional experience, rather than somatic illness, and 
therefore heart distress, as defined by Good cannot be thought of as an instance of 
somatisation of depression among Iranian patients.  
An important point to be drawn from this discussion is the fact that often Iranians talk 
about their emotional experiences using terms denoting physical parts of the body. 
Whilst some of these articulations can be phenomenologically interesting and 
significant, such as the feeling of being ‘droopy’ or ‘bent’ which express a state of one’s 
being through inducing a physical image of the state of body, a knowledge of the 
culture, and cultural ways of employing language and expressions is required in order 
to offer an account reflecting the experiences of those uttering the expressions. 
Furthermore, I would argue that part of the reason why Iranians talk about their 
emotional experiences in terms of physical sensations, can be traced again to theories 
in traditional medicine, where physical and psychological experiences are seen as 
inseparable, each influencing the other. It can therefore be seen that an overview of 
some of the elements presented in these theories would be crucial in giving an account 
of somatisation, both in the articulation of sensations and experiences, as well as in 
the conceptualisations and the way Iranians think about depression and their 
experiences of it.   
7.4. Cultural Conceptions and Somatisation 
As has been discussed in §2.3.1, the Iranian conceptualisation of depression is in part 
informed by the conceptions of health and illness theorised in traditional Iranian and 
Islamic medicine. In this characterisation, psychological and physical ailments are 
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dependent on one another, such that psychological illnesses have physical 
manifestations and vice versa. Although similar views have historically been important 
in Western traditions, their place does not extend to modern times, unlike in Iran, 
where such historical conceptualisations remain influential to the present day. In 
discussions of melancholia, first articulated by Al-Razi and expanded on by Ibn-Sina (or 
Avicenna), this interdependency is seen clearly. For instance, Ibn-Sina attributes one 
of the causes of melancholia to the domination of one of the humours on the brain, 
therefore causing an imbalance in the brain, which results in sadness, overthinking, 
anger, and isolation. With this characterisation, the best way to try to cure such an 
imbalance would be through a change in diet to restore the balance of the humours 
(Avicenna, 1999 [1025]). However, he argues that melancholic characteristics are not 
exclusively rooted in humoral imbalances in the brain, but can originate in various 
parts of the body, as well as being caused by psychological factors such as excessive 
fear and grief. He thinks cases with different causes should have different treatments 
accordingly (Al-Issa, 2000, p. 48). Ibn-Sina tried to explain the physiological 
mechanisms that give rise to melancholic characteristics. For example, he claims these 
could be due to “the whole body’s black-bile intemperament or the dysfunction of the 
major organs, particularly the spleen, liver, and the stomach, for various reasons … 
Ibn-Sīnā emphasises the heart; its cold and dry intemperament was, according to him, 
a frequent cause of melancholia – at least it was impossible for the heart not to be 
associated in some way when such a temperament affected another part of the body” 
(Dols, 1992, p. 81). These accounts make clear the emphasis placed on the body in 
investigating psychological ailments, and in particular the importance attached to the 
heart.  
The historical trajectory between melancholia and depression has been noted in 
various studies (e.g. Radden, 2003, 2009) and is not exclusive to Iranian/Islamic 
medicine. However, what is noteworthy is the present-day place of traditional 
medicine in Iran and the continuing influence of conceptions explored in this tradition 
on the folk theories around health and illness which continue to play a part in everyday 
thinking and behaviours of Iranians in encounters with illness. In other words, 
traditional medicine, its characterisation of illness, and the remedies it offers for 
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various ailments, form part of the Iranian culture. This is true to such an extent that 
Iranians continue to refer to traditional texts for everyday ailments and their cure, and 
everyone has at least a basic grasp of the claims and arguments made by traditional 
medicine. The continuing influence of this field is further evidenced by the creation of 
new institutions dedicated to teaching and researching Iranian and Islamic medicine, 
as noted in §2.3.1. It is due to this familiarity that, when it comes to mental illness, 
Iranians tend to accept claims that are in line with their belief system; for example that 
exercising, as a form of taking care of one’s physical health, is effective in ensuring 
one’s mental health, given the interdependency of the two. On the other hand, various 
claims and practices which are further away from the engrained belief system are met 
with stronger resistance, such as the idea that there might be an illness characterised 
purely by psychological distress, or that antidepressants might be effective. It should 
be noted that the use of chemical medicine for physical illness is an accepted form of 
medicine in Iran, despite its divergence from traditional medicine, due to the long 
history of its practice in the country as well as people being familiar with its 
effectiveness. The same cannot be said for medicine used for mental illness, and there 
remains a degree of scepticism regarding such treatments, as seen in the earlier 
discussions in chapter 5.  
Given the place of traditional medicine, not only in practice, but in ways of thinking 
and interpreting illness in Iran, ideas about depression are highly influenced by these 
pre-existing systems of belief. Stigmatisation of depression in Iranian society arises 
from the inability to accept a mental illness which is not accompanied by physical 
symptoms. This leads a large portion of patients with depression to feel the burden of 
having to legitimise their illness, and many come to report physical symptoms, as 
discussed in the case of uncontrollable crying (§5.4.1). I suggest that such thinking 
partly explains why the emphasis on somatic symptoms is higher in Iran as compared 
to the UK. This view is confirmed by a practicing psychiatrist in Iran who told me that 
although Iranians have no problem talking about their emotional and psychological 
suffering (unlike people from some other cultures such as China), they often feel that 
their suffering can only be acknowledged if accompanied by somatic symptoms. This 
emphasis, furthermore, is seen more among patients from less affluent backgrounds, 
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such as small villages, where there is higher stigma attached to mental illnesses such 
as depression. In larger cities, however, such as Shiraz and Tehran, complaints of 
somatic symptoms are seen less frequently, or do not carry the same heavy emphasis 
(Moghimi, 2017 – personal correspondence).  
What is evident is the role of folk theories of illness, which not only account for the 
roots of the stigmatisation of depression in Iran, but also offer a way of explaining the 
presence of somatic symptoms in patients. In other words, those suffering from 
depression, by virtue of understanding the dominant frames of thoughts, consciously 
or otherwise, know that by the cultural conceptions of illness dominant in society, an 
illness such as depression is legitimised and made more understandable if 
accompanied by somatic symptoms. The cultural frames of thought in this regard act 
as a space of shared understanding in which individuals can seek one another’s 
acceptance by adhering to shared values and systems of beliefs. Although such 
mechanisms are not necessarily carried out consciously, they remain part of the way 
in which individuals conduct themselves and adhere to the accepted norms and values 
of the collective society.  
It should be noted that such stigma-avoiding communication strategies are not unique 
to Iran. As the body of literature on somatisation of depression among Chinese 
patients shows, knowledge of the expectations of society and ways of escaping 
stigmatisation plausibly plays an important role in the higher levels of reported 
somatic symptoms in China. In this case, the knowledge of the way different symptoms 
are interpreted in society, leads to communication strategies designed to avoid certain 
outcomes, such as stigmatisation. This characterisation is in line with my argument 
regarding somatisation of depression in Iran. It is also important to note that in 
accounting for Chinese somatisation, studies point either to variation in the actual 
experience and expression of distress, or to variation in the understanding of 
particular symptoms and their significance and the communication of this 
understanding to others (Ryder & Chentsova-Dutton, 2012). This distinction, however, 
overlooks the fact that social and learned understandings of illness and/or various 
symptoms influence the individual’s lived experience of the symptoms. 
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In any given cultural context, a specific symptom might attract social 
support, bring shame on the family, provide rapid access to health care 
resources, be politically threatening, or indeed have any number of different 
consequences. These realities do not simply provide sufferers with a menu 
of behavioral options, but rather shape which aspects of the phenomenal 
field are attended to and then emphasized. Different social worlds draw out 
different symptoms. (Zhou, et al., 2016, p. 5) 
These two seemingly distinct elements, therefore, are equally important in 
understanding and accounting for somatisation in cross-cultural studies. 
In Iranian understanding, psychological and physical symptoms of an illness, rather 
than being separate and distinct, are together constitutive of the overall experience 
of illness. Such a conceptualisation comes in contrast to the dominant Western views 
which see the body and bodily feelings as fundamentally distinct from the mental and 
psychological, with the central presumption that the body only serves as a vessel for 
projecting the inner states of the mind and the psyche. As Fuchs argues, in this 
Western conceptualisation, somatisation “denotes a shift of psychological content or 
meaning onto the body, leading to the rather Eurocentric view that members of non-
Western cultures have only insufficient introspective or verbal capacities to perceive 
and express their feelings in a mature way” (Fuchs, 2014, p. 184).  In a culture such as 
Iran, however, somatic symptoms, rather than being an extra culturally specific 
symptom of depression, ought to be viewed as an essential integral part of the 
experience of depression. Although the misconceptions and the resultant 
stigmatisation of depression demands the existence of somatic symptoms in 
depression, the starting point of both the stigmatisation and the significance of 
somatic symptoms for the individual experiencing them, remain the same; namely, the 
cultural conceptualisation of illness, which views physical and psychological symptoms 
as essentially integral parts of the whole experience of the illness.  This unity of 
psychological and physical symptoms means that the significance of somatic 
symptoms, as well as being a way of avoiding stigmas, lies in the lived experience of 
patients. Viewed as an essential part of the experience of depression, somatic 
symptoms therefore ought to be analysed in terms of the phenomenology of 
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embodiment and the significance of the body as the primary point of contact between 
the individual and the world in which she dwells.  
7.5. Somatic Symptoms as Disturbances to Embodiment 
In giving a phenomenological account of the bodily feelings in depression, it is 
important first to give an account of the way the body itself is viewed in the 
phenomenological literature. The body, or a certain part of it, is central in the 
experience of different states that are referred to as ‘feelings’, ranging from feelings 
of touch to existential feelings, which form the basis of our relation to the world. As 
the medium through which we find ourselves and our being-in-the-world, the body 
constitutes a central aspect of our experience in the world. Notably, not only is the 
body the medium through which we perceive and experience the world, but is itself 
an object of perception that resides in the world. This twofold characteristic of the 
body was noted most distinctly by Merleau-Ponty:  
If it is true that I am conscious of my body through the world and if my body 
is the unperceived term at the center of the world toward which every object 
turns its face, then it is true for the same reason that my body is the pivot of 
the world … it is as though our body comprises two distinct layers, that of 
the habitual body and that of the actual body. (Merleau-Ponty, 2012 [1945], 
p. 84) 
This important phenomenological distinction, in other words, is “between the body 
that I prereflectively live, that is, the lived or subject body (Leib), and the physical body 
that I can perceive or that is perceived by others, in other words, the object body 
(Körper)” (Fuchs & Schlimme, 2009, pp. 570-571). This distinction can also be seen in 
the way we relate to the world through our bodily feelings. As Ratcliffe shows, whilst 
“some feelings reveal parts of the body in an object-like way, … others operate as a 
medium through which something else is experienced” (Ratclife, 2008, p. 107). In 
other words, in experiencing some feelings we experience the body as an object of 
perception or experience, whilst in others, the body itself is the subject doing the 
perceiving or experiencing of an object residing out there in the world.  
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As such, not only is the body the primary source of our self-experience, but it also 
serves as the medium of our contact with the world. Therefore, background bodily 
feelings, such as tension or relaxation, ease or unease, affect the way in which the 
world is presented to us, by colouring all world-directed experiences (Fuchs, 2014), by 
virtue of the body being the means through which we perceive and experience the 
world. Understood in this way, not only is the lived body directed outwards towards 
things in the world, but it also “opens up the world as a space of purposive, practical 
possibilities, and thus shapes all our experiences, activities and thoughts” (Ratclife, 
2008, p. 107). It is given this centrality of the body and bodily experiences that 
phenomenological accounts of depression give an account of the illness in terms of 
bodily experiences which are disrupted in the course of the illness. Disruptions in our 
embodied experiences of ourselves and the world we live in, on these views, 
encompasses not only the physical sensations involved in depression, but also our 
affective experiences and relations with others.  
Disturbances of embodiment, following the phenomenological distinction between 
object body and subject body, can be classified into two main forms. In the first 
instance, disturbance of embodiment can be related to explicit body awareness or 
one’s body image and can therefore be seen as disturbance related to object body. 
Disturbances understood in this sense, seen for example in cases of anorexia nervosa, 
signify conscious perceptions, emotions and attitudes towards one’s body. On the 
second classification, disturbances of embodiment affect the subject body, i.e. the pre-
reflective embodied sense of self. This latter form of disturbance can be seen in 
schizophrenia and depression, where one’s sense of self is diminished, or one’s contact 
with the world, as primarily a bodily experience, is altered.  
#27(F) – I feel like my body gets heavy.  
#7(F) – [I feel] numb/leaden. Without energy. Sleepy. Endless hunger. 
#4(F) – [I feel] beaten (koofteh), tired, bent (khamideh). 
#35(F) – My physical ability decreases, but because of the conditions of my 
life I have to carry on working. 
#33(M) – [I feel] lethargy, listlessness, feeling weak [to do] daily social tasks. 
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#42 – I feel that my body is weak and numb. 
#25(M) – I don’t have any feelings [in my body]. 
One of the most common embodied experiences of depression, seen equally in Iran 
and the UK, which can illuminate on the nature of the disturbance of embodiment 
affecting the subject body, is the perception of the body as heavy and leaden, or weak 
and numb (see Ratcliffe, 2015, p. 76). The body in this sense loses its quality of fluidity 
and transparency as a medium of experience and becomes instead a solid, leaden body 
which, instead of giving access to the world and one’s surroundings, presents an 
obstacle to the individual’s desires, intentions and impulses, such that “phenomenal 
space is not embodied anymore” (Fuchs & Schlimme, 2009, p. 572). In experiencing 
the overwhelming sense of fatigue and physical weakness, as felt in depression, the 
patient is confronted with her body, not as a medium of which she is only 
prereflectively aware, but as a limiting and oppressive force. As a primary point of 
contact with the world and as a medium through which different possibilities in the 
world are presented to one, the limiting quality of the body in depression influences 
the way in which one relates to the world. The confining nature of the body in 
depression reflects the loss of possibilities and the limiting nature of the world as felt 
by depressed patients. “The open horizon of possible experiences shrinks into a locked 
atmosphere, in which everything becomes permeated by a sense of lost possibilities” 
(Fuchs & Schlimme, 2009, pp. 572-573).  
The perception of the body as heavy and leaden, numb and weak, can be thought of 
as a form of disturbance of embodiment seen universally across cultures. As Fuchs has 
noted, “one may conclude that depression is primarily experienced as a bodily 
disturbance in a majority of cultures, rather than only shifted and projected to the 
body secondarily” (Fuchs, 2014, p. 183). However, the physical sensations in 
depression are varied and different feelings are complained about to different degrees 
in different cultures. As was noted earlier, one example of such a symptom is the 
presence of pain in various parts of the body. As Ratcliffe reports, there are some 
complaints made by patients in the UK, of general aches and pains, joint pain, and 
headaches (Ratcliffe, 2015, p. 75). Although such complaints form a small percentage 
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of the complaints regarding physical symptoms in the UK sample, similar complaints 
in the Iranian sample are seen much more frequently. In fact, as seen in Figure 3, in 
the Iranian sample, complaints of pain are the most frequent complaints of physical 
discomfort, after complaints of fatigue and physical weakness. This difference, I would 
suggest, can be accounted for not only through the social pressures and stigmas that 
demand an easily understandable physical symptom such as pain, but also through the 
culturally-specific attitudes and behaviours towards the sensation of pain itself. Yet 
pain is primarily felt and experienced on an individual domain, and only secondarily 
put in the cultural domain of understanding and interpretation through its expression 
and communication. As such, a phenomenological account of pain experience should 
be laid out before turning to culture, as a meaning-making system for interpretation 
of these individual experiences, and as the background that gives these experiences 
their significance.  
7.5.1. Pain as disturbance to embodiment 
#17(F) – I sleep a lot, I have headaches, my body feels heavy. 
#14(F) – [I have] feelings of excessive exhaustion and headaches, together 
with lack of appetite and physical weakness. 
#36 – I feel shattered, and I often have body pain and am completely 
frustrated (asabi). 
#29(F) – [I have] neck pain, hand trembling. 
#8 (M)– I have disc herniation … constant back ache and [feeling] shattered. 
When I’m in a good mood I work three times more than a normal person. 
#20(F) – I have pain in my arms and legs, I sleep a lot more. 
#19(F) – Feeling of feebleness  (hes-e bi-hāli), headaches and crying. 
The experience of bodily pains in depression can be seen, to varying degrees, in 
different cultures (e.g. Drehera, et al., 2017, Bair & Robinson, 2003). Pain is a complex 
experience that draws its meaning not only from the cultural setting and meaning-
making frameworks, but also from the personal and phenomenological significance it 
carries for the individual in pain.  
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The fact that experiences of pain can carry meaning is clear once one understands pain 
as an emotion, as well as a physical sensation. The definition provided by the 
International Association for the Study of Pain, makes it clear that the emotional part 
of the experience of pain is inseparable from the sensory element. Pain is defined here 
as “An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or 
potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage” (IASP, 2017). As an 
emotional experience, expressions and understanding of pain are learned and occur 
and find meaning within a social, cultural, and linguistic context. Indeed, there are 
empirical cross-cultural studies that support this claim, suggesting that “the meaning 
and expression of pain and suffering is socially learned and culturally significant. 
Culture is the conditioning influence in forming the individual’s patterns of responding 
to and expressing pain” (Lovering, 2006, p. 390). Additionally, the emotional aspect of 
the experience of pain is phenomenologically significant. Emotions and their meaning 
content, as explored in §6.3, are about things in the world, and emotional experiences 
shape our view and understanding of the world and things within it, and are therefore 
significative. Given this background, I will first look at the significance of pain 
experience for the individual in pain, and how the presence of the sensation of pain 
among Iranian depressed patients can be thought of as an instance of disturbance of 
embodiment. I will then examine the way in which these pain experiences find 
significance within the broader social and cultural context of Iran.  
In his discussion of the phenomenology of chronic pain, Fredrik Svenaeus puts forward 
a phenomenological account of pain as an embodied experience encompassing both 
emotional and physical domains of experience (Svenaeus, 2015). Emphasising the 
experiential aspect of pain – that pain is primarily suffered rather than known, 
Svenaeus highlights the nature of the experience of pain as an awareness of one’s 
body in illness. As noted in the discussion of unhomelikeness (§5.5), in illness one’s 
relationship with the world is altered, and this includes one’s perception of, and 
relation to one’s own body. In illness one is more aware of the limiting qualities of 
one’s body and the effort with which previously undemanding tasks are carried out. 
Svenaeus construes the experience of pain as an example of the way in which the 
body, and more specifically suffering in the body, is brought to the centre of one’s 
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consciousness. The suffering brought about in pain, Svenaeus argues, can be described 
“as a kind of bodily resistance and modulation displaying itself at the heart of 
consciousness and human experience” (Svenaeus, 2015, p. 113). Just in the case of 
various bodily sensations in illness, one is confronted here with a sense of alienation 
from one’s own body, since the suffering in pain presents “an awareness of a body 
that is mine, but yet alien, since it resists and disturbs, rather than supports, my ways 
of being conscious and directed towards the world” (Ibid.). Construed in this way, one 
can begin to see parallels with accounts of disturbance of embodiment in depression. 
Just as in the case of the perception of the body as heavy and leaden, which rather 
than disclosing, encloses the world in which one dwells, the individual in pain 
experiences her body as alien, one that upsets the normal harmony between desires, 
intentions, and possibilities for action.  
An important note that should be borne in mind in giving an account of pain and the 
significance of the experience of pain, is the all-encompassing nature of the 
experience. As a world-enclosing sensation, pain directs the individual’s focus towards 
her body, as a body in pain, which would otherwise remain in the background of 
experiences. Svenaeus describes this shift in consciousness by construing pain as a 
mood which permeates our entire being-in-the-world. In experiencing the mood of 
pain, he argues, “the world literally disappears; our horizon of meaningfulness 
gradually shrinks until nothing but the self-centred pain remains” (Svenaeus, 2015, p. 
116). Of course this description, being concerned with chronic pain experiences, 
strikes one as too strong a claim to be applied to pain as an instance of somatised 
depression. However, the fact remains that in experiencing any kind of pain, the 
sensation becomes the centre of one’s attention and in so doing influences a range of 
thoughts and activities that determine one’s relationship to the world. The inability to 
carry out the daily tasks and what is routinely expected of one, as felt in depression, 
can in large part be attributed to the disturbance of embodiment. This is since a large 
part of other symptoms seen in depression, such as lack of motivation and drive 
towards the daily activities, manifest themselves in bodily sensations as well, as has 
been seen in the case of heavy and leaden body in depression. It is in this sense that 
pain in various parts of the body, together with the feelings of weakness and fatigue, 
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and the perception of the body as heavy and leaden, can be thought of as various 
instances in which the body and awareness of it comes to the foreground of one’s 
consciousness as a limiting factor in everything one does. In all these instances the 
body, previously the enabling medium for experiences and navigating the world, 
presents an impenetrable obstacle to one’s normal way of being and relating to the 
world.   
Such phenomenological significance of the sensation of pain, which colours the way 
the individual in pain relates to the world and to her body as the medium for 
experiences, precedes the sociocultural understanding and significance of pain. But 
the observation that our individual experiences are always situated within a given 
sociocultural context, one that dominates our framework for understanding and 
interpretation, means that individuals understand their individual experiences of pain 
against this broader cultural context. As such, in order to understand the significance 
of the strong emphasis on pain among Iranian patients, one needs to take into account 
the cultural ways of interpreting and encountering pain.  
7.5.2. pPain culture and behaviour 
Given the presence of pain sensations in depression in different cultures, the question 
that becomes salient is one regarding the different emphasis placed on this sensation 
in different cultures. In particular, what is of interest here is the cultural factors that 
give rise to the higher emphasis placed on pain, as one of the most reported somatic 
syptoms in the questionnaire in Iran, compared to those in the UK. I would argue that, 
in addition to the cultural understanding of illness and social expectations which 
demand that mental illnesses be accompanied by at least some physical symptoms 
such as pain, the cultural way of understanding pain and responding to it are influential 
in the emphasis placed on pain in depression among Iranian patients. In this sense, the 
Iranian complaints of pain are highly dependent on the cultural ways of understanding 
pain, as Kleinman argues, “[p]hysical complaints, based on actual psychobiological 
processes, may be encouraged by a culture’s behavioral norms, rules of social 
etiquette, and even by language usage.” (Kleinman & Kleinman, 1985, p. 473) 
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In the first instance, in accounting for the experience of pain among the Iranian sample 
of patients suffering from depression, pain should be understood as a potentially 
expressive  sensation. The sociocultural beliefs and attitudes towards pain, which vary 
cross culturally, give meaning to the experience of pain. As Kleinman argues, 
somatisation can be thought of as a “habitual coping style or idiom of distress” 
(Kleinman & Kleinman, 1985, p. 473), learned through one’s experience of living in a 
certain sociocultural setting. Understanding pain as an instance of somatisation, 
means that the cultural meanings and significance taken up by the sensation ought be 
considered for a meaningful account.  
As seen from Svenaeus’ account, pain is characterised by the debilitating effect it has 
on an individual’s normal way of being-in-the-world. This effect plays a significant role 
in explaining the common understandings of, and behaviours towards experiences of 
pain in Iranian culture. Within this context, pain is regarded as a highly debilitating 
phenomenon with an all-encompassing character which takes over one’s normal way 
of being. An individual in pain, therefore, is not faced with the same expectations and 
is rather viewed more sympathetically and compassionately by others. Due to this 
understanding of pain, it is common for individuals to use being in pain as an excuse 
and/or an explanation for one’s inability to perform certain actions or be a certain way. 
For example, it is common for people to use a simple headache as a reason for their 
unwillingness or inability to engage in social gatherings or doing a task expected of 
them. What adds to this understanding, is arguably the familiarity of the sensation of 
pain, which readily arouses feelings of sympathy in others, and in so doing, allows the 
individual in pain to use her pain experience as an explanatory tool for her behaviour 
and state of being. In this context then, being in pain, or the expression of being such, 
can be thought of as a means of standing out from others and getting noticed, which 
would mean that the usual rules and expectations no longer apply to one.  
Such an understanding of pain is also partly explained by some of the cultural norms 
and attitudes towards pain relief in Iran. Despite the small number of studies done in 
Iran on pain culture, some medical research on pain can illuminate the matter at hand. 
In a study conducted on a sample of cancer patients, the patients’ attitudes towards 
pain and pain relief were investigated (Najafi Ghezeljeh & Hosseini, 2012). What this 
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study shows, is the desire to tolerate pain among patients, and the belief that unless 
the pain is unbearable, one should refrain from taking pain killers. In responding to an 
exhaustive questionnaire, 69% of the patients agreed (11% of these strongly agree) 
with the statement that ‘before asking for a painkiller one should wait for the pain to 
become really severe’, while 63% agreed that ‘painkillers should only be used when 
pain is at its severest’. Such attitudes can be broken down to three elements, namely, 
attitudes towards painkillers, beliefs regarding the ability to control pain severity 
through mental strength, and the cultural beliefs that suffering pain can be good for 
one.  
Attitudes towards the consumption of painkillers is varied, and it should be noted that 
painkiller medications, including strong and potentially addictive painkillers, are 
readily available for purchase. However, what is shown in the study aforementioned, 
is the reluctance among patients to take painkillers and the prevalence of inaccurate 
beliefs about these medications. For instance, a large percentage of patients believe 
that painkillers generally – i.e. across all classes not just opioids – are extremely 
addictive (77.5%), with a larger percentage believing that there is a possibility of 
getting addicted to painkillers (79%). Additionally, over half of those studied (59.5%) 
believe that using painkillers for minor pain means that these would not be effective 
in reducing severe pains later on. Such beliefs have an undeniable influence on the 
pain-relief behaviours of patients and can explain why patients feel impelled to take 
painkillers only in cases where the pain is unbearable.  
Beliefs regarding the influence of mental strength on the severity of pain are also 
noteworthy in this discussion, and can further make sense of the attitudes towards 
painkillers. A large portion of the patients under study in Iran, believe that thinking 
about pain increases the severity of pain (80.5%), and that the severity of pain can be 
controlled by changing one’s thoughts (72.5%). Similarly, 88% believe that depressed 
feeling and mood worsens pain, and conversely, 89% believe that tolerating pain is 
much easier in a state of calmness and equanimity.  
Lastly, there are prevalent beliefs in Iranian culture regarding the relationship between 
tolerating pain and having a strong (and sometimes righteous) character, which makes 
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one stand out from others. In line with the beliefs discussed earlier, that suffering is 
an inevitable part of life and one’s attempts to be a good person, suffering from pain 
can be understood as a means to strengthening one’s character and act as an 
atonement for one’s sins. Such beliefs can be invoked in accounting for some of the 
beliefs regarding the nature and use of painkillers as well. If one is in pain and believes 
that tolerating this pain makes her stand out from others and can be seen as having a 
strong character, not only is there incentive for her not to take painkillers, but also to 
express her being in pain more openly. Furthermore, such beliefs also have a role in 
the way an individual in pain is received by others, namely, as mentioned above, with 
more sympathy and compassion. I would argue that the fact that others have such 
views towards an individual in pain, to an extent that their previous expectations and 
attitudes towards the individual can be suspended, play a role in the emphasis placed 
on pain among depressed patients in Iran, as a means of receiving more sympathy and 
understanding from others. 
The Iranian understanding of pain and the resultant attitudes to painkillers differ from 
those found in the UK. Anecdotal accounts indicate, for instance, the tendency among 
UK parents to give small kids large amounts of paracetamol, not as a last resort but 
rather as a readily available solution to different minor discomforts (Kleeman, 2019). 
Such use of medications can signify the existence of different cultural attitudes to 
painkillers in the UK compared to Iran, one that is at least less hesitant about using 
them. In addition to different cultural beliefs about pain itself, the differences in the 
use of painkillers can be seen as an important signifier of cultural views and attitudes 
towards pain relief. What the outline of some of the prevalent beliefs and attitudes 
towards painkillers in Iran reveal, is the expressiveness of pain experience and the 
notion of agency and personal worth attached to it. Part of the significance of the 
higher emphasis on pain among Iranian depressed patients can be explained once it is 
established that, for cultural reasons people are more reluctant to taking painkillers, 
and instead more open to express and talk about their experience of being in pain – in 
order to arouse empathy or understanding in others, for instance. Prohibitive attitudes 
towards painkillers, such as their being addictive or losing effectiveness with time, can 
be thought to legitimate higher emphasis and expression of pain experience, leading 
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to one’s character and status standing out among others, and higher levels of empathy 
in others.  
Indeed, as was noted earlier, Iranians often make use of physical sensations to express 
emotional distress and the physical sensation of pain can indeed be seen as an 
example of this sort of expression. An example of this is found in a study examining 
chronic lower back pain among Iranian women. It can be seen from the first-person 
accounts presented, not only that the women attribute the cause of their pain to 
emotional distress resulting from difficulties of life and the pressure they find 
themselves under, but also that the pain itself gave voice to these difficulties and was 
expressed as an idiom of distress (Tavafian, et al., 2008, p. 343). Additionally, and more 
importantly, the participants in the study linked their back pain with their emotions: 
“back pain became a proxy indicator of emotional upset. It was akin to an ‘emotions 
barometer’” (Ibid.).  
Now it is given these observations, regarding the significance of the experience of pain 
both on an individual as well as socio-cultural levels, that the significance of the 
sensation of pain as presented in depression can be understood. As pointed out 
earlier, the stigmatisation of depression as a mental illness and the social expectations 
of such an illness play an important role in somatisation of depression in Iran. The 
stigmas are often based around the understanding of illness, as construed in 
traditional medicine, which emphasises the interdependency of physical and mental 
or emotional symptoms. As seen in chapter 5, Iranian depressed patients often 
complain of the fact that others find it difficult to accept an illness such as depression 
which does not manifest with physical, observable symptoms. Given the 
understanding of pain in Iranian culture, the presence of pain in the experience of 
depression, enables patients to escape at least some of the stigmatisation. In other 
words, not only does the sensation of pain – much in the same way as uncontrollable 
crying discussed in §5.4.1 – act as a legitimising factor for depression as a ‘real’ illness, 
but it also removes the expectations of others that the patient in depression is unable 
to meet. The presence of the sensation of pain, given its nature as taking over all 
aspects of one’s life and relation to the world, acts as an explanatory tool for why the 
patient in depression is unable to do the daily tasks or be her usual self, in a way that 
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removes the blame from the individual and acknowledges the nature of depression as 
an illness that affects all aspects of one’s being.  
It is important to note that the explanatory power of the sensation of pain, and the 
legitimising effect it has for depression as a ‘real’ illness, does not undermine the 
phenomenological significance of the sensation for the patient herself. On the 
contrary, the two aspects of the experience can be thought of as interdependent and 
complementary. It is because pain is experienced as an all-encompassing sensation, 
that disturbs one’s usual understanding of the body and its abilities, that the patient 
is able to link the sensation to her altered abilities and behaviours. On the other hand, 
the communication of the state of one in pain and the link between pain and the 
disruption it causes is made possible given the background of shared sociocultural 
understanding of pain as a debilitating experience that influences all aspects of one’s 
life.   
7.6. Conclusions 
The aim in this chapter has been to give an account of the significance of somatic 
symptoms in depression among Iranian patients. As I have argued, there are a few 
distinct but interrelated factors at play, which make the emphasis on somatic 
symptoms greater in Iran, as compared to the UK. Firstly, and most importantly, is the 
conception of health and illness rooted in traditional Iranian medicine, which views 
the psychological and physical ailments as fundamentally inseparable. Such a 
conception demands that mental illnesses such as depression be accompanied by 
physical symptoms in order to be understood as ‘real’ illnesses. This, however, should 
not be taken to mean that the somatic symptoms in themselves carry no 
phenomenological significance. On the contrary, as I have shown, there are various 
bodily symptoms that occur in depression and shape the experience of the illness as a 
whole. Although one can give an account of depression, as it is experienced 
universally, in terms of disturbances of embodiment, various somatic symptoms are 
emphasised more or less in different cultures. The experience of pain in different parts 
of the body, for example, which can be thought of as an instance of disturbance of 
embodiment, is strongly emphasised among Iranian patients. I have argued that 
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cultural ways of understanding pain and responding to it, can account for this 
difference. Seen as a mark of a strong character, and as an instance of necessary 
suffering in life, pain is used as a means of distinguishing oneself from others, as well 
as being used to legitimise one’s depression. Such cultural frames of thought and 
behaviour towards pain, account for the tendency among Iranian patients to 
emphasise their state as being in pain.  
What has been an important element throughout this analysis, is the fact that somatic 
symptoms and their significance ought to be understood within the context of cultural 
understandings and attitudes. It is the totality of these cultural factors that determine 
the significance of somatic symptoms in depression. Therefore, accounts which 
attempt to reduce the complex and interdependent nature of these elements into a 
simple difference between Western and non-Western cultures, or the ability or 
inability to express emotional and psychological distress, fail to capture the important 
place of somatic symptoms in depression in its entirety. 
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8. Culture, Experiences and Narratives, and the Problem of 
Interpretation 
8.1. Introduction  
What I have aimed to explore through the discussions presented in this work, is the 
question of whether, and how, culture and cultural variation can account for the 
variation in experiences of depression. First-person accounts of depression have been 
the starting point of this investigation, with a particular methodological approach 
employed, both in the acquisition of data, as well as in the analysis and interpretation 
of these. In this chapter, with the preceding arguments in mind, I aim to examine the 
methodology employed in the work, its strengths and weaknesses, and therefore to 
consider how successful it has been in answering the questions the thesis set out to 
answer. In this discussion, some of the theoretical implications of the thesis will be 
discussed, in particular those related to the interplay of culture and experiences, as 
well as those regarding the interpretation of data. Building on these implications, in 
the next chapter I will examine broader implications of the findings and arguments of 
the thesis for psychiatry and phenomenology.   
In the first section, following from the arguments presented throughout the thesis, 
and with the aid of theoretical considerations, I argue for an account of experiences 
as fundamentally and inherently cultural. In doing so, I aim to show some of the 
strengths of the methodology employed, as well as the possible implications such an 
understanding of experiences would have for phenomenological studies more 
generally. As I will argue, in a phenomenological study, rather than taking the 
experiences in isolation, as the subject of study, we ought generally to understand 
experiences in the context in which they occur. This is since, the way we conceptualise, 
understand, and interpret our experiences in most cases is fundamentally intertwined 
with the culture and society in which the experience is had. As such, I suggest that any 
study of experiences that does not take the multifaceted nature of experiences into 
account, remains incomplete.  
Although, as I argue, our culture and experiences are generally interconnected, there 
are plausibly certain types of experience where the influence of culture is less salient. 
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In attempting to understand and account for such experiences, the general framework 
laid out in this thesis falls short of providing satisfactory answers. Additionally, these 
cases make manifest further issues with interpretation of first-person reports and the 
methods employed in understanding and analysing them. Taking pain experience and 
pain reports as an example of a case where such issues and shortcoming are clear, in 
the second section I explore alternative methods and frameworks for the analysis of 
such experiences. I argue against the use of notions of ‘idioms of distress’ for such 
analysis, since the concept lacks the explanatory power needed for the interpretation 
of pain reports. Instead I suggest concrete methodological improvements that could 
aid the understanding and analysis of such symptom reports and experiences.  
8.2. Experience as Fundamentally Cultural 
One of the important methodological points in this work has been the presumed 
relationship between experiences and culture. As seen in the previous chapters, the 
approach employed views culture as a meaning-making system, which influences the 
way a phenomenon, such as depression, is experienced. In light of what has been 
shown with regards to the particular ways in which culture influences understandings 
and experiences of a phenomenon, here I aim to elucidate the more general and 
theoretical implications of this methodological approach. I suggest that we ought to 
understand experiences as fundamentally bound with culture, and cultural narratives. 
Such an understanding can be shown to be compatible not only with anthropological 
accounts of the link between experiences and culture, but also with the 
phenomenological views of experiences and the nature of our relation to the world.  
Discussions in the previous chapters show that cultural conceptions and ways of 
thought and interpretation have an undeniable influence on the way a phenomenon 
such as depression is experienced. It is important to note that embedded within this 
claim, and indeed within the methodological approach of the work, is the 
inseparability of narratives of experience, themselves culturally shaped, from the 
experiences themselves. This inseparability is manifested in most of the symptoms 
examined in this work, although in some cases more than others. In the analyses 
throughout this work, the starting point has been the first-person accounts, i.e. the 
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way individuals themselves talk about their experiences. From these personal 
narratives, cultural models of thought, and frameworks for interpretation are 
extracted, and it is these cultural elements that are shown to be largely underlying the 
variation in the experiences of depression. Given its centrality, it is important to have 
a theoretical account of how this interconnectivity could be understood, before 
turning to specific methodological difficulties related to the interpretation of reports.  
8.2.1. Culture, narratives, and experience 
Experiences and narratives, rather than separate and operating on different levels of 
primacy, ought to be viewed as closely and deeply intertwined. As Mattingley argues, 
“narrative imitates experience because experience already has in it the seeds of 
narrative” (Mattingly, 1998, p. 45). There is indeed an intimate link between 
experiences and narrative, “for experience structures expressions, in that we 
understand other people and their expressions on the basis of our own experience and 
self-understanding. But expressions also structure experience, in that dominant 
narratives of a historical era, important rituals and festivals, and classic works of art 
[thus the cultural context] define and illuminate inner experience” (Bruner, 1986, p. 
6). The relational link between narratives and experiences on this account, is not due 
to one being a copy of the other, but because of a ‘structural homology’ between the 
two. I would argue that the close link between narratives and experiences can be 
illustrated through understanding the role of culture as a mediator between 
experiences and narratives. The ‘structural homology’ Mattingly refers to, can be seen 
to be a result of this role of culture, as influencing both and providing a context in 
terms of which experiences are understood and narratives are created.  
This defining role of culture is accounted for most clearly in the works of Clifford 
Geertz, through the emphasis placed on cultural structures as having a meaning-
making role for experiences, as well as narratives. What is important for our 
discussion, is Geertz’s characterisation of cultural processes, not as something that 
happens ‘in the head’, but rather as structures of significance that “impose meaning 
upon experience” (Geertz, 1973, p. 45). These are not ‘in the head’ in the sense that 
they transcend the individuals’ frames of thought and rather, are constitutive of the 
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world where individuals dwell, therefore shaping the background against which they 
understand and interpret their experiences. In this sense culture is construed as an 
organising force that shapes our experiences and gives meaning and significance to 
them, such that without culture “man’s behaviour would be virtually ungovernable, a 
mere chaos of pointless acts and exploding emotions, his experience virtually 
shapeless” (ibid. p. 46). This role of culture as conditioning for experiences means that 
it is fundamentally impossible to separate experiences from the cultural settings that 
give rise to them. Similarly, by providing the context for understanding experiences, 
culture shapes the narratives of experience, as tools through which the understanding 
of an experience is made possible.  
Geertz’s account of the relationship between culture and experiences signifies a move 
away from the traditional phenomenological theories and methods, such as Husserl’s, 
where the fundamental project is to bracket out experiences in and of themselves, 
and take them as subject of study. However, this view can be reconciled with later 
phenomenologists (used in this work), who argue that individual experiences find 
meaning against the backdrop of one’s being-in-the-world, which inevitably includes 
the sociocultural settings and systems of meaning one is thrown into. The close 
proximity of Geertz’s account to these phenomenologists makes the case for the use 
of his account here. 
The inseparability of culture and experiences in this sense, and the consequence of 
this characterisation for cross-cultural studies can be further clarified using an 
example; consider cross-cultural variation in experiences of grief. It is worth noting 
that what is meant by experiences of grief, is the way in which different groups of 
people, by virtue of their culture, experience, and talk about, the same phenomenon, 
namely someone’s death, in different ways. Cultural ways of understanding and 
interpreting the phenomena of loss and death, shape not only the way people 
experience the phenomenon, but also the way they express and interpret their 
experiences, both in the moment and in later recollections.   
The conceptualisation of death in Iran, as well as the rituals following someone’s 
death, are based upon a religious framework, where death is viewed as a passing from 
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one world to the next. The funeral ceremony, therefore, is organised so as to respect 
and address the religious beliefs. Furthermore, in a collectivist society like Iran, where 
the death of someone close is a significant event, the ceremonies present a space for 
those who remain to mourn in a way that suits the norms and customs of the group. 
The rituals start with family members burying the dead, not in a coffin, but wrapped 
in a white cloth (kafan), which could become loose, revealing to the grieving crowd 
the dead person’s face or arm as they are burying them. The custom demands that the 
mourning rituals take place on an ongoing basis for a year, with those close to the lost 
one refusing to take off their black clothes for the period. The rituals, filled with 
grieving chants and songs, and with women crying and screaming, take place on the 
day of the burial, as well as on the third, seventh, and fortieth day since the burial, and 
are concluded with a gathering on the anniversary of the burial. Needless to say, the 
normal course of life is interrupted, not only because of the immense sense of sadness 
one feels after a loss, but also due to the cultural norms, which necessitate the 
planning and preparing the ceremonies and accommodating for the often large 
number of people attending.  
Now in comparing the experiences of loss by two sets of individuals, one from Iran and 
other from the UK, it has to be acknowledged that their experiences are not limited to 
an internal feeling with no influence from the outside world. Embedded within any 
personal account of experiences, are the cultural conceptions and customs which 
shape the individual experiences of loss, regardless of whether associations and links 
are made explicitly and consciously or not. It is in this sense that the way loss is 
experienced in a given culture is inherently and essentially cultural. Consequently, any 
attempt at understanding these experiences and their variation across cultures needs 
to take into account the cultural setting that shapes experiences and narratives, in 
order to get a comprehensive picture of various factors influencing the overall 
experiences. Furthermore, in the absence of phenomenological access to the different 
ways of experiencing, there is nothing else that can be known and/or studied about 
the way an individual or a collective experience a phenomenon, except for the cultural 
background of experiences which account for the understanding and interpretation of 
the phenomenon experienced.  
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There is, additionally, a temporal element to the cultural domain of experience. This 
is since the norms and practices that shape the culture, and the norms and modes of 
understanding which link the cultural context to the experiences of a phenomenon, 
come about in a historical context (e.g. Hacking, 2002). This temporal element has 
been an important point in the methodological approach of the work at hand, since in 
many instances the strong cultural elements that influence experiences of depression 
can be traced historically. Furthermore, some of the strongest cultural elements in this 
domain are those with a long history which has allowed them to shape part of the 
conceptual framework of the society in its encounter with depression. An example of 
such a historically embedded cultural framework that has been present throughout 
this work, is traditional Iranian medicine and the folk beliefs rooted in it. Given this 
importance, I think it is important to further understand the link between practices 
and cultural conceptions, in the historical context. 
8.2.2. History, cultural conceptions, and experience 
Pierre Bourdieu shows that the cultural conceptions and modes of thought which give 
rise to various customs and practices, precisely shape the way one experiences a 
phenomenon, as well as the narratives that express these experiences.22 This is seen 
in his account of the habitus. For Bourdieu, this notion provides a means for 
reconciling the social structure of the world with individual agency, and aims to 
account for the way the ‘outer’ social life and the ‘inner’ self, shape and reshape one 
another (Maton, 2008).23 In addition to placing emphasis on the role of the cultural 
and social context in the construction of individual conceptions and practices, habitus 
 
22 Ian Hacking has also suggested an account of understanding phenomena and our experience 
of them in a historical context (Hacking, 2002), and has shown how the historical 
developments change our perceptions and understanding of some mental disorders (Hacking, 
1995). I use Bourdieu’s account in detailing this link, as his account is concerned both with 
history, as well as cultural norms and customs. Thus the links between his account and the 
arguments presented in this work can be drawn more easily.   
23 The relevancy of this theory can be seen through the importance of outer and inner self in 
the Iranian culture and its influence on the conceptions and experiences of interpersonal 
relationships, as noted in §2.3.2.  
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explains the way these practices change through time and thus provides a link 
between the past, present and future practices.  
The habitus is defined primarily as a property of social agents, and in terms of the 
individual’s dispositions. It is important to note what Bourdieu means by ‘dispositions’. 
In a footnote in Outline of a Theory of Practice he gives a brief account of dispositions 
as such: 
The word disposition … expresses first the result of an organizing action, with 
a meaning close to that of words such as structure; it also designates a way 
of being, a habitual state (especially of the body) and, in particular, a 
predisposition, tendency, propensity or inclination. (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 214)  
Furthermore, as the internalisation of social structures and norms, dispositions are 
also the carriers of history into the present and future practices. It is due to this 
characteristic that Bourdieu defines the habitus as a “system of durable, transposable 
dispositions” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53), with the power of generating and maintaining 
practices. As a property of social agents, moreover, habitus comprises a “structured, 
and structuring, structure” (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 170). It is structured in the sense that 
it is comprised of one’s past and present circumstances, and structuring in the sense 
that it shapes, or at least helps in the shaping of, one’s present and future practices. 
And lastly, it is a structure itself in that it is regulated and systematically ordered, as 
opposed to being random and disorganised (Maton, 2008, p. 51). As such, the habitus 
incorporates the element of temporality in sociocultural ways of being, thinking, and 
acting. 
In addition to shaping practices, habitus further generates individuals’ perceptions, 
beliefs, and appreciation of the field, i.e. the social and cultural context that individuals 
inhabit. It is important to note here, the importance of the field in the process of 
generating practices and beliefs: it is the relational nature, and the interdependency 
of field and habitus that gives rise to these practices. The field, Bourdieu claims, 
presents itself to the individuals as a ‘space of possibles’ defined with respect to the 
individual’s position in the field. These possibilities then become operative and active 
as achievable possibilities, “in so far as they are perceived and appreciated through 
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the schemes of perception and appreciation which constitute a habitus” (Bourdieu, 
1993, p. 64). In other words, the habitus, as a cognitive system for perception, 
appreciation, and formation of practices and beliefs is constructed in accordance with 
the field one inhabits, and one’s position within it, while the space of possibilities 
embedded in the field are actualised in accordance with one’s habitus, thus indicating 
the importance of the relational nature attributed to the two. In talking about the 
variation in rituals of burial and the experience of grief in Iran, one can see that the 
centrality of religion, and the place of interpersonal relationships in the Iranian culture, 
as well as the emphasis on the public display of sadness in the society, define the space 
for the formation of the specific rituals of burial and mourning. In other words, it is 
against the backdrop of sociocultural values and belief systems that particular 
practices find meaning and significance.   
As such, the habitus explains not only the individual’s practices and beliefs, but also 
the collective, regulated practices and conceptions found in groups of people. As a 
system of “principles of the generation and structuring of practices and 
representations” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 72), the habitus gives rise to regulated practices, 
without this regulation being the result of obedience to rules that exist objectively in 
the society. Rather, these are “collectively orchestrated without being the product of 
the orchestrating action of a conductor” (Ibid.). The regulated and orchestrated nature 
of practices is due to them being the product of collective past experiences and 
conditions of being, which produce the principles underlying the present practices. 
The harmonising effect of the habitus is seen more clearly among groups of people 
that share a similar position in the field, and are therefore likely to have similar 
experiences, leading to similar beliefs and perceptions. For instance, in the context of 
the Iran-Iraq war and generational memories, it is clear how this mechanism works. 
For those growing up in the war, although elements of the experiences would be 
different (e.g. proximity to war zones), they share a largely similar position in the field. 
As such, as Behrouzan has shown, many of the conceptions, beliefs, and perceptions 
held by those with similar experiences of the war, or similar memories of these 
experiences, are comparable in form, and influential in shaping present principles and 
sense of identity. Bourdieu argues that this similarity in experiences as a result of a 
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common structure, leads to the harmony seen in the collective practices and 
conceptions, since similar experiences give rise to similar principles in the habitus that 
give rise to future practices among the collective groups of individuals. These 
similarities, furthermore, define for these members a common sense of reality and a 
common anticipated future. As such, practices produced by the habitus can be 
accounted for through the relation between these practices and social conditions, 
which gave rise to the principles producing these practices, thus relating the past to 
the present. It is in this sense that for Bourdieu, habitus is “history turned into nature” 
(Bourdieu, 1977, p. 78). 
The creation of a common-sense world is an important effect of the orchestration of 
habitus. In such a world, through consensus within the group, practices and 
conceptions are deemed sensible and reasonable. As Bourdieu argues, this consensus 
comes from “the harmonization of agents’ experiences and the continuous 
reinforcement that each of them receives from the expression, individual or collective, 
improvised or programmed, of similar or identical experiences” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 
80). Construed as such, the habitus not only incorporates the history and the past 
experiences and conceptions into the present ones, but also defines a framework 
through which commonalities in beliefs and practices among members of a society 
and culture, and their significance, can be understood and accounted for.  
To summarise, Bourdieu’s analysis starts with an account of dispositions as a way of 
being, incorporating individuals’ tendencies and inclinations, with regards to both 
perceptions and interpretations of experiences, and the resulting actions and 
practices. These dispositions, being the product of past experiences and beliefs, lay 
the foundations for the formation of principles and cognitive schemas, i.e. the habitus, 
which has the power of generating new practices, beliefs, perceptions and 
interpretations. As a consequence of being the product of dispositions, as the 
internalisations of the structures of the society and past experiences, the collective 
habitus is harmonised and orchestrated. This is such that members of the same social 
group are endowed with a system of meaning, that renders the world they inhabit and 
their practices meaningful and sensible. In this way, then, the habitus is a product of 
history. However, it also has the power of shaping the future, since, as mentioned 
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above, it is in accordance with the habitus and the practice generating principles 
within it, that certain possibilities presented to the individuals within the field are 
activated with the potential to be actualised.   
On this account, therefore, culture, as a system of practices, beliefs, and a way of being 
in and relating to the world, is seen to be intimately linked with individual and 
collective history and memories, giving the world a sense of meaning. In accounting 
for the way depression is conceptualised and encountered in a culture, it is important 
to note the various factors, not only those that in the present are seen to influence 
narratives and experiences of depression, but also those with historical significance, 
which give the present narratives and encounters their meaning. As I have shown in 
the previous chapters, the way depression is understood, experienced, and articulated 
in Iran today, is a result of cultural ways of understanding (e.g. death-consciousness), 
which are themselves shaped and influenced by shared historical events (e.g. Iran-Iraq 
war). Taking note of temporality in the discussion is also important in accounting for 
change in encounters with depression. As societies change and go through different 
shared experiences, so do the beliefs and perceptions of phenomena and events, and 
could result in major cultural shifts. The findings and analyses in the present work is 
considerably different to those conducted in Iran before the 1979 revolution, in part 
due to such cultural shifts.  
 
 
What these various theories show, is that in conducting a phenomenological study, 
although the prime focus of study is experiences, it must be acknowledged that these 
experiences are had by an individual as a being-in-the-world. When we talk about ‘the 
world in depression’ and the ‘existential change’ involved in depression, we aim to 
signify a change in the way an individual in depression understands herself and the 
world around her. Yet it is important to note that this change in perception does not 
happen in isolation, but is rather dependent on how the individual understands herself 
and her place in the world, as well as the way she understands depression itself. 
Various factors, such as culture, history, language, and politics, shape the background 
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of understanding and way of thought for individuals. As such, not only is it important 
for a phenomenological understanding to take into account these meaning-making 
factors, but also this importance is seen even more strongly in cross-cultural studies, 
which aim to understand variation in experiences.  
There are various methodological consequences of this understanding. First and 
foremost, as I have already demonstrated, it is important to recognise individuals and 
the way they understand and articulate their experiences as situated within a 
phenomenologically significant context. This context is constituted by cultural ways of 
thought and understanding, shaped by historical events and customs, and itself shapes 
the narratives of experiences. Included within this realisation, is the fact that although 
phenomenology is concerned with the structures of consciousness, and experiences 
that we, as conscious beings, have, these structures are often dependent on the 
context in which they operate. As such, although informative, the phenomenology of, 
for instance, loss and grief in isolation from their sociocultural context, remains 
abstract and incomplete. It is only when experiences are considered as situated in a 
context, shaped by the values and norms accepted by those who dwell in the context, 
that the experience and its significance can be fully apprehended and appreciated. It 
is due to the realisation of this importance that, throughout the work, I have aimed to 
emphasise the role of culture in shaping experiences, and show how variations in 
experiences of depression can be explained through cultural considerations.  
Secondly, the realisation that multiple factors have an influence on shaping the world 
of experiences, leads to certain methodological difficulties. This is since, depending on 
the lens through which the experiences are investigated and narratives interpreted, 
different pictures of the experiences emerge. In attempting to understand experiences 
of depression in Iran, there are different points of emphasis. For instance, the image 
presented in this work is based on the cultural frames of thought, as seen particularly 
in religious modes of understanding, and works of literature. In contrast, Behrouzan 
focuses on understanding depreshen in the context of generational memories of a 
certain point in time. Other works could aim to understand depression and 
experiences of it in Iran, with different points of focus and emphasis, potentially 
yielding different results. This is not to say that each of these analyses is incomplete 
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and lacking substance in some way. On the contrary, I would argue that these should 
be viewed as complementary: it is only through examining the phenomenon and 
experiences of it from different perspectives that a more complete image can start to 
emerge. In other words, due to the multidimensionality of experiences as situated 
within a complex context, the way experiences of a phenomenon such as depression 
are to be understood and interpreted can take various forms depending on the focus 
on a particular dimension of the significance of experiences.  
The theoretical accounts considered here, are invaluable in informing a suitable 
methodological approach and the kind of questions to be asked in a cross-cultural 
phenomenological study. However, they do not present an adequate framework 
through which all kinds of experiences and reports can be interpreted and understood. 
This is seen especially in experiences that seem to have important pre-linguistic 
sensory elements, such as pain. In interpreting and understanding experiences and 
reports of an experience like pain the theories considered above provide only part of 
the answer. As such, additional tools and methodological adjustments may be needed 
in order to give a satisfactory account of the significance of such experiences, as will 
be considered in the next section.  
8.3. Issues in the Interpretation of Reports  
Since first-person reports have been the starting point of this study, problems that can 
arise in the interpretation of these reports are central in the discussion of 
shortcomings of the methodology. As noted in the previous sections, the cultural 
context of utterances provide a meaning-making background to these reports, making 
it a crucial element in understanding and interpreting first-person accounts. The 
problem of interpretation is also manifest in attempting to discern the intended 
meaning of a personal report, and differentiating between literal and metaphorical 
meanings. Discerning the intended meaning of the responses to the questionnaire 
used in this study is further complicated by the nature of the responses as written, and 
the lack of face-to-face interaction with respondents. Such issues are seen in different 
responses. For instance, the following is what one respondent wrote when asked 
about the causes of their depression: 
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#13(M) – I think the inability to communicate with the opposite sex, not 
having sex, not having a job relevant to my subject and specialisation, the 
frayed clothes, so that [I] can’t leave the house too much, being mocked by 
other people, others talking behind one’s back and different [malicious] 
labels attached to one (spook, womanizer, extremist …), unresolvability of 
the socio-political problems, the falling and burning of Plasco [an iconic 
building in Tehran], not having money to do what others do, my computer 
being old and shattered, not having a smart phone and spending more time 
at a computer which always has to have a fan next to it, my father’s poverty, 
the barbarity of Hezbollah, and extreme hair loss. 
Such a report might be interpreted as expressing a general sense of dissatisfaction 
with life, which is often referred to by Iranians in talking about their conception, 
and experiences of, depression. However, in questioning whether this would be a 
correct interpretation, one that indeed captures the intended meaning, one is 
faced with questions regarding how the report itself should be viewed. The 
interpretation of the report depends on whether one takes it at face value, with 
the literal meaning taken as the intended meaning, or whether it is to be 
understood metaphorically, or sarcastically, or as a joke. Discerning which 
meaning is intended would require closer examination and investigation. The most 
obvious solution to such issues is clarification questions, but this would not be 
possible with the questionnaire format employed here. The question then arises 
as to whether the methodological tools employed in the study are sufficient for 
such an investigation.  
Among reports that make such problems with interpretation salient, pain reports 
present a revealing case, due to the multifaceted nature of pain experience. As 
mentioned in chapter 7, Iranian patients suffering from depression complain more 
frequently about having pain, as compared to those in the UK. These reports can 
be interpreted in various ways. It could be that Iranians experience more bodily 
pain in depression compared to those in the UK, or that expression of pain is used 
metaphorically by Iranians to express another feeling, such as general distress and 
bodily discomfort. Equally, it could be that individuals in Iran worry more about 
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pain and are therefore more likely to report it, or that as a familiar sensation pain 
is more easily sympathised with, prompting the use of pain reports. These are only 
a few ways reports of pain could be understood and interpreted. Yet the question 
remains, as to which of these is closer to the truth, and how the truth of such 
understandings can be known.  
#20(F) – I have pain in my arms and legs, I sleep a lot more. 
#36(F) – I feel shattered, and I often have body pain and am completely 
agitated. 
#17(F) – I sleep a lot, I have headaches, my body feels heavy. 
#14(F) – [I have] feelings of excessive exhaustion and headaches, together 
with lack of appetite and physical weakness. 
Given the influence of culturally learnt ways of expressing distress through pain 
reports, some theorists would suggest that they should be classified as ‘idioms of 
distress’. However, in the next section I will argue that the notion of ‘idioms of distress’ 
lacks explanatory power, and as such, beyond offering a way of classifying these 
reports, falls short of providing a satisfactory account of the significance of them in the 
context of experiences of depression.  
8.3.1. Symptom reports as idioms of distress 
Some authors have supposed, that in cases where a symptom report is closely tied to 
cultural expressions and modes of communications, the notion of idioms of distress 
can be used to highlight the complexities involved in interpreting the reports. The 
notion was first defined in 1981 by Mark Nichter, based on the following observation:  
In any given culture a variety of ways exist to express distress. Expressive 
modes are culturally constituted in the sense that they initiate particular 
types of interaction and are associated with culturally pervasive values, 
norms, generative themes, and health concerns. (Nichter, 1981, p. 279) 
Nichter argues that by viewing “ethnopsychiatric phenomena as idioms of distress”, 
greater perspective and better understanding can be facilitated, through the 
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recognition of the complex systems of thought and meaning in different cultures that 
underlie conceptualisations of phenomena. Thus, idioms of distress denote “socially 
and culturally resonant means of experiencing and expressing distress in local worlds” 
(Nichter, 2010, p. 405). These are varied based on the cultural traditions of 
understanding human distress, as well as culturally specific ways of conveying 
experiences (e.g. metaphors in language, and folk theories of medicine).  
The notion is closely connected with that of culture-bound syndromes, which originally 
designated the varied phenomena in different cultures as the variations of the 
universal categories of psychiatric disorders, such as schizophrenia or depression (Yap, 
1969). Nichter saw idioms of distress as a more befitting characterisation than 
syndromes per se. On his account, different sickness categories each describe “local 
reactions to particular forms of psychiatric distress that arise in the differing situations 
of disparate cultures. Some of these ways of expressing distress become formalized 
with names in local languages, but do not necessarily become as rigidly defined as are 
psychiatric diagnoses” (Rebhun, 2004).  
Different authors employ the concept of ‘idioms of distress’ in different ways. 
Sometimes ‘idioms of distress’ are taken to be cultural illness syndromes (e.g. Brain 
Fag Syndrome affecting West African students (Ebigbo, et al., 2015)), and 
psychological and/or somatic complaints (e.g. reports of pain (Keyes & Ryff, 2003)), 
which signify variations in the manifestations and articulations of distress and 
suffering. This is while for other authors ‘idioms of distress’ are the systems of beliefs, 
values, and cultural norms, which underlie the cultural ways of encountering and 
interpreting distress, as well as the way these experiences are framed and manifested 
in behaviour. Such idioms include religious involvement, attribution of one’s state to 
witchcraft assault, and acting-out behaviours (Hinton & Lewis-Fernández, 2010). In 
order to have a better understanding of the notion and the way it has been used, I will 
present two cases which indicate some of the different aims and points of interest as 
related to the notion of idioms of distress. I will thus suggest that the notion is too 
vague and lacks explanatory power.  
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As noted above, idioms of distress are closely connected with the notion of culture-
bound syndromes. An example of this case is Khyâl attacks as recorded in parts of Asia, 
particularly the South East. Khyâl is conceptualised in as “a pathological windlike 
substance, a substance often described by the same local word for external winds … 
[and] is thought to cause havoc in the body and to potentially cause death” (Hinton, 
et al., 2010, p. 245). Khyâl attacks sometimes resemble symptoms seen in malaria. In 
the study by Hinton and others on Cambodian refugee populations, Khyâl attacks are 
seen as closely linked with panic attack and PTSD symptoms, and are often generated 
by trauma, and are thought to represent a case of “how trauma results in certain 
somatic symptoms in a particular cultural context” (ibid., p.273).  The association 
between trauma and symptoms characteristic of Khyâl attacks is such that, the authors 
argue, “enacting the malarial episode has become an idiom of distress and a key 
shaper of the anxiety experience, a key anxiety-related cultural syndrome” (ibid. 
p.267). But it is not just the malarial symptoms characteristic of Khyâl attacks that 
represent an idiom of distress (or a cultural syndrome) in this case, as the authors 
argue that the attacks themselves should be understood as such an idiom. They argue 
that Khyâl attacks, as presented in their study, represents an instance of an idiom of 
distress “that has great overlap with panic attacks, panic disorders, and PTSD” (ibid. p. 
273). Idioms of distress can be an embodied affect form in cases of dysphoria or 
anxiety, or can represent fear of an event, such as death or harm. Khyâl attacks, it is 
argued, often take both of these forms:  
[Khyâl attacks can simultaneously be] a feared event and an affect form that 
is embodied to convey distress and to obtain succor through its treatments 
and through conveying to others that one is in a state of distress – and that 
event is ‘read’ by others as indicating that the person is in distress (e.g. that 
the person has had a ‘worry’ episode that caused the Khyâl attacks, that the 
person is weak), so that though the syndrome may not be embodied to 
convey distress, it still serves as an idiom of distress, a distress indicator. 
(Hinton, et al., 2010, p. 274)  
Khyâl attacks present a case where idioms of distress are construed as closely 
connected with (if not equivalent to) cultural syndromes, and representing a culturally 
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specific manifestation of PTSD, a DSM-defined disorder. The authors argue that Khyâl 
attack as explored in their study, “is one of several ethnobehavioral pathways that are 
available when feeling distressed, is one culturally determined dysphoria form among 
many others” (Hinton, et al., 2010, p. 275). Khyâl attacks, therefore, are understood 
as a cultural embodiment of negative affects, including dysphoria and anxiety, and a 
cultural way of both indicating distress, and responding to it. The close resemblance 
and association between Khyâl attacks and PTSD is further seen as evidence that Khyâl 
attacks are the cultural manifestation of PTSD itself; “in societies in which ‘PTSD’ is a 
known entity in the general population (it is not in the Cambodian case), the 
layperson’s understanding of ‘PTSD’ may play the role of an ‘idiom of distress’, of 
cultural syndrome” (ibid., p. 276). It should be noted that Khyâl attacks are also 
included in the DSM-5 list of cultural concepts of distress.  
The second example of the use of the notion of idioms of distress, is the case of 
‘thinking too much’ idioms. These idioms, rather than being unique to one culture, are 
seen across different cultural groups and appear in different ethnographic studies of 
mental distress and disorders. DSM-5 has recognised idioms of ‘thinking too much’ 
(under the equivalent term in Shona, Kufungisisa) as cultural explanations seen among 
the Shona of Zimbawe, although the description acknowledges that such expressions 
are used in many different cultures (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 834). A 
systematic overview of the literature on these idioms, shows that they are prevalent, 
to different degrees, all around the world. Although the frequency of studies done on 
the subject is considerably higher in Africa (43.5%) and South East Asia (29.7%), than 
it is in the US/Europe and Australia (2.9% each) (Kaiser, et al., 2015, p. 172).  
‘Thinking too much’ idioms, have been the subject of studies, both in their own right, 
and as accompanying psychiatric disorders, most often general distress and 
depression. Perhaps mirroring the use of this idiom by individuals and cultural groups, 
different studies have examined the idiom as a symptom, a syndrome, or explanation 
or cause of an illness, physical and psychiatric alike. These different descriptions of the 
idiom have not been viewed as mutually exclusive, and as Kaiser and others show, 
various studies consider ‘thinking too much’ as belonging to two or all of the above 
categories. Here, then, we have a case of an idiom of distress, that 1) cannot be 
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considered as culturally specific, as it is seen in various different cultures and 
geographical locations around the world, and 2) is not clearly significative of any 
particular element of an illness or disorder. It seems, instead, that the use of the notion 
of idiom of distress in this case, merely signals the fact that an expression is used 
widely in different cultures to convey an array of different meanings, but that is often 
associated with distress.  
These two examples are sufficient to show the diversity in uses of the notion of idioms 
of distress. In the first case, the notion, equated with cultural syndromes, signifies a 
cluster of symptoms documented among a particular group of people, with 
considerable overlap with commonly known symptoms of panic attacks and PTSD. In 
the second case, the category of ‘idioms of distress’ is applied to an expression of 
rumination, seen in most cultures and parts of the world, thus in effect removing the 
cultural specificity of the notion. The notion is also more ambiguous in the second 
case, as it is not clear what it signifies and to which conditions it applies.  
The variation in the use and application of the notion of idioms of distress, can in part 
be attributed to the different aims and points of interest related to the notion in the 
literature. For instance, some scholars argue for the use of the notion with the aim of 
improving clinical care and to emphasise the importance of understanding patients’ 
cultural background that play a role in their symptomatology (e.g. Hinton & Lewis-
Fernández, 2010). The notion has indeed been useful and informative in these areas, 
as well as in reducing stigmas (e.g. Kohrt & Hruschka, 2010), and developing and 
adapting local assessment tools for care and research (e.g. Weaver & Kaiser, 2015). 
Despite its clinical implications, it remains unclear whether the notion signifies ‘real’ 
psychiatric categories. As Hacking has noted in his discussion of fugue, certain 
categories of mental illnesses are unique to a certain context and disappear once the 
conditions of the context changes (Hacking, 1998). Hacking uses the notion of 
‘ecological niches’ to argue that a certain cultural context (including norms and 
customs as well as historical and/or folk conceptualisations) at a certain point in time 
can give rise to and accommodate a category of mental illness, especially those that 
fit in an already existing medical taxonomy (note the similarities drawn between Khyâl 
attacks and PTSD). Yet with changing circumstances, including the changes in what the 
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psychiatric consensus of the day consider as constituitive of a disorder, the previously 
identified categories of mental illness may disappear, as did hysterical fugue. Thus one 
problem with the notion of idioms of distress, in its clinical interest and application, is 
the fact that they could be signifying such ‘transient mental illnesses’: “an illness that 
appears at a time, in a place, and later fades away” (Hacking, 1998, p. 1). 
Other scholars are interested in other elements revealed through the notion of idioms 
of distress. In particular, as Kaiser and others point out, various anthropologists have 
noted that “idioms of distress can communicate suffering that does not reference 
psychopathological states, instead expressing collective and social anxiety, engaging 
in symbolic protest, or providing ‘metacommentary on social injustice’” (Kaiser, et al., 
2015, p. 171). Understanding the notion in these terms, would in turn shift the focus 
to questions regarding power (who defines distress?), and away from cultural 
understandings of health and illness, which were the focus of the original definition 
given by Nichter.    
Now it could be suggested that pain reports among the Iranian depressed patients 
should be classified as an instance of idioms of distress. This is especially the case since, 
as mentioned earlier (§7.5.2), one way of understanding pain reports in Iran is as a 
proxy for the expression of being in distress, as a result of too much work and 
responsibility, or general stress. Such an understanding is in line with accounts arguing 
that reports of physical distress can be thought of as idioms of distress, especially in 
cultures where “somatizing indirectly expresses, and is understood by others as, 
emotional distress” (Keyes & Ryff, 2003, p. 1833). However, this is not the only 
symptom among Iranian patients that can be characterised as an idiom of distress. 
Rather, given the way the notion has been defined and used in the literature, many of 
the symptoms discussed in this work, such as aggressive behaviours and hostility 
towards others, might be considered ‘idioms of distress’. Potentially, given the link 
between various symptom reports and the general dissatisfaction with the conditions 
under which the society is organised and operates, and given the role of cultural 
understanding and conceptions in experiences and narratives of depression, 
depression itself might be construed as an idiom of distress. In this sense, depression 
would be used as an umbrella term and a framework, within which individuals express 
  193 
and understand their experiences. More precisely, depression could be considered a 
way for individuals to express their state of distress. As noted earlier, Behrouzan’s 
account of depreshen is an example in this regard, with a group of individuals 
“choosing a clinical language to express [their] emotional state. The psychiatric 
vernacular has helped [them] situate [their] present-day emotional distress within 
historical and social contexts” (Behrouzan, 2016, p. 93). This would be especially the 
case for those who, rather than having received a formal diagnosis of depression, self-
identify as such.  
These examples show that the notion of idioms of distress is useful only insofar as it 
signifies the interconnectivity of cultural conceptions with narratives and experiences 
of phenomena, as laid out in section §8.2. In other words, since cultural modes of 
thought and understanding are pervasive in everyday conceptualisations and 
narratives of experiences, any form of cultural variation in experiences and 
articulations of psychiatric disorders can be classified as an idiom of distress. Such a 
classification, however, does not, and cannot explain the significance of this 
interconnectivity and its influence on experiences. In other words, talk of idioms of 
distress indicates that culture influences narratives and experiences of illness, without 
showing how this is done.  
8.3.2. The complex nature of pain experience 
The problem of how to interpret pain reports, arises due to the multifaceted nature of 
pain experience, part of which is shaped by cultural conceptions of pain and culturally 
shaped modes of communicating pain experience. The multifaceted nature of pain is 
laid out by Craig in his proposed ‘social communication model’ of pain. In this model, 
not only is the nature of pain experience as a biological and/or psychological 
phenomenon acknowledged, but the overall pain experience is shown to be facilitated 
together with the inter- and intrapersonal factors. In this model, the complexities of 
the phenomenon of pain, as included in the various stages of experience and 
expression of, and encounter with pain are acknowledged. Some of these complex 
processes include:   
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the very complex biology of tissue injury and repair; the complexities of the 
experience of pain; the varyingly public verbal, nonverbal, and physiological 
manifestations of pain; the complex reactions of observers as they 
endeavour to appraise and understand the person’s pain; and the complex 
judgements associated with decisions to deliver or withhold care, amongst 
other possibilities. (Craig, 2009, p. 23) 
What this model shows, is the different factors that shape the experience of pain, 
regardless of whether or not this experience involves a sensory element. The social 
element in the experience of pain, is undoubtedly shaped by culture. For instance, how 
pain is conceptualised in the culture, and what its significance is, as well as the 
culturally accepted ways of encountering and treating pain. The difficulty in 
interpreting pain reports arises from the multifaceted nature of pain, which renders a 
framework for analysis, that views experiences as essentially cultural, inadequate. 
Although such a framework is valuable in discerning the cultural significance of pain 
behaviour, it cannot provide a satisfactorily comprehensive account of understanding 
and interpreting pain reports. This is due to the nature of pain as a pre-linguistic 
experience; it is primarily sensed and felt before being articulated, and thus put in the 
cultural domains of thought and interpretations. Although it should be noted that the 
cultural ways of understanding pain would also have an influence on the kind and 
intensity of the sensory experience of pain. Thus, what is involved in pain experience 
is a relational link between culture, and sensory experience. It is this nature of pain 
experience that sets it apart from some of the other experiences considered in this 
work, and demands extra work for providing a satisfactory interpretation of pain 
reports. As such, the approach and framework set out in the work, that indicates the 
connections between cultural frames of thought and modes of interpretation, and 
experiences and conceptions, fall short of providing a context against which these 
reports are to be interpreted and accounted for.  
Therefore, although the considerations of cultural modes of understanding and 
encountering pain give a picture of the overall pain experience, as part of the culturally 
shaped experience of depression in Iran, they fall short of providing an accurate 
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interpretation of pain reports themselves. Such an interpretation could instead be 
facilitated through concrete methodological changes.  
8.3.3. Methodological improvements 
The problem with the interpretation of pain reports, highlights certain methodological 
shortcomings, and ways these could be improved in future research. In this section I 
will make concrete suggestions of how the methodology employed in the work could 
be improved to provide a framework for interpreting and understanding difficult first-
person reports, such as reports of pain. It should be noted that besides the 
methodological shortcomings, one of the barriers to providing satisfactory and 
accurate interpretations of reports, has been the scarcity of research on different 
sociocultural elements that shape the individual experiences. In the case of pain 
reports, for instance, the lack of research on the sociocultural significance of pain and 
pain behaviour in Iran, has been a significant problem preventing the understanding 
of different elements that shape Iranians’ pain experience. In the absence of a 
comprehensive body of research on such important and varying elements, there is a 
danger that interpretations of reports become speculative and detail a way of 
understanding of reports that is far from the intended meaning and significance 
detailed in the personal reports. As such, as well as giving concrete suggestions for 
methodological improvement, I would emphasise the importance of further research 
in obtaining better results, interpretations, and understanding of the cultural 
significance of variation in experiences of depression.  
The first issue highlighted by the problem of interpreting pain reports, is one regarding 
narrative construction. The method used to obtain data – a questionnaire with rigid 
questions and limited space for responses – prevented the construction of more 
comprehensive personal narratives. A methodology that allows individuals to situate 
their experiences of depression (emotional, physical, cognitive, etc.) within the 
context of how they perceive themselves in the world, therefore giving space for 
construction of personal narratives, could aid the construction of a bigger cultural 
narrative. In such a case, the significance of each element of experience would be 
articulated given the individuals’ frame of thought and interpretation, and against the 
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backdrop of the totality of the experience of depression. For instance, the presence of 
pain in the narrative where physical weakness and inability to carry out tasks play a 
key role, would carry a different significance compared to one where pain is construed 
as a way of communicating distress to others.  
This limitation on the construction of personal narratives, as a shortcoming of the 
methodology, can be seen in various lights. The rigidity of questions, which are 
predesigned and independent of the respondents’ answers, calls attention to the 
absence of follow up questions, as a means of aiding narrative construction, as well as 
clarifying the responses. For instance, in cases of pain reports, follow up questions 
about the individuals’ responses to the pain, or their descriptions of the pain felt, 
would help paint a more accurate picture of their pain experience. As seen in the Social 
Communication Model of pain, there are various factors influencing the experience 
and expression of pain, the understanding of some of which could be facilitated by 
follow up questions.  
A cultural point must be acknowledged in accounting for the shortcomings of the 
methodology, specifically that of narrative construction. The responses to the 
questionnaire conducted in Iran were considerably shorter and less detailed compared 
to the ones in the Durham sample. This difference can be due to the fact that, 
compared to the UK, there are far fewer qualitative studies using written 
questionnaires conducted in Iran, arguably resulting in Iranians being less adept to 
such research methods. Moreover, given the importance of social relationships in Iran, 
especially the role these play at establishing trust, one would expect an important 
shortfall of the present methodology to be the inability to establish a relationship 
between researcher and respondents. The absence of the researcher, and the 
construction of the questionnaire as a written one, rather than one that could be 
completed through a face-to-face conversation with the researcher, are important 
factors contributing to this shortfall. Such a shortcoming, I would argue, will have had 
a considerable influence on the construction of narratives, as well as the level of detail 
respondents felt comfortable sharing, in written form, to the researcher. This, indeed, 
is in addition to the fact that, in a methodology with both researcher and respondent 
present, much could be inferred from the body language and facial expressions of 
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respondents. In describing their pain experience, for example, gestures and bodily 
expressions could convey the kind and intensity of the experiences, in a way that 
perhaps words and reports could not (Craig, et al., 2011).  
It should be noted that although important, the suggested methodological 
improvements above do not provide a method for discerning whether pain reports 
refer to a sensory experience of pain. Given the analysis offered in §8.2, the cultural 
ways of understanding and expressing pain are often inseparable from how the 
sensory element of pain is experienced. As such, the methodology for deducing the 
reference of pain reports (sensory experience vs general distress), should not be 
reliant on self-reports. This is especially the case in the absence of research that would 
allow the separation of cultural scripts for expressing distress using pain, from pain 
reports indicating a sensory experience. Although most of the pain assessment 
methods rely on verbal personal reports, there are some nonverbal, observational 
assessment methods that could be used. Such observational methods, include, as 
hinted above, the patients’ facial expressions which could signal the presence of 
sensory pain experience; wincing and flinching when moving body parts, for example, 
provide some indication of the presence of pain. Other methods in this category 
include long periods of observation to discern the patients’ pain behaviour on a daily 
basis; the kind of limitations pain experience brings them and the ways patients 
attempt to alleviate the pain, such as taking pain medication (Turk & Melzack, 1992). 
Such nonverbal methods of pain assessment could give a better picture of the somatic 
complaints patients with depression have.  
As has been noted, a cultural understanding of the meaning and significance of pain 
cannot be attained without a body of interdisciplinary research on the matter. 
Research on pain in Iran has been largely limited to the study of the phenomenon as 
a medical symptom, with biological roots and medical treatment. As such there is little 
research done on the relations between culture and pain, such as cultural significance 
of pain, sociocultural elements that shape the expression of pain, attitudes towards 
pain, and the common ways of encountering and relieving pain. In the absence of such 
studies, which elucidate the context around narratives of pain, the significance of pain 
reports in depression cannot be fully accounted for, and remains incomplete. It is, 
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therefore, the totality of these elements, methodological improvements, specific 
methods of assessing the sensory element of pain experiences, and a pre-existing body 
of literature on pain culture, which together can help to construct an accurate 
interpretation of pain reports among Iranian patients, thus discerning the significance 
of these reports in the context of Iranian culture.  
8.4. Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter has been to discuss some of the theoretical implications of the 
thesis, as well as exploring some of the shortcomings of the methodology employed. 
In the first section I offered a theoretical argument for the understanding of 
experiences as inherently bound with cultural dispositions. Whilst emphasising the 
interconnectivity of culture, narratives, and experiences, the arguments offered show 
how elements of history and formation of concepts based on shared experiences, play 
a role in the way a phenomenon such as depression is understood, talked about, and 
experienced in a given culture. I also showed how such an understanding is in line with 
phenomenological approaches that view experiences as always necessarily situated 
within a sociocultural context.   
Recognising the different kinds of experiences that are involved in depression, in the 
second part of the chapter I argued that despite its strengths, such a framework for 
understanding experiences, should be accompanied by methodological adjustment in 
order to offer a satisfactory interpretation of various symptom reports. I examined 
pain reports as an instance of a case where the problems with interpretation and the 
shortcomings of this framework are manifested. Arguing against the use of the notion 
of idioms of distress for such problematic cases, I argued that concrete methodological 
improvements would be needed to discern the meaning and significance of these 
reports. I emphasised in particular, the importance of a methodological approach that 
allows the construction of personal narratives of experiences, which detail the 
different significance individuals give to elements of their experience, and which aid a 
better understanding of the links between culture, narratives, and experiences.  
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9. Concluding Remarks: Implications for Psychiatry and 
Phenomenology 
In this concluding chapter, reviewing the central claims and conclusions of the thesis, 
I will aim to show the consequences and implications of this thesis for psychiatry and 
phenomenology more generally. This project set out to answer particular questions 
regarding cross-cultural variations in experiences of depression, as seen in Iran and 
the UK. As the empirical data suggests, such variations can be seen in the presence of 
particular symptoms and absence of others, as well as in the variations in the emphasis 
placed on different symptoms. Iranians, unlike patients in the UK, rarely complain of 
having feelings of guilt in depression, and instead present with aggression and 
aggressive behaviour. Patients in the UK complain of feeling lonely and isolated in 
depression, whereas those in Iran talk about a tendency and desire towards isolation. 
Whilst hopelessness is present in both samples, the emphasis placed on this feeling 
among the Iranian population is much stronger. Hopelessness among Iranian patients 
is accompanied by feelings of absurdity, which highlight the loss of meaning, rather 
than sadness, as a central complaint among Iranian patients with depression.  There 
have, of course, also been similarities between the complaints and symptom reports, 
such as the embodied experience of depression manifested in the perception of one’s 
body as heavy and leaden, and the perception of time as slowing down in depression.  
Using the empirical data and the first-person accounts as the starting point of the 
investigation, I have offered a phenomenological account of the significance and role 
of culture in shaping these variations. Throughout the analysis, the individuals and 
their experiences are viewed as situated within a phenomenologically significant 
world, thus enabling an analysis that takes culture as a central influencing factor. This 
phenomenological outlook, a close examination of some of the important pillars of 
Iranian culture today, and observation of forces that shape the dominant discourse in 
the country today, have informed the analyses offered in the work. As such, the 
discussions and argument here trace the different manifestations and articulations of 
depression to pre-existing cultural frames of thought and interpretation, which 
underlie the variations seen in experiences of depression. In this context, cultural 
conceptualisations of life, health and illness, cultural ways of relating to the world and 
  200 
other people, and cultural ways of thinking about life and death, have been shown to 
play an important role.  As I have argued, many of these cultural frameworks for 
thought, understanding and interpretation, although pervasive in all aspects of life, 
remain largely unconscious. This is indeed not surprising, given the fact that they are 
internalised through years and centuries of practice, and their influence on the way a 
phenomenon is experienced and articulated is only revealed through a close 
examination of the network of cultural meaning-making mechanisms.  
The contribution of this work to the body of literature on cross-cultural variations in 
mental disorders lies in its outlook; not only does it aim at recording the variations as 
they are seen between different sociocultural contexts, but it also attempts to give an 
account of the roots of such variations, tracing them in their cultural and historical 
trajectory. In this sense, the arguments presented here lay out not only the fact of the 
matter that there are such variations across cultures, but also the ways through which 
these variations can be made sense of and understood. Importantly, the analyses 
given here aim to recognise the different historical, political and ideological, linguistic, 
as well as cultural elements that together shape the background of experiences, and 
form the mechanisms through which cultural variations in experiences arise.  
In the previous chapter, I offered some theoretical implications of the thesis for the 
way we understand experiences, and how these are inseparable from the cultural 
context in which they are had, as well as from the narratives that express them. But 
the arguments presented throughout this work have broader implications, particularly 
for psychiatry, as a science as well as a practice, and for phenomenology, as a discipline 
and method. In what follows I will detail some of these implications. 
9.1. Implications for the Science and Practice of Psychiatry 
One of the central claims of this work has been that culture, as a system of values and 
customs, but also of thoughts and interpretation, has a considerable role in shaping 
manifestations and experiences of a mental illness such as depression. As I have 
discussed, the way in which this role is played is through the influence of cultural 
modes of thought on the conceptualisations of phenomena, which in turn shape the 
way a phenomenon is experienced. Accepting this mechanism raises questions about 
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the way we commonly think about psychiatry and our expectations of its practice. If it 
can be established, as I have argued, that various external factors including culture 
and society can, in large part, shape psychiatric illnesses, then the status of psychiatry 
as a science that sets out to investigate mental disorders that are assumed to take 
much the same form across cultures is undermined. Similarly, the practice of 
psychiatry, including the diagnostic criteria and treatment methods, which following 
the status of psychiatry as a science are presumed to be universal and independent of 
cultural variations, is brought under question.  
The main question that arises here is one regarding the suitability and appropriateness 
of universal diagnostic criteria for mental disorders such as depression. The criteria for 
defining and diagnosing mental disorders, as set out by the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), is assumed to be applicable universally, and is in 
wide use around the globe – including both in Iran and the UK. This criteria assumes 
that the manifestation and articulation of depression, bar some negligible differences, 
remain largely similar and identifiable regardless of the cultural context in which they 
are experienced and observed. As the data and arguments presented throughout the 
thesis show, however, common symptoms of depression can differ across cultures, in 
ways that do not necessarily represent the criteria set out in the DSM. As I will show, 
despite certain changes in light of research on cross-cultural variations in mental 
disorders including depression, the DSM criteria remain too rigid and specific to 
account for such variations in symptoms. Related to the concern regarding diagnostic 
criteria is the question of what should be considered a symptom at all. As the 
discussions on idioms of distress in §8.3.1 show, there are blurred lines between what 
is considered pathological, and what is merely an accepted way of talking about 
distress and dissatisfaction in a given culture and society. Such blurred lines have 
implications for what can plausibly be considered a symptom of a pathological state in 
a given sociocultural context. Furthermore, in considering these blurred lines we are 
ultimately confronted with the question of where a disorder resides; in few individuals 
in a society, as is often presumed, or could there be a point where a society as a whole 
can be thought to be ‘disordered’? I will not attempt to answer here whether or not a 
‘disordered society’ can be made sense of, but in the following sections, using 
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examples from earlier discussions, I will illustrate the circumstances under which this 
question arises. An exposition of these conceptual and practical difficulties further 
illuminates the problems with the rigidity of the diagnostic criteria laid out in the DSM, 
which I will explore in §9.1.2.  
9.1.1. What constitutes a pathological symptom 
I have shown in the earlier discussions that the cultural conceptualisations of a 
phenomenon such as depression influence not only the way that phenomenon is 
experienced, but also how it is manifested and articulated. It is equally important to 
note the sociocultural context at a given point in time, which could blur the boundary 
between what is considered to be a symptom of a pathological state, and what is to 
be seen as a normal reaction to the certain stressors present in an individual’s 
environment. For instance, hopelessness is one of the important elements in the 
identification and diagnosis of depression, and as has been seen, represents one of 
the most important elements of experience of depression in Iran. The problem of 
hopelessness in Iran, however, is not limited to depression, and rather, has been 
viewed as one of the most pressing sociological crises facing the country (Center for 
Strategic Studies, 2018). In the last decade, due to political and economic issues in 
Iran, and notably due to lack of change, hopelessness has increased among Iranians 
regardless of their situation in the society.  
The high prevalence of hopelessness in Iranian society has initiated various debates, 
some of which conflate socio-political hopelessness, as seen on a social level, with 
psychological hopelessness seen on an individual level. Such viewings in turn have led 
to debates which resort to explain the socio-political situation with the help of 
medical, in particular psychiatric, nomenclature.  These debates are often centred 
around the question of whether Iran, as a society as a whole, can be considered to 
suffer from depression (e.g. Pargar, 2017), thus arguably portraying depression as an 
inevitable state, not of any single individual, but of the society that encompasses the 
world of many individuals. This inevitability of depression is seen repeatedly in the 
respondents’ view of what depression is, and what they view to be the causes of their 
own depression. An example of this is the quote seen in §8.3 from a respondent 
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articulating various forms of dissatisfaction with the socio-political system as causing 
their depression. Noteworthy in such cases, is the fact that the conflation of various 
forms of hopelessness, and especially the explanation of socio-political hopelessness 
in terms of depression, further blurs the line between what is considered to be 
pathological and what is a normal, albeit unpleasant and problematic, state of the 
world and one’s position within it.  
Similarly, complaints of feelings of absurdity and aggressiveness towards other people, 
can be shown to be, in part, a normalised presence in Iranian society, and rooted in 
the socio-political shortcomings which exacerbate a sense of helplessness and 
frustration among people. Given the prevalence of hopelessness, which is in large part 
due to people’s inability to bring about change, and which prevents individuals from 
being able to imagine a good future for themselves, one can expect to see a sense of 
despair among the population. In this sense, given the impossibility of change, the 
continuation of life can strike one as absurd and frustrating. Such feelings, in their 
external expression, could easily be manifested in the form of aggressive behaviour. 
As Kashi has noted, there are fundamental differences between the different forms of 
complaints, those made on a daily basis encompassing the everyday life of Iranians, 
and those which designate a pathological issue, as they arise due to different and often 
distinct circumstances. “In the circumstances of the [Iranian] society today, if we view 
the [socio-political] projects promised after the revolution as failed, it would mean, 
either that we encounter a society suffering from lack of meaning, in itself a political 
matter, or that we encounter a fatigued and angry society, which is again a political 
matter” (Kashi, 2018 – my translation). Viewed in this way, it can be seen that these 
symptoms rather than signifying psychological problems that could be construed as 
pathological, and treatable through medication, can be thought to be a normal 
reaction to the socio-political difficulties.  
The problem here is that often there are no obvious ways of separating these various 
complaints. Such a difficulty can lead to complications for psychiatrists and mental 
health professionals, since it is the totality of individuals’ experiences, political, 
cultural, and pathological alike, which together shape narratives of depression among 
Iranians. This difficulty is due to structuring, i.e. “the ways sociocultural factors shape 
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generalized distress into particular outcomes” (Horwitz, 2002, p. 114), which may or 
may not be in line with psychiatric diagnostic criteria. Structuring brings under 
question the assumption of diagnostic psychiatry – that particular symptom clusters 
denote a specific underlying disease entity (Ibid.) – since as has been shown 
throughout this work, symptom reports are inseparable from the context in which 
they are expressed. One could expect, for instance, that the complaints rooted in 
socio-political difficulties could ‘spill over’ to complaints considered pathological by a 
specialist. This expectation is further strengthened given the often fuzzy line between 
what is considered pathological and what has become a normal, routine way of 
expressing dissatisfaction and distress in the broader sociocultural domain. 
Furthermore, the dominant discourse present in the society, rather than aiming to 
explain and separate these elements, either dismisses, or frames the socio-political 
complaints in medical terms – as is seen in the increasing number of discussions on 
depression, not as a psychiatric illness, but as a sociological state of the nation.  
Such descriptions of the society and its ailments, which conflate the individual and 
pathological, with the social and everyday normal reactions, are problematic. This is 
because, as the dominant discourse, they can figure in individuals’ descriptions and 
understanding of themselves, as suffering from psychiatric disorders by virtue of being 
part of a society that has long manifested and experienced feelings and behaviours on 
the borderline of normality and pathology. As Hacking has extensively argued, 
descriptions of the self or of different phenomena, have a determining influence on 
behaviours and experiences, and on possibilities of action (Hacking, 2002). Such 
medicalised self-descriptions and narratives could in turn pose problems when it 
comes to diagnosis of depression, as they are always already constructed in medical 
terms, determining individuals’ expectations and help-seeking behaviour with regards 
to psychiatric professionals.  
Although it is undeniable that the socio-political status of a country and the dominant 
discourse influence articulations and conceptualisations of depression, it is important 
to distinguish these influences from the cultural ones. The symptoms and behaviours 
that can be seen as results of a certain socio-political state, can be thought of as 
reactions to such difficulties, and thus dependent on the context of one’s experience 
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in the here and now. In contrast, the behaviours and modes of thought brought about 
through culture are seen as longer lasting, ones that are not readily removed with a 
change in the state of the one’s environment and socio-political status. Descriptions 
that arise in a certain socio-political environment, seem more prone to change, “some 
dropping in, some dropping out” of the collective understanding, thus changing some 
of the behaviours and articulations relating to them (Hacking, 2002, p. 48). For 
instance, although the high emphasis on feelings of hopelessness could be lessened 
following an improvement in the socio-political state of Iran, the importance of loss of 
meaning as rooted in cultural conceptualisation of life, may not be altered with such a 
change. Of course, it should be acknowledged that cultural modes of thought are 
remade in light of social and political change, but an exposition of the relationship 
between the two would be beyond the scope of this work. It should be noted, 
however, that although the focus of this work has been on the influence of culture, 
one that has defined the modes of understanding spanning hundreds of years, 
conducting the present research has coincided with unprecedented socio-political 
turmoil in Iran, which inevitably has influenced at least part of the narratives and 
understandings of depression.   
The particular question regarding difficulties in diagnosis is, if individuals articulate 
their experiences and complaints in accordance with the way depressive symptoms 
and depression in general are portrayed in the dominant discourse, then how ought 
psychiatrists to view and regard the complaints presented by individuals. For example, 
would the sense of hopelessness and despair be considered a symptom of depression, 
or merely another expression of dissatisfaction with the world one inhabits? One way 
of answering this problem in practical terms, may be to have culturally specific cost-
benefit analysis which could guide the diagnostic and treatment processes. For 
instance, practitioners may judge antidepressants to be suitable only for those 
individuals that score a certain point on a hopelessness scale, and not for those who 
score a lower point. In such a scenario, the pragmatic considerations of the 
effectiveness and value of treatment attempts would be judged based on the severity 
of the symptoms, while bypassing the conceptual difficulty of determining what is to 
be considered pathological. Such pragmatic solutions could help minimise mistakes 
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and over-diagnosis and overmedication, especially in cases where there are no 
straightforward ways of separating common ways of reporting distress and 
dissatisfaction from those reports that more closely resemble symptoms of 
depression. Although such solutions could offer practical help in such problematic 
cases, the need for the development of such tools also signals the shortcomings of the 
current available diagnostic criteria, due to their rigidity and the resulting inability to 
account for cultural factors that influence the manifestations of mental disorders.  
9.1.2. Universal diagnostic criteria 
The body of literature on cross-cultural variations in different mental disorders, have 
in instances resulted in revisions and additions to the DSM criteria. It is acknowledged 
in the DSM-5 that cultural context plays a fundamental role in shaping individuals’ 
illness experience, where by culture it is meant “systems of knowledge, concepts, 
rules, and practices that are learned and transmitted across generations” (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 749). The provision of Cultural Formulation, 
introduced in DSM-IV, and expanded on in DSM-5, aims to highlight the importance of 
culture, by aiming to discern, among other factors, the individuals’ cultural identity, 
cultural conceptions of distress and illness, and common sociocultural stressors (Ibid., 
pp. 749-760). However, these additions do not affect the diagnostic criteria, which is 
thought to be universal and remains the core part of the DSM.  
Additionally, there are cultural provisions and complications that are acknowledged in 
the context of particular disorders. For instance, within the criteria for Major 
Depressive Disorder (MDD) in the DSM-5, culture-related issues are acknowledged, 
albeit briefly. It is noted that cross-cultural studies of depression point to some 
variations, yet these do not yield culturally specific symptoms for depression, but 
rather indicate different emphases on particular symptoms:  
While these findings suggest substantial cultural differences in the 
expression of major depressive disorder, they do not permit simple linkages 
between particular cultures and the likelihood of specific symptoms. Rather, 
clinicians should be aware that in most countries the majority of cases of 
depression go unrecognized in primary care settings and that in many 
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cultures, somatic symptoms are very likely to constitute the presenting 
complaint. (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 166)  
One of the important aims of the present study has been to discern particularly the 
cultural workings and frameworks which can be shown to influence manifestations 
and articulations of different aspects of the experience of depression. As I have 
argued, however, these mechanisms most often operate below the surface of any 
individuals’ consciousness. As such, attempts to discern such cultural workings from 
the individual patients themselves would be ineffective. For instance, DSM-5 attempts 
to account for such workings, through the proposed Cultural Formulation Interview 
(CFI). An individual concerned with having depression may be asked whether certain 
elements from their cultural “background or identity” could make a difference to their 
depression, or cause difficulties and concerns in dealing with their depression 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 753). It would be implausible to think that 
individuals may be able to answer such questions in a way that elucidates the different 
cultural mechanisms and dynamics that shape experiences of depression in their 
cultural context.  
As can be seen, therefore, despite various revisions and push from researchers, the 
DSM has remained largely oblivious to cultural variation. This obliviousness is shared, 
to an extent, by some researchers within Iran, who are intent upon proving that, at 
least in the case of Iran, the DSM criteria for depression matches nearly perfectly with 
the individuals’ symptoms. For instance, one group of researchers in Iran conclude that 
“despite criticisms of the DSM-IV-TR, we found its criteria for MDD nearly enough for 
the studied population” (Amini, et al., 2013, p. 690), barring somatic symptoms such 
as pain, which they observed among their sample but are not emphasised enough in 
the criteria. It could be argued that the use of alternative diagnostic criteria, such as 
the ICD, which allow different countries to adapt their diagnostic criteria to their 
particular cultural context, would resolve some of the worries presented here. There 
are, however, concerns that the role of culture in diagnosis, as laid out by the ICD, 
remains nebulous and ambiguous, and therefore falls short of offering a 
comprehensive diagnostic criteria mindful of cultural influences (Alarcón, 2009). In the 
absence of culturally nuanced diagnostic criteria, the burden remains on practitioners 
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to separate pathological complaints from other, socially and culturally formed 
complaints of distress and dissatisfaction.  
Similar to the case of reports of pain, a body of research that explains the differences 
between such reports and complaints could ensure better understanding of patients’ 
complaints, leading to more reliable diagnoses. The need for such an approach to 
diagnosis, implies that the diagnostic criteria currently in use fall short of providing a 
comprehensive basis for the identification of depression, in light of cultural variation. 
In other words, it is only in conjunction with awareness of the nuances of culture and 
society, and the way these play a role in the narratives and experiences of mental 
illness, that the diagnostic criteria can be used effectively. In the absence of such 
knowledge and sensitivity, there could be a large disparity between the individuals’ 
understanding of mental illness, and consequently their expectations from 
practitioners, and the views of mental health professionals and the help they can 
provide. What this entails, more broadly, is the fact that the practice of psychiatry, 
despite being construed as universally applicable, remains (or ought to remain) 
dependent on, and responsive to various elements that shape the narratives, 
manifestations, and experiences of mental illnesses. These include sociocultural 
elements which vary not only across cultures, but also across time in any given culture, 
due to shifts in values, concerns, and modes of thought that, as noted earlier, play a 
role in conceptualisations and therefore experiences of mental illnesses.  As such, it 
could be suggested that sensitivity to sociocultural norms, of discourse and practice 
alike, ought to be part of the process of psychiatric diagnosis and treatment, not only 
in Iran, but more broadly in the practice of psychiatry in any cultural context.  
This latter point has further implications and consequences for psychiatry as a science, 
with a claim to universality. For if it is accepted that the manifestations of mental 
illnesses are influenced by sociocultural elements, and therefore knowledge of and 
sensitivity to these influences should complement the diagnostic criteria, then the 
claim to universality of science of psychiatry is undermined. Since in effect the claim is 
made that, contrary to the claims made by the science of psychiatry, mental illnesses 
are not manifested, articulated, nor experienced in the same way across cultures. As 
mentioned in chapter 2, this consequence can be made sense of using the distinction 
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between disease and illnesses: mental disorders are conceptualised as disease entities 
which, like biological disorders, are thought to be universal across cultures. As the 
analysis in this work has shown, however, the manifestations and experiences of 
depression is largely shaped by culture. And the identification of mental disorders is 
often done through personal reports and/or changes in behaviour, both of which are, 
to a considerable extent, shaped by culture and environment. This, of course, does not 
imply that the project of psychiatry as a whole fails to yield satisfactory results, but 
rather, in light of the findings presented in this study, the science and practice of 
psychiatry should be more accommodating of cultural variation. Additionally, the way 
mental illnesses (as a type of illness, with different tokens as specific disorders) are 
conceptualised ought to allow for cultural variation.   
There are indeed similarities seen in experiences of depression in Iran and the UK, 
which imply that there could be a universal categorisation of depression, despite 
variations in other elements of experiences. Such similarities include the perception 
of time as slowing down, fatigue and lack of energy, disturbances to embodiment in 
the form of the perception of the body as heavy and leaden. An important part of 
experience of depression, that also seems to be universal, is the disturbance in 
personal relationships. As has been discussed in chapters 5 and 6, there are 
considerable differences in how such a disturbance is manifested in Iran and the UK. 
Yet it can be argued that the fact of existence of such disturbances is seen in the same 
way in both cultures, and in instances, elements such as perceived lack of empathy 
and even a sense of hostility towards others remain largely similar across the two 
cultures. What such similarities show, I would argue, is not that depression, as a 
category of illness is itself culture-bound, but rather, that the way depression is 
classified (in particular in the DSM) is too narrow to allow for cultural variation. The 
DSM classifications rest upon symptom clusters and are therefore based upon how a 
particular disorder manifests itself. Such method of classification, as noted by Hacking, 
ultimately defines kinds of people and mental disorders based on a set of pre-defined 
conditions (Hacking, 1995, p. 22). Such rigidity and specificity in identifying disorders, 
and describing those suffering from them (Hacking, 2002, p. 109), leaves little room 
for accommodating cultural variation.  
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In distressful conditions such as depression, where cultural structuring, but also socio-
political pressures play a considerable role, it is important to have an understanding 
that acknowledges these various influences. In these cases, “classifications that view 
distress as broad, as continuous, and as manifest in multiple ways are more useful than 
the specific, discrete, and singular categories of diagnostic psychiatry” (Horwitz, 2002, 
p. 220). An account of depression which, rather than resting on specific manifestations 
(e.g. sense of guilt and worthlessness), is based on what could be thought of as core 
elements of depression (e.g. disturbances in interpersonal relationships) which can be 
manifested in different ways (sense of guilt, or aggression) would present a more 
reliable account of what depression is. Such an account would accommodate cultural 
variations without undermining the validity of the category of depression itself. Such 
an account could further signal the need for cultural elements to be taken into account 
in the diagnosis, as well as the treatment of depression. 
9.2. Implications for Phenomenological Studies 
The second domain where the implications of the present study can be seen, is in the 
field of phenomenology, as a discipline and method. Phenomenology is concerned 
with structures of human consciousness, as revealed through the first-person 
perspective. These structures are revealed through the examination of various kinds 
of experiences, such as perception, thought, memory, emotion, and bodily awareness 
among others. These different domains of experience involve what Husserl called 
‘intentionality’, the property of directedness of our consciousness. The fact that our 
consciousness is always and necessarily directed towards something out there in the 
world, determines the basic form of our different experiences, and relation to the 
world we inhabit. Despite certain differences in methods of different 
phenomenologists, the subject of study and the assumption behind it has remained 
the same; the structures of our consciousness which make our conscious experiences 
intelligible, are universal and unique to our mode of being as conscious humans. What 
the argumentation presented in this work has shown is the fact that culture –  given 
its influence in shaping our consciousness and conscious interpretations of the world 
– has a role to play in phenomenological investigation of experiences. I would argue 
that a greater recognition of the place of culture in our conscious understanding and 
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experience of the world, would enable a better phenomenological understanding of 
such experiences. Such a recognition is in line with the history and development of 
phenomenology and phenomenological investigations, with the likes of Heidegger and 
Sartre attempting to enumerate the particular ways in which social norms and cultural 
backgrounds influence the phenomenological significance of our experiences.  
The founder of phenomenology, Husserl, at least in his earlier writings, viewed 
phenomenological projects as relying on abstraction of experiences and examination 
of experiences in isolation. The ‘phenomenological reduction’ that makes possible the 
study of a certain experience, for Husserl, means returning to the primordial mode of 
experiencing, which involves bracketing out the experience, and reducing the cultural 
world to the world of immediate experiences. This reduction, therefore, “leads us back 
to the source of the meaning and existence of the experienced world, in so far as it is 
experienced, by uncovering intentionality” (Schmitt, 1959, p. 240). As such, for Husserl 
in his early writings, the subject of phenomenological investigation is experiences in 
isolation, with meanings associated with the experience only by virtue of it being the 
experience of a conscious being. Despite such beginnings, in his later writings Husserl 
gave a larger importance and significance to culture as an important constituent of the 
life-world, i.e. the context within which experiences find meaning and significance.  In 
his later writings, through giving a central importance to the notion of life-world, 
Husserl emphasised the embedded and situated nature of experiences. This 
irreducibly situated nature of experiences, for Husserl, is seen in the unique ways 
experiences are shaped in different life-worlds.   
Diverging from early Husserlian reduction and more in line with his later writings, 
Heidegger defines a more inclusive framework in which to understand and examine 
intentionality as a key characteristic of human consciousness; one where the context 
of experiences is inseparable from the understanding and significance of the 
experience itself. As has been shown in the thesis, for Heidegger, our mode of being 
and our everyday experiences always find meaning within the context of the world we 
inhabit and where we dwell. For him, “the intentional structure is present not only in 
the realm of consciousness, understood in terms of man’s cognitive and theoretical 
relation to his world, but already in the whole of man’s pre-cognitive awareness … 
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Prior to any cognitive reflection there is a primordial pre-conceptual awareness 
through which man already understands himself as fundamentally related to his 
world” (Schrag, 1958, p. 121). Phenomenological investigation in this way, is mindful 
of the world of the individual, bound with her use of tools in the workplace, and with 
relations she has with other people in the world. In this sense, Heidegger’s notion of 
Dasein being ‘thrown’ into the world it inhabits is made sense of, since the world is 
always already there, shaping our different experiences and understandings of it. As 
such, there is a context in which experiences are had, which cannot be separated from 
the experiences themselves as the subject of phenomenological study.  
The brief exposition of the two understandings of what the subject of a 
phenomenological investigation is, and what it entails, show a move towards the 
better recognition of the context in which we experience different phenomena. In 
Heidegger’s understanding, the world is always pre-reflectively disclosed to us, 
through moods and attunements, thus determining and shaping our experiences of 
and within the world, as well as the significance and interpretation we attach to these 
experiences.  
As shown in §8.2.1, the arguments presented in this work imply, not only that the 
context of experiences ought to be acknowledged and examined in a 
phenomenological investigation, but also that the crucial role of culture in shaping this 
context should not be overlooked. If it is accepted, as I have argued in chapter 8, that 
experiences are fundamentally inseparable from the cultural context which gives them 
meaning and significance, then phenomenology as the study of experiences ought to 
be able to account for the influence of culture. This would mean that within 
phenomenological methods, unlike Husserl’s conviction, experiences cannot be 
isolated from the context in which they occur (recall the example of experience of loss 
and grief noted in §8.2.1). It also means, that the context recognised in 
phenomenological investigations ought to go further than that suggested by 
Heidegger, and rather than detailing the universal context of our experience of the 
world, such as use of tools and relations with other people, it should examine the 
cultural background that shape our experiences, and reveal the world to our 
consciousness in a particular way.  
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As the arguments presented throughout this work indicate, culture as a system of 
beliefs and understanding of the world and our place within it, is pervasive in different 
elements of our experiences of the world we inhabit. The universal structures of our 
consciousness, as the central concern of phenomenology, are revealed through the 
investigation of different kinds of experiences, which are shaped, to a large extent, by 
culture. Studying culture as that which gives a context to our experiences, as well as 
defining a framework through which our experiences are made intelligible and 
meaningful, would allow a better understanding of the experiences under 
examination. Furthermore, recognising the importance of culture could give a better 
understanding of the structures of our consciousness, through the recognition that the 
first-person perspective through which we are conscious of the world and our lived 
experiences, is always already embedded within a cultural world. Thus, our 
consciousness of the world, and the conscious interpretation we put on the world, 
carry within them not only the world we are thrown into with things and people 
already within it, but also the cultural framework within which our consciousness is 
embedded, and which allows us to assign meaning and significance to the world we 
are pre-reflectively aware of.  
This interest in culture does not mean that phenomenological investigations into types 
of experience that we – by virtue of the kind of being that we are – live through are 
futile or incomplete. It rather signals the need to acknowledge the role played by 
culture in shaping these experiences. In order to be informative of the nuances of our 
conscious awareness of the world and our place within it, phenomenological theories 
need to be examined against different sociocultural contexts, which through 
enculturation shape our different experiences.  If, as I have shown, our way of being-
in, and relating to the world, as well as our perceptions of ourselves and our body, is 
shaped by the culture, and if the world in which we are thrown is itself shaped and 
determined by culture, then this important element ought to be considered in 
phenomenological investigations. It is only through the recognition of experiences and 
individuals, not as abstract entities, but as situated within a phenomenologically 
significant cultural context, that a more comprehensive account of the workings of our 
consciousness can be given. In this understanding, there is no single phenomenology 
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of depression, but different phenomenologies depending on the cultural context in 
which experiences of depression are examined.  
This suggested approach, and indeed the one defended throughout the thesis sits 
nicely with the increasingly influential enactive approaches to psychopathology, which 
emphasise as key features of the mind its dynamical, embodied, and situated 
character (Colombetti, 2013). Such an approach, through recognising the situatedness 
of the individual experiencing mental disorders, aims at painting a more 
comprehensive picture of the meaning and significance attached to these experiences. 
Furthermore, it can discern the ways in which this significance is shaped by and 
dependent on the individual’s relation with its world – through its embodied and 
situated nature, and the dynamic sense-making involved in its relation to its 
environment (e.g. Fuchs & Schlimme, 2009; Fuchs, 2014; Maiese, 2016). Such 
approaches have also included discussions on the relation between culture and 
experiences of mental disorder (e.g. Durt, et al., 2017; Kirmayer & Ramstead, 2017). 
As Kirmayer and Ryder have noted, psychopathology involves psychological, social and 
cultural processes in addition to neurological ones, and the effects of culture on 
psychopathology are seen “not only at the level of the nervous system but also 
through social structure, instituitions and practices” (Kirmayer & Ryder, 2016, p. 146). 
The present study, its conclusions and suggested future approaches therefore, aim at 
furthering such a multidimensional approach to the study of mental disorders and 
their experiences. It should, however, be noted that the methodological approach 
employed in this project has not lent itself well to looking at the embedded nature of 
depression. While such features are an important part of experience of depression, 
other methods would be needed for investigating them.  
 
Psychiatry and phenomenology are both, to different extents, concerned with people, 
as the beings that live through conscious experiences, and as those who can be 
diseased and distressed. What the implications laid out for both fields reveal, is the 
inadequacy of a universal understanding of people and the phenomena they 
encounter and experience. This universal understanding views people as largely 
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similar in how they understand, encounter and experience different phenomena, and 
in how different phenomena are manifested in them. The arguments presented in this 
work reveal the shortcomings of such an understanding, and reveal various important 
nuances that, although crucial, remain overlooked in this way of framing and 
understanding people. I would argue that in order to understand human experiences 
and the different phenomena they encounter in their different ways, the role of 
culture, as an organising force for thought, interpretation, and action ought to be 
recognised and examined alongside other important elements. Once it is 
acknowledged that we, as human beings, are fundamentally cultural beings, with our 
experiences and interpretations of the world as always already embedded and 
situated within a cultural world, the importance of including culture in examinations 
of our behaviour in different fields of interest is made clear. It is only through this 
recognition of the centrality of culture that the study of people, with their normal and 
pathological behaviours and experiences can be made complete.  
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Appendix – Depression Questionnaire Conducted in Iran 
The files in this appendix have been approved by members of Lancaster University’s 
Ethics Committee. An exact copy of these was translated into Farsi and distributed 
among Iranians with an experience of depression.  
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 Experiences of Depression in Iran 
 
My name is Moujan Mirdamadi and I am conducting this research as a PhD student 
at Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom. 
 
What is the study about? 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the experiences of depression among 
Iranians living in Iran. These findings will then be compared to those related to the 
experiences of depression among those in the UK.  
 
Why have I been approached? 
You have been approached because the study requires information from people who 
have experienced depressive episodes whether diagnosed by medical professional or 
not.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
No.  It’s completely up to you to decide whether or not you take part.  
 
What will I be asked to do if I take part? 
If you decide you would like to take part, you would be asked to fill in a 
questionnaire relating to your experiences of depression. You will be asked to 
include as much detail as possible for as many questions as possible.  
 
Will my data be Identifiable? 
The information you provide will be kept anonymous. The data collected for this 
study will be stored securely and only the researcher conducting this study will have 
access to this data: 
o Hard copies of questionnaires will be kept in a locked cabinet in the 
researcher’s office at the University.   
o The files on the computer and/or laptop will be encrypted (that is no-one 
other than the researcher will be able to access them) and the 
computer/laptop itself password protected.   
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o At the end of the study, all data from the questionnaire will be kept securely 
for ten years. At the end of this period, they will be destroyed.  
o The typed version of your responses will be made anonymous by removing 
any identifying information including your name. Anonymised direct 
quotations from your interview may be pooled with other participants’ 
responses, used in the reports or publications from the study. 
o Once anonymised and incorporated into themes, it might not be possible to 
withdraw your responses. However, every attempt will be made to extract 
your data if requested.  
o All your personal data will be treated as confidential and will be kept 
electronically on an encrypted laptop, separately from your responses. Your 
personal data will be kept until the end of the research and will be destroyed 
afterwards.  
 
What will happen to the results? 
The results will be summarised and reported in a thesis and may be submitted for 
publication in an academic or professional journal. The findings may also be 
presented at academic and professional conferences and workshops. 
 
Are there any risks? 
There are no risks anticipated with participating in this study.  However, if you 
experience any distress following your participation you are encouraged to contact 
the resources provided at the end of this sheet. Please note that answering these 
questions might trigger negative thoughts. You can opt out of participating at any 
time if this happens and are encouraged to contact the helplines listed at the end of 
this paper.  
 
Are there any benefits to taking part? 
Although you may find participating interesting, there are no direct benefits in taking 
part. 
 
Who has reviewed the project? 
This study has been reviewed and approved by members of Lancaster University 
Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Where can I obtain further information about the study if I need it? 
If you have any questions about the study, please contact the main researcher: 
 
Student: 
 Moujan Mirdamadi 
 m.mirdamadi@lancaster.ac.uk 
 Tel: +44(0)1524 594702 
Office B05 
Politics, Philosophy and Religion 
County South, Lancaster University 
Lancaster, United Kingdom 
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Supervisors: 
 Dr. Rachel Cooper 
 r.v.cooper@lancaster.ac.uk 
 Tel: +44 (0)1524594702 
Politics, Philosophy and Religion 
County South, Lancaster University 
Lancaster, United Kingdom 
LA1 4YL 
 
 Dr. Cain Todd 
 c.todd@lancaster.ac.uk 
 Tel: +44 (0)1524 594267 
Politics, Philosophy and Religion 
County South, Lancaster University 
Lancaster, United Kingdom 
LA1 4YL 
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Complaints  
If you wish to make a complaint or raise any issues relating to the study, please contact Dr 
Rachel Cooper: 
r.v.cooper@lancaster.ac.uk 
Tel: +44 (0)1524 594702 
 
Resources in the event of distress 
Should you feel distressed either as a result of taking part, or in the future, the following 
resources may be of assistance. 
 Social Emergency Centre: 123 
 Consultation services: 142  
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. If you would like to be 
contacted about the results, please include your contact details.  
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Consent Form 
 
Study Title: Experiences of Depression in Iran 
 
We are asking if you would like to take part in a research project aimed at investigating 
different aspects of experiences of depression among Iranians.  
Before you consent to participating in the study we ask that you read the participant 
information sheet and mark each box below with your initials if you agree.  If you have any 
questions or queries before signing the consent form please contact to the principal 




1. I confirm that I am aged 18 or older.  
2. I confirm that I have read the information sheet and fully 
understand what is expected of me within this study  
3. I confirm that I have had the opportunity to ask any 
questions and to have them answered to my satisfaction.  
4. I understand that my responses will remain anonymous 
throughout this research.  
5. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am 
free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason.  
6. I understand that once my data have been anonymised and 
incorporated into themes it might not be possible for it to 
be withdrawn, though every attempt will be made to extract 
my data, up to the point of publication. 
7. I understand that my responses will be pooled with other 
participants’ responses, anonymised and may be published 
8. I consent to information and quotations from my interview 
being used in reports, conferences and training events.  
9. I consent to the researcher keeping my responses for 10 
years after the study has finished.  
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Personal details 
Age: ………….     Sex: …………………..     Place of residence: …………………….. 
Have you ever been diagnosed with depression? If so, please give details of 
your diagnosis and the type of treatment you have received.  
Have you ever been diagnosed with any other mental illnesses? If so, please 
give details. 
Questions 
1. Describe your emotions and moods during those periods when you are 
depressed. In what ways are they different from when you are not 
depressed? 
2. Does the world look different when you’re depressed? If so, how? 
3. Do other people, including family and friends, seem different when 
you’re depressed? If so, how? 
4. How does your body feel when you’re depressed? 
5. How does depression affect your ability to perform routine tasks and 
other everyday activities? 
6. When you are depressed, does time seem different to you? If so, how? 
7. How, if at all, does depression affect your ability to think? 
8. In what ways, if any, does depression make you think differently about 
life compared to when you are not depressed? 
9. If you have taken medication for depression, what effect did it have? 
10. Are there aspects of depression that you find particularly difficult to 
convey to others? If so, could you try as best you can to indicate what 
they are and why they are so hard to express. 
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11. What do you think depression is and what, in your view, caused your 
depression? 
12. Who and/or what have you consulted in order to try to understand 
your depression? (E.g., medical practitioners, friends, books, internet 
sources, etc.). 
13. How would you describe your relationships with others when you are 
depressed?  
14. Has the reaction of others influenced your experience of depression? If 
so, how? 
15. What distinguishes what you’re feeling as depression, from other, more 
general forms of sadness?  
16. Are there any positive aspects associated with your depression? 
17. If there are important aspects of your experience of depression not 





* Questions 1-12 and 17 were used by the research team at Durham University, for 
the Experiences of Depression study. The questions are available online and 
reproduced in publications following the study. 
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